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Glossary
My arguments in the following pages are for the most part accessible, and will not lean
on unexplained jargon to get any points across. This glossary shows that my most
recurring terms are ones you’ve probably already used or can easily infer their meanings.
But I have used them with particular subtleties that the arguments themselves will flesh
out, but I have included here in glossary form for succinct “pre-capitulation.”

Automobility – “the configuration of people, machines, landscape, urban geography, and
culture that attends the increasing dependence upon the gas engine for transport in
industrial and post industrial societies.”1 It is the expansive social, spatial, and
institutional tapestry which both undergirds and flows out of a widely democratized mode
of petroleum-fueled individual mobility. Automobility includes car culture (cars, oil
supplies, onramps, etc), the culture of cars (NASCAR, Sunday driving, The Fast and the
Furious), the geography of easy-motoring (parking lots, java shacks, exurbs). This
combines in a society-wide positive feedback loop where increased mobility rewards new
building and commerce modes, which in turn makes automobility a requisite for
functional cultural membership. It is the interplay of affordable driving with an
individualistic culture and underregulated urban design which produce a car-scaled
1 Sidonie Smith, Moving Lives: Twentieth-Century Womenʼs Travel Writing (Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press, 2001): 185.
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landscape that in turn rewards and reinforces affordable driving and individualism. And
on the vicious cycle of automobility continues. For example: malls are created as the
automobilized bastard children of town centers, which steadily replace actual town
centers and public spaces, which in turn produces a culture dependent on cars to get to its
public (albeit civic-turned-commercial) spaces, Q.E.D..

Consumerism – an industry-choreographed cultural matrix designed to sell products by
crafting personal and group identity through an engineered narrative rooted in individual
choice.2 “Consumption,” said Jean Baudrillard, “is a system of meaning.”3 Consumerism
rewards consistent, dependable, predictable expectations based on a name. This
predictability in turn empowers the consumer’s choice laying at the heart of the matter.
Consumers are, according to the narrative of the ads, keen discerners of product who are
always on the lookout for the best deal. To buy is, like voting, the ultimate expression of
our public self; “I shop; therefore I am.” One’s power to choose in a consumerismsaturated culture becomes a mythologized potency unto itself.

Local/Locality – appropriately human-scaled relationship. Local food, for example, may
come from a hundred-mile-wide foodshed, while a local business is likely to be within
walking distance. Locality thus refers to the appropriately intimate scale of the
relationship between two or more things.
2 Skye Jethani, The Divine Commodity: Discovering a Faith Beyond Consumer Christianity
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2010): 50-53. On page 50, Jethani writes “We define our identity and
construct meaning for our lives through the brands we consume.”
3

2001): 49.

Jean Baudrillard, Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press,
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Neighborhood – Neighborhood is something between place and locality. Though the
term may connote a primarily residential area, I intend it as more than a housing
subdivision. A neighborhood should include civic, residential, and commercial functions.
In American suburbs zoned for single uses in massive swaths, this may not always be a
possible. Indeed it shows that a neighborhood may not necessarily be much of a place.
Still, its rhetorical utility is to catalyze the imperative: it may invoke the reader’s own
context into their imagination as they reflect on a text.

Place – the encompassing phenomenological ecology of a particular location at the
human scale, including and transcending: social and economic relations, the built
environment, natural features, and its storied history. Much more than mere “location.” A
sense of place most lucidly emerges when encountering the intersubjective coherence of
these and other aspects of an area. 4

Suburban Christianity – the forms of Christian faith specially adapted to suburbia by
scaling to an automobilized geography and culture, and by catering to consumerism’s
identity-forming narratives and techniques.

Suburbia – any urban geography which is patterned to the scale of the automobile.
While other forms of urban geography (new urbanism, city center, etc.) incorporate and

4 Eric O. Jacobsen, The Space Between: A Christian Engagement with the Built Environment
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2012): 29-78.
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accommodate the automobile, it is suburbia which is built wholesale around the car as a
primary form of personal locomotion, accommodating non-motorized mobility modes
only where is minimally necessary. Suburbia, suburban, and suburbanized will also be
used in a slightly looser manner throughout this dissertation to conjure their wider
colloquial cloud of cultural values, artifacts, rhythms, and architecture associated with a
car-scaled urban geography.
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Abstract
The world and Christianity were radically reshaped when humanity harnessed
petroleum, particularly as it catalyzed the rise of automobility. The wider anthropological
components of this revolution are widely documented, but its ecclesial components are
rarely considered. This lack of reflection has prevented more effective responses to
diverse ministry problems that find their roots in automobility. Examining the future of
oil and automobility converts this lack of ecclesial reflection into a staggering crisis of
narrative and preparation by churches. Our problem, then, is that we have hardly
discussed any of this as the church. This dissertation argues for the necessity and
suggested contours of such a discussion.
I review how oil allowed automobility’s rise as society-steering hegemon, reveal
its interrelationship with suburbia and consumerism, and propose that web as the locus of
automobilized Christianity. I then review the historical development of automobility and
suburbia to understand its effects on churches.
Looking forward, I summarize what energy experts are saying about the future of
global oil production and supplies, and outline the variously proposed trajectories of the
future of the world and the church with an eye toward their incomplete consideration of
oil’s future. I then review possible ecclesial mitigations of an energy-constricted future
with an eye toward pragmatic and ethical integrity.

xi

The urgency of American Christianity’s need to begin a conversation about oil
and automobility’s past and pending role thus established, the argument is capstoned with
outlines of what that future may include and what wise contours should shape that
conversation. Accessibility, actionability, and an affirming tone will be the hallmarks of
such a conversation, with a particular bent toward adaptive muddling, transition,
resilience, and distributed creativity. The dissertation concludes with summaries of the
nature, scope, and other details of my Artifact, a book proposal that could launch the
conversation about past, present, and future of the petrol-driven church.

xii

SECTION 1: THE PROBLEM
1.1 Focusing the Inquiry
1.1.1. Beginning a conversation, not ending one
Humanity’s harnessing of cheap and abundant fossil fuel energy lies beneath most
of the major social transformations in the past 200 years, and especially the decades since
World War II. Modernity, consumerism, telecommunications, progress, automobility,
industrialism, individualism, and more have been enabled and directed by all this cheap
energy. Fossil fuels created a new way to be human, a new kind of society.1
Fossil fuels also created a new kind of Christianity, a non-local and placeless faith
driven by marketplace dynamics and frazzled by the ensuing identity crises. Hydrocarbon
energy changed the faith at least as much as Gutenberg’s printing press.
Fossil fuels, though, are not renewable: their production rates level off and wither,
and eventually we as a planet will run out of recoverable fossil fuels. Earth was gifted
two trillion barrels of oil, and we’ve already burned through about half of it. 2 That’s
writing on the wall for automobility and placelessness: they will not last long. Nor will
the petrol-powered society it helped craft. We are living in an historic blip, the brief 150
year burst of abundant fossil fuels and their attendant cultural changes.
1 Richard Heinberg, Peak Everything : Waking Up to the Century of Declines (Gabriola Island,
BC: New Society Publishers, 2010): 37-39.
2 Sonia Shah, Crude: The Story of Oil (New York, NY: Seven Stories Press, 2004): xix. Michael C.
Ruppert, Confronting Collapse: The Crisis of Energy and Money in a Post Peak Oil World (White River
Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishers, 2010): 28.

1

2

That means today’s placeless Christianity is also a historical blip. It too shall pass.
As fossil fuel supplies constrict, a different form of Christianity will emerge. We will
return from our botched effort to be church in the space of flows and inhabit again the
space of places. Our suburban diaspora will end; placeless Christianity will birth
something inevitably local. Churches will, amid much social upheaval, be re-placed.
The problem is we haven’t remotely begun to reflect on any of this for the church.
Almost nobody is talking about the church’s past, present, or future through the lens of
automobility or energy supplies.3 If the scope of automobility’s effects on our enacted
ecclesiologies is half as vast as I suspect, then this is an immensely important study to
broadcast.
Avoiding this challenge is a problem insofar as speeding in the dark is a problem:
it’s simply much better to have a sense of what’s down the road from us. In this regard,
this dissertation is not meant to solve the problem of energy decline for churches. Many
responses and mitigations will be examined and celebrated. But the core problem here is
a wholesale ignorance of what is ahead, along with a baffling lack of meditation on how
automobility has affected the church up to this point. Apropos, this dissertation will not
“end” the conversation on a particular ministry problem: it aspires to simply begin one.

1.1.2 The road ahead
The crux of my argument drills down several layers deeper than fossil fuels as a
whole. Petroleum is the particular fossil fuel through which I will consider the problem.
To be sure: coal, natural gas, and tar sands will be examined in this project. It is
3 Andy Mellen and Neil Hollow, No Oil in the Lamp: Fuel, Faith, and the Energy Crisis (London,
UK: DLT Books, 2012).

3

petroleum, though, which provides the bulwark of our total energy consumption in
America, and is the source of 94% of all transportation energy.4 Petroleum, harnessed by
the internal combustion engine, is what made, enables, and expands virtually every facet
of American life. It’s how we get almost everything to where it needs to be: food, water,
ambulances, commuting, shopping, military, recreation, construction, and religious
practices in America overwhelmingly depend on petroleum vis-a-vis the automobile.
This dissertation will therefore focus on the effects of the rise and decline of
automobility on the American churches. Special consideration will be given to its effects
on the church in other countries, and to other fossil fuels’ impact on American churches.5
But the dominant inquiry revolves around the placeless, delocalized nature of Christianity
in petroleum’s historical blip, and on how a Christianity so formed might transition into a
low-automobility, low-petroleum world.
To do this, Section 1 will review how oil allowed automobility, which allowed
suburbia. Combined these forces have remade society. First I will outline the
interrelationship between suburbia, consumerism, and automobility as described by

4 US Department of Energy, “Annual Energy Report” (2010), http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/
annual/pdf/sec1_3.pdf (accessed November 5, 2012).
5 This point should not be breezed over: God is up to much more than what I’m talking about here.
And the world has many, many more challenges and opportunities than I can address here. Global climate
change, resource wars, water depletion, the decline of the American Empire, the rise of the church in the
Global South and China, and the deep integration of connective technologies across humanity are all
crucial dogears on the pages of the human story yet to be written. I will introduce them when appropriate,
but will focus my inquiry on the de-localizing and re-localizing effects of automobility and peak oil within
the American context.

4

secular studies on those topics,6 and from there propose where suburban Christianity fits
into that mix (1.2). I will then review the history and development of automobility and
suburbia in America (1.3) in order to understand its effects on the American churches
(1.4). I will test out the ambitious claims of those subsections by detecting an impulse to
relocalize in the leading trends of American Christianity (1.5). The problem in our past is
that we don’t consider the role of technology on our ecclesiality (1.6). Looking forward, I
will review what energy experts are saying about the future of global oil production and
supplies (1.7) and recap the ministry problems before us (1.8).
Section 2 will summarize the variously proposed trajectories of the future of the
world and the church (2.2 and 2.3) with an eye toward their incomplete consideration of
oil’s future. I will then review possible ecclesial mitigations of an energy-constricted
future with an eye toward pragmatic and ethical integrity.
The urgency of American Christianity’s need to begin a conversation about oil
and automobility’s past and pending role will capstone in Section 3, where I will outline
what that future may include and draft contours that I hope will be included in such a
conversation.

1.2 Suburbia, Consumerism, & Automobility Go Together
Before the automobile, there was no such thing as suburbia. Sure, as many
historians of suburbia will note, the 19th century bore its architectural germ in the form of
6 Andres Duany, Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, and Jeff Speck, Suburban Nation (New York, NY: North
Point Press, 2010); Robert Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia (New York, NY:
Basic Books, 1987); Dolores Hayden, Building Suburbia: Green Fields and Urban Growth, 1820-2000
(New York, NY: Vintage, 2004); James Howard Kunstler, The Geography of Nowhere: The Rise and
Decline of America's Man-Made Landscape (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994); Cotten Seiler,
Republic of Drivers: A Cultural History of Automobility in America (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, 1994).
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borderland estates, picturesque enclaves, and streetcar developments.7 But suburbia as we
know it today – unremarkable square miles of single-family houses on winding sidewalkbereft roads giving way to indistinct square miles of big-box retail stores and shopping
malls awash in a sea of parking lots, overlooked by dreary square miles of office parks,
and stitched together with interstates, cloverleaf onramps, and left-turn lanes – is the
landscape of the automobile. Automobility didn’t just make it easier to get to work and
play; it created a geography, an architecture, an economy, and a culture around itself.
Cars, rather than incidental instruments in how we get from A to B, are what enabled (and
indeed permitted in the first place) this way of living in the land. No cars: no suburbia.
This in turn has reshaped every facet of American life. Leisure and labor, family
and farm, entertainment and exercise, work and worship all have newly suburbanized
modes of being. The scope of this overhaul of American life is monolithic, and
constitutes nothing less than a new culture. Cars as culture-makers, then, have occasioned
a new way of being human. Americans do everything different because of the car and the
car’s culture: suburbia.
For all their expansive nature, suburbia and automobility’s affect on churches and
spirituality have gone largely unremarked upon. That over 85% of megachurches are in
suburban settings8 is mentioned only incidentally, usually for an author to comment on
their architectural resemblance to shopping malls and a critique of megachurches’
capitulation to consumerism. Writing about how suburban churches resemble suburbia is
7
8

Hayden, 3-9.

Scott Thumma and Warren Bird, “Changes in American Megachurches: Tracing Eight Years of
Growth and Innovation in the Nation’s Largest-Attendance Congregations, 2008,” Hartford Institute for
Religion Research, http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/megastoday2008_summaryreport.html (accessed
November 15, 2010).

6

different from writing about how suburban churches happened to get that way. Cars and
suburbia are treated as matter-of-fact aspects of modern Americana with only ancillary
import to church analysis by most studies of recent church history. The nature of suburbia
as a culture-forming phenomenon is basically ignored.
Before traveling any farther I will define the most common terms ahead. They are
automobility, suburbia, consumerism, and suburban Christianity. I gave tighter forms of
these definitions in the glossary, but will support them in more depth here. This teases out
their relationships to one another, which are rudimentarily diagramed below in Figure 1.
Note there that, for reasons to be explained shortly, suburban Christianity is a subset of
both consumerism and consumerism’s parent, suburbia.

At the root of all that follows is automobility, defined here as “the configuration
of people, machines, landscape, urban geography, and culture that attends the increasing
dependence upon the gas engine for transport in industrial and post industrial societies.”9

9

Smith, 185.

7

It is the expansive social, spatial, and institutional tapestry which both undergirds and
flows out of a widely democratized mode of petroleum-fueled individual mobility. It isn’t
just the stuff of driving – cars, oil supplies, onramps, and the like. It’s more than the
culture of cars – NASCAR, Sunday driving, andThe Fast and the Furious. It’s more than
the geography of easy-motoring – parking lots, java shacks, and exurbs. Automobility is
all of that combined (and more) in a comprehensive society-wide positive feedback loop
where increased mobility rewards new building and commerce modes, which in turn
makes automobility a requisite for functional cultural membership. It is the interplay of
affordable driving with an individualistic culture and underregulated urban design which
produce a car-scaled landscape that in turn rewards and reinforces affordable driving and
individualism. And on the vicious cycle of automobility continues. For example: malls
are created as the automobilized bastard children of town centers, which steadily replace
actual town centers and public spaces, which in turn produces a culture dependent on cars
to get to its public (albeit civic-turned-commercial) spaces, Q.E.D.
Suburbia is here defined as any urban geography which is patterned to the scale of
the automobile.10 While other forms of urban geography (new urbanism, city center, etc.)
incorporate and accommodate the automobile, it is suburbia which is built wholesale
around the car as a primary form of personal locomotion, accommodating non-motorized

10

Most histories of suburbia include the many decades of suburban development prior to the
invention and eventual mass-adoption of the automobile. In this broader sense suburbia is a low-density
non-farmed built environment. Some scholars link it with the ability to commute to work, as was allowed
by railroads and electric trollies in the late 19th century in America. I have chosen to tie the term to an
automobile-scaled built environment because it takes both of these senses and applies it to what we have
before us today. It’s no good making space for the bourgeois enclaves of the 1880’s in defining suburbia
when those enclaves have long since been overrun with automobilized infrastructure and development. For
an example of those preferring commutability as suburbia’s metric, see Jon C. Teaford, The American
Suburb: The Basics (New York City, NY: Routledge, 2008): 1-17.

8

mobility modes only where is minimally necessary. Suburbia, suburban, and
suburbanized will also be used in a slightly looser manner throughout this dissertation to
conjure their wider colloquial cloud of cultural values, artifacts, rhythms, and architecture
associated with a car-scaled urban geography. Suburban Christianity, for example, is not
just the faith of Christians who happen to live in the suburbs, but more expansively is a
Christianity robustly adapted to and shaped by those automobilized cultures which
inhabit suburbia.
Consumerism is an industry-choreographed cultural matrix designed to sell
products by crafting personal and group identity through an engineered narrative rooted
in individual choice.11 “Consumption,” said Jean Baudrillard, “is a system of meaning.”12
For example, the consumerism behind Apple products (exemplified in their “I’m a Mac”
TV spots) is a narrative of “other computers are hard to use, unpredictable, and for statusquo brown-shirt peons. We think different. Ours just work, and are for savvy innovators
like you.” At once they’ve conjured up an identity-forging story of both marginalized/
roguish independence and acceptance into an “in crowd” who have seen the light. Mac
users are painted as both the cool kids and the witty nerds who have emerged from the
Gatesian nightmare triumphant. That is consumerism at its most potent. Apple’s market
savvy is also consistent with the marketing proverb that you’re rarely selling the product
as much as the brand, the sizzle more than the steak. Consumerism rewards consistent,
dependable, predictable expectations based on a name: “there’s the REI, I know what to
11 Jethani, 50-53. On page 50, Jethani writes “We define our identity and construct meaning for
our lives through the brands we consume.” Also see William T. Cavanaugh, Being Consumed: Economics
and Christian Desire (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008): 36, 45-46.
12

Baudrillard, 49.
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expect there.” The predictability of brand recognition thus apes the dependability of a
relationship with less risk of surprises. This predictability in turn empowers the
consumer’s choice at the heart of the matter. Consumers are, according to the narrative of
the ads, keen discerners of product who are always on the lookout for the best deal. To
buy is, like voting, the ultimate expression of our public self; “I shop; therefore I am.”13
One’s power to choose in a consumerism-saturated culture becomes a mythologized
potency unto itself.14
Appropriately choice lies at the center of suburban Christianity. You can choose to
go here, to this congregation, over so many other churches. One’s arrival or departure at
their chosen church is of little consequence to the rewards of this choice; what matters in
a consumerized, suburbanized church is that you chose it and can choose to leave it for
another church. Within the suburban church par excellence, the megachurch, that
identity-forging power of choice is again rewarded: I can choose which felt need or
affinity group in which I want to find belonging. Stay-at-home moms, empty-nesters,
golfers, porn addicts, justice advocates, new parents, skateboarders, and dancers all get to
choose their own Jesus-ified social niche to belong to. Rather than being an alternative
community, suburban Christianity offers their version of already existing ways people
organize themselves (affinity, therapy, life-stage, etc.). Thus after the consumerism-act of
choosing a church, one further reinforces their consumerism-identity by choosing to

13

Cavanaugh, 34-35, 53. On page 35, he writes: “Consumerism is not so much about having more
as it is about having something else; that’s why it is not simply buying but shopping that is the heart of
consumerism. Buying brings a temporary halt to the restlessness that typifies consumerism. This
restlessness – the moving on to shopping for something else, no matter what one has just purchased – sets
the spiritual tone for consumerism.”
14

Seiler, 1-35.
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belong or not to belong to a particular ministry. Suburban Christianity, then, is defined
for this dissertation as the forms of Christian faith specially adapted to suburbia by
scaling to an automobilized geography and culture, and by catering to consumerism’s
identity-forming narratives and techniques. Hence Figure 1’s rooting suburban
Christianity in both suburbia and consumerism – both of which are rooted in an
affordable, sustained, widespread automobility.
Summarily suburbia and automobility are foundational, not merely ornamental, to
a proper study of postwar American church habits because they are foundational to
proper studies of postwar Americana. Individualism, postmodernism, and consumerism
will be firmly tethered to the cul-de-sacs, big-boxes, and tailgates representing the
tapestry of American living, and in which those abstracts find embodiment and constant
negotiation. So also in the churches, as will be shown further in 1.4.

1.3 Automobility’s Historical Legacy for Society
1.3.1 Why America adopted the car
Automobility comprehensively altered humanity. Nowhere is this more evident
than America, where cars outnumber adults. 15 Here, cars are a ubiquitous feature of the
national scene, an unquestioned watermark of maturity, class, and cultural identity.
Indeed cars are emblematic of USAmerican values including independence, selfdetermination, expression-through-consumption, individualism, and mobility. “The
American suburb,” writes Purdue professor Jon Teaford, “is a prime example of the
15

250 million registered passenger vehicles and 244 million adults. US Department of
Transportation, “Highway Statistics.” Available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/
statistics.cfm (accessed November 13, 2012). US Census Bureau, “State & Country Quick Facts,” http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (accessed November 13, 2012).

11

nation’s tradition of expansive freedom and mobility.”16 This is to say nothing of the
necessity of automobility for most Americans.
The automobile’s massive adoption rate and decisive enthronement in America
was a complicated matter, but much of it can be chalked up to two feedback loops: the
built environment and an emaciated discourse about socially mitigating its effects.
Together they help us understand why the automobile became prevalent, and why it has
remained prevalent.
The argument for built-environment-as-feedback-loop is as elegant as it is
accessible: the automobile allowed us to move people and freight at a completely new
scale, which in turn rewarded built environments catering to its preferences, which in turn
made that new scale of transit all the more mandatory. Pedestrians were moved out of the
streets to make way for speedier cars and trucks.17 Businesses with parking spots gained
customers. Developers and planners leveraged the car’s economic utility, which in turn
accelerated its adoption rate by all of society. The more we built for cars, the more
necessary they became, and the less viable or appealing walking, bicycling, and public
transit became. So entrenched is our built commitment to automobility that some
environmentalists are now prioritizing smart planning over more efficiently-designed
cars. Writes journalist David Owen,
The energy inefficiency of individual automobiles, in other words, is a far less
important environmental issue than the energy inefficiency of the asphalt-latticed
way of life that we have built to oblige them – the sprawling American landscape
of subdivisions, parking lots, strip malls, and interstate bypasses. The critical
16
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energy drain in a typical American suburb is not the Hummer in the driveway; it’s
everything the Hummer makes possible – the oversized houses and irrigated
yards, the network of new feeder roads and residential streets, the costly and
inefficient outward expansion of the power grid, the duplicated stores and
schools, the two-hour solo commutes. … That is why, in the long run, a car’s fuel
gauge is far less significant, environmentally speaking, than its odometer. 18
We have formalized our addiction through our built environment.
Identifying a feedback loop regarding moral discernment on these matters is more
subtle. If the built environment was a weighted gas pedal, our inability to reign in
automobility with social reflection was a busted brake pedal and jammed steering wheel.
Modernity in the industrial and post-industrial age “unleashed human creative capacities
without a concept of order capable of limiting those capacities.”19 This is a central
“Pandora’s Box” conundrum of industrial production and innovation in a liberal society:
before anyone has time to consider a new technology’s social ramifications, others eager
to variously enjoy and exploit it already have.20 Local pockets of discernment and careful
use are in a market society easily paved over by an embracing public. The Maginot Lines
of moral reflection on technology are simply marched around by a blitzkrieg of shopping
carts and delivery trucks. Voices of critique are derided as backwards, anti-progress, and
laughably ignorant. On the cycle goes, and thus do the brakes of wise reflection fail in
industrial market society. In the case of the topic at hand, this produces the break-neck
speed of automobility’s adoption and built-environment accoutrement outpaced society’s
ability to adapt to it or engage in a careful public discourse about it.
18
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Finally, before narrating automobility’s still-unfolding legacy: a word about this
ostensibly secular topic’s prominence in a seminary dissertation. Although many tomes
have been inked concerning the social ripples of automobility (except in religion, of
course), it still merits reviewing here. I will review them for two reasons. First,
automobility is not a common topic of interest or research for seminarians or ministers,
and so for the sake of my readers these ideas merit review. Second, many of the ecclesial
effects of automobility are intertwined with its more ‘secular’ changes, such as small
group ministries operating as coping mechanisms for dwindling social capital in
neighborhoods.

1.3.2 Human-scaled life
America has not always been as suburban and urban as it is today, though this fact
is often overlooked. In 1801, for example, “95% of Americans essentially made their fulltime living from agriculture. By the turn of the 20th century, it was 45 percent, and by the
turn of the 21st less than 2 percent.”21 This marks not only a shift from rural to urban, but
most emphatically rural and city to suburbs. Mass mechanization of farming reduced the
percentage of the population needed as farmers to feed the remainder of society precisely
as new industries and employment opportunities opened up in urban and suburban areas
to fill the labor gap created by petrol-powered combines, conveyors, and balers.
As farmers were leaving the sweat of the fields, city-dwellers were looking to the
fringes of soot-stained urban squalor to find the good life. Gilded Age America lined the

21 Deborah and Frank Popper, An America Without Farmers?, The Land Institute, April 8, 2004,
http://www.landinstitute.org/vnews/display.v/ART/2004/04/08/4076b2169776a (accessed November 22,
2010).
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continent with railroads and gridded its cities with electric trolleys that connected urban
industrial sectors with outlying streetcar suburbs and commercial districts. These
neighborhoods were densely-placed single- and multi-family houses striped with narrow
commercial corridors hugging the streetcar line’s frequent stops. Everything necessary to
city living – except the sooty industrial zones – was always within a five to ten minute
walk. This combination of walkable residential-commerce neighborhoods with distance
from Dickensian grime provided streetcar neighborhoods a human-scaled geography that
civic planners and geographers to this day celebrate as some of America’s most beloved
places to live. As walkable as they are, streetcar suburbs’ density relative to historic urban
centers were nonetheless the beginning of rapid urban sprawl. Metropolitan Boston, for
example, tripled in area between 1890 and 1900 – the peak of the streetcar suburbs. 22
Everyday life remained overwhelmingly human-scaled even as trolley lines stretched
metropolitan areas into historic farmlands.
Church attendance and affiliation in the age of streetcar suburbs continued to be
human-scaled. For individual believers, options were typically limited to what one could
walk or carriage to. Consistent with those limited urban options is the roughly 50% of
America in rural settings who had an even slimmer set to choose from, often depending
on itinerant preachers.

1.3.3 Automobility emerges
Automobiles steadily changed how Americans arrange their patterns of
commerce, worship, and homemaking. Streetcar ridership peaked in 1923 as automobility
22
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edged into the daily life of the skilled workers and upper-middle class families living on
the urban periphery.23 New development patterns slowly began to assume an
automobilized citizenry, making streetcars inconvenient and redundant. This transition
from streetcar to private car was a steady gradient that, by 1930, had nevertheless made a
clear mark on the shape of urban areas in the form of onion-like layers of peripheral, carfriendlier housing developments.24
Initially seen as a dangerous plaything of the rich, manufacturers at the turn of the
century struggled to effectively market automobiles. Eventually, however, these
marketers struck gold as they pitched automobility as a means to express freedom.
Longstanding in American liberalism is the conceiving “of the freedom to move as
primary and essential to a range of other rights.”25 Mobility, that is, had long been
associated with a sort of ultimate American self, the pioneer and cowboy. Automobility,
then, became a core way to assert national identity and individual freedom/worth. 26
Freedom and mobility, in the American mind, go together – but so also does freedom and
selfhood. Thus the car’s enhancing of personal mobility became entangled with the
American sense of selfhood and worth. “Free men are those unbounded, who can escape
the despotism of the diurnal,” went the logic. One historian observes “a free American in
pursuit of happiness … is mobile, is, has been, will be, in motion.”27 The Progressive
23 Julia Gombach, “Streetcar Suburbs, 1888 to 1928”, Living Places.com, http://
www.livingplaces.com/Streetcar_Suburbs.html (accessed November 23, 2010).
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movement’s most explosive years found in the automobile much that characterized its
narrative and priorities.28 Automobility, citizenship, and freedom thus became tightly
coiled in American mythos. This identity-expressing, membership-validating effect of
automobility will reappear shortly in a deeper study of American automobility and faith.

1.3.4 Oil becomes useful
For cars to become ubiquitous they would need a common fuel that is abundant,
accessible, transportable, and relatively lightweight. This ruled out wood and coal.29
What marked all of the above boxes was petroleum. For millennia petroleum had little
use; infrequently some localities used lighter-grade oil similar to kerosene to light lamps,
and elsewhere thicker oil was used to pave streets. 30 While every oil deposit contains this
spectrum of oil thickness, it wasn’t until the middle of the 19th century that anyone found
a commercially viable method for parsing out these grades of petroleum through a
complex distilling process. Canadian Abraham Gesner first discovered how to efficiently
extract kerosene from crude oil, launching at last a market for oil products.31
This newfound utility for crude oil merged with declining whale oil supplies to
provoke Edwin L. Drake to devise a risky new way to mine oil from the Pennsylvanian
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earth in 1859. Many entrepreneurs followed suit. 32 The most usable refined grade was
kerosene lamp oil until another grade of oil, gasoline, found a use in the internal
combustion engine.33 Its inventors’ names echo through history on the hoods of our cars:
Gottlieb Daimler and Karl Benz.34 By the turn of the century half of America’s 8000
automobiles ran on Daimler and Benz’s gasoline engines.35 Oil, long of little use, had
finally found its purpose.

1.3.5 A magical and revolutionary product
It didn’t take long for oil to upend everything. 1908 heralded the invention of
Henry Ford’s Model T car, an affordable vehicle which “democratized driving in
America.”36 Ford’s Taylorized production methods drove down the entry-cost of
automobility, thus propelling ongoing access to automobility through class lines in the
two decades to come. Already in 1910 there were 496,000 registered cars in America. 37
By 1920 some two million cars were being sold annually.38 This American life was in
dramatic flux.
City governments and businesses were among the fastest to respond to this
change. They did so with a mixture of panic and eagerness as they retrofitted roadways to
32
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better accommodate their fast-motoring citizens. Those streetcars and trolleys so richly
associated with walkable, still-beloved neighborhoods were by 1930 frowned upon as
restrictors of individual liberty, cloggers of streets, and only for the poor. Accordingly,
new developments prioritized the automobile. The message being sent was clear: the
modern driver was who business and government alike would vigorously cater to.
Driving increasingly became a mark of cultural membership and requisite of social
advancement. That is, social mobility became tied to vehicular mobility.39
New leisure activities permitted by cars transformed how people understood time
and nature. Weekend camping, for example, or driving out to pristine “wilderness” areas,
accelerated the exigent American habit of reducing “nature” to a discrete, localized thing
that can be driven to, enjoyed, and left at will. 40 The rest of Creation was experienced
through the windshield, and found a romanticized, increasingly commodified presence in
the automobilized imagination.
So pervasively identity-shaping was the automobile in this time and into the
1930s, that much of what is colloquially coddled as “Americana” imagery finds its roots
here. Quaint country gas stations, fast food restaurants, drive-in movie theaters, “Lover’s
Lanes” all took shape, and massively shaped the collective American memory in these
decades.
The automobile’s revolutionary impact on social and moral habits was easily
observed far and wide. Sociologists of the late 1920’s Helen and Robert Lynd studied
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Muncie, Indiana to understand how Midwestern small town life was changing. During
their studies, one resident told them, “Why on earth do you need to study what’s
changing in this country? I can tell you what’s happening in just four letters: A-U-T-O!”41
Technology sociologist Rudi Volti writes:
The Lynds’ study described many consequences of automobile ownership, such as
an apparent decline in neighborly interaction and the financial sacrifices people
made in order to pay for their cars. Of special concern were the effects of the
automobile on conventional morality, which led one judge of the juvenile court to
refer to the automobile as ‘a house of prostitution on wheels’… In fact, in
Middletown and elsewhere, most amorous uses of the automobile did not involve
sex for payment. The significance of widespread automobile ownership for sexual
behavior was that it allowed young men and women to escape close supervision.
It is impossible to ascertain the extent to which premarital sex increased in the
1920s, and how much of it was due to the spread of car ownership. It seems
beyond question, however, that the availability of cars made a strong contribution
to the changes in behavior and moral standards that characterized the era.42

Elsewhere David L. Lewis notes that cars “permitted couples to get much farther away
from front porch swings, parlor sofas, hovering mothers, and pesky siblings than ever
before. In motor vehicles, couples could range far afield… Courtship itself was extended
from the five-mile radius of the horse and buggy to ten, twenty, and fifty miles and
more.”43 The conservative or traditional sexual ethics that would later be so lauded by
evangelicals were being steadily eroded not by a wave of new ideas, but by a new
technology. Feminism wasn’t so much the problem as were Fords. Cars made it easier to
act on humanity’s latent sexual impulses by providing easy one-night escapes into erotic
41 Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd, Middletown: A Study in Contemporary American
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deviance, away from auntie’s watchful eye. Later mobility patterns would advance this
trend by shredding the social webs of grounded relationship and shared morality so
essential to preserving durable communities, and in which one realizes the sheer
pragmatism of historical Christian sexual ethics;44 that is, chastity is a communitypreserving virtue as much as it is a God-glorifying one.45 In the 20th century, though, as
automobility unraveled the communal fabrics which make such virtues legible, the
practical need for them waned. So it was that sexual license would come with a driver’s
license.
The Lynds’ study also explored automobility’s effects on views of gender roles.
On the one hand, automobility liberated women for social mobility and outdoor leisure,
and on the other hand reinforced traditional gender roles in cars’ use for performing
domestic and parental duties.46 These cultural shifts and others will be discussed at length
below with regard to Christianity. It is worth pausing here, though, to note how quickly
people of this era were associating many cultural shifts to, not the advent of any
particularly en vogue idea, but to the democratization of automobility.

1.3.6 Suburbia emerging
New customs, commercial ventures, and construction priorities all paved the way
for a new way of living in the land, one centered quite suddenly on the automobile. That
mode of urban geography, begun in the 1920’s, was deferred somewhat until after World
44
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War II. Yet by that point a car-scaled geography and architecture were all but inevitable.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt had launched massive highway-building efforts as one of
the New Deal’s earliest programs, producing roadside commerce strips the nation wide.47
By the end of the 1930’s, the miles of surfaced roads in America had doubled to 1.3
million.48 Intended as a salve to unemployment, Roosevelt’s roads tattooed a hard-toescape vision of America’s future into the landscape: this was to be a nation of drivers.
The government wasn’t the only culprit in throttling the feedback cycle between
vehicle and infrastructure. General Motors, Standard Oil, Firestone Tires, Mack
Manufacturing, and Phillips Petroleum conspired over the course of the 1930’s and early
1940’s to buy up and shut down nearly half of the nation’s privately-owned trolley
lines.49 What replaced them? Unsurprisingly, GM busses spinning Firestone tires and
running on Standard Oil.
Between government incentive and corporate aggression, the way was paved for
the post-war automobilized citizenry to inhabit the land in uncharted new ways. The era
of sitcom suburbs was just around the corner. It would be an era of overt cooperation
between government and corporate interests, working together to build millions of new
homes continent-wide, ostensibly for the nation’s veterans. The federal government
pumped hundreds of millions of dollars in subsidies to big developers eager to build
scores of single-family houses as cheaply as possible.50
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That these are single-family dwellings should not be quickly overlooked. In the
painful years of 1930 to 1945, families increasingly resorted to living with relatives in
multi-family dwellings.51 So prevalent was the trend toward co-housing that in those 16
years, demand never reached the excess of supply in American housing.52 Even before
those years, living with or very close to extended family was the norm for most people.
This proximity mingled with stability of lineage helped produce what is now wistfully
referred to by commentators as “social capital” – that elusive specie of human flourishing
pushed to the brink of extinction in the decades to come.
The post-war celebration of the single-family residence reveals the locus of the
“nuclear family” so enshrined by later evangelicals to be in mass-produced housing that
scaled its houses not for normative living patterns (extended family living, etc.) but to
maximize the number of potential homeowners and thus the developer’s profits. Why
build one house for three families when you can build one for each family? Moreover,
while the nuclear family patterns existed for thousands of years, it wasn’t until the early
industrialization in the 1700’s that such household arrangements became anywhere close
to prevalent in Western nations.53 London bourgeois pioneered this by huddling around
the new, insular family type that quite consciously “split middle class work and
residence.”54 Industrialization’s reinforcement of single-family residences and
51 This trend, however, has begun to return since the 2008 financial meltdown. See: “The Return
of the Multi-Generational Family Household,” Pew Social Trends, http://pewsocialtrends.org/2010/03/18/
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52

Hayden, 131-132.

53 Jerry Bentley, Heather Streets Salter, and Herbert Ziegler; Traditions & Encounters: A Brief
Global History (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2008): chapter 20.
54

1987): 9.

Robert Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia (New York: Basic Books,

23

conventional gender roles (men the breadwinners, women maintaining the domestic arts)
continued in the post-war era as white-collar job and social lives fractured from extended
family reinforced female domesticity and enhanced economic productivity as a badge of
masculinity.55 In this telling, we see that an atomized and architecturally-isolated nuclear
family is the anomaly, not the norm, in human history.56 Nuclear families, that is, were
broadly understood to be the center of a much wider social organism.
Sitcom suburbia’s fragmented residential landscape not only severed families
from their wider kinship groups and neighbors, but ultimately became a persistent
catalyst of individualism – then celebrated as an anti-communism civic virtue. 57
Suburbia, as Elizabeth Gorden wrote in Home Beautiful in the 1950’s, was “the
architecture that will encourage the development of individualism.”58 These houses
would be the contained arena for individual self-expression through the accumulation of
goods and dis-integration from others. It was the arena, in other words, of choice – choice
in relationships and choice in purchases. The architecture of suburbia, then, provided an
enduring reification of consumerism – defined above as an industry-choreographed
cultural matrix designed to sell products by crafting personal and group identity through
an engineered narrative rooted in individual choice. Public parks would be replaced with
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private backyards. Sidewalk street corners as “third places” came to be replaced with
consumption- and choice-oriented gathering places like fast food shanties and shopping
malls. Likewise, front porches – long recognized as a negotiated space between the
public and private – disappeared or were shrunk back to ornamental gimmick. Indeed the
suburban picket fence and front door would become an Iron Curtain between the public
and the private, between the realm of citizenship and the realm of consumerism. 59 In a
deft move of architectural irony, precisely as American neighborhoods, cities, retailers,
and farmers were scaling upward from the human to the automobile, suburban housing
scaled down from that of the connected community to the individual.
Having cars in mind was a given for developers and planners. What mattered was
profitability! The redundancy in design and the sprawling nature of suburbs, stretching
from highway to highway, had more to do with crass efficiency of materials than it did
with any conspiracy toward an extended and more deeply engrained automobility.60 The
mass production, shipment, and assembly of suburban residences are a product of an
automobilized construction industry, and the strip malls and burger huts which came to
garnish them are likewise petrol-dependent. Yet as far as developers were concerned, the
haphazard patchwork of houses and parking lots was really just their happy capitulation
to satisfy the radically automobilized consumer. Thus we can safely conclude that cars
enabled suburbia, but only occasionally inspired it.
The cheap, stale pragmatism represented by Levittown’s Cape Cod shacks reigned
in suburban development for decades to come. It was all about efficiency; redundancy is
59
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both cheaper to make and builds brand dependability and trust with prospective
consumers. Mass produced housing units, four-lane highways, consistently-flavored
McDonald’s milkshakes from coast to coast, big box retailers, and the grocery
supermarket all claimed the spoils in the battle between the profitability of economies of
scale and the fragility of the scale of human community. In the brave new world ahead,
predictability and profitability laid the land. Thus just as each house in Levittown was
only nominally different from its neighbor, so also suburbs would develop uniformly
around America and the world, being only shades different from one another. Says
cultural critic Jim Kunstler,
These housing “products” represent a triumph of mass merchandising over
regional building traditions, of salesmanship over civilization. You can be sure the
same houses have been built along a highway strip outside Fresno, California, at
the edge of a swamp in Pahokee, Florida, and on the blizzard blown fringes of St.
Cloud, Minnesota. They might not be anywhere. The places they stand are just
different versions of nowhere, because these houses exist in no specific relation to
anything except the road and the power cable. 61
Suburbia came to be a geography of nowhere. 62 There would be no room for the peculiar,
local, contextual and slow-to-understand of a given place; a product and a place’s
membership in tomorrow required opaque predictability and decontextualized
accessibility. 63 Of this cultural trend in the church, more will be said below.
Simultaneously the federal government was exerting tens of billions of dollars
into building the interstate highway system.64 This web of millions of paved miles made
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it easier to get just about anywhere by car. No one saw this more clearly than real estate
developers, who bought up land near planned off-ramps and built a new kind of retail: the
shopping mall.65 Originally pitched as “shopping towns,” the first fully-enclosed
shopping mall opened outside of Minneapolis in 1956.66 These malls are typically
designed with one anchor store surrounded by dozens of smaller boutiques and looming
over an ocean of parking. Malls were privately-owned, privately-policed cartoons of
downtowns complete with indoor trees, play structures, and restaurants.
Unlike a downtown, cars were conspicuously absent inside malls. Here, the entire
“road” otherwise separating shops was now a pedestrian-friendly zone! Yet this
pedestrian-mindedness is a false vision of human-scaled commerce. Shoppers had to
drive to the mall in the first place, and the shop owners’ businesses assume visitors will
be carrying enough home that they’ll need a car to do it. Yet this charade continues today
as new malls try harder than ever to imitate the feel of moseying through an historic
downtown.
So expansive has suburban commercial space become, there are now over 19
square-feet of retail space in America for every one of its men, women, and children. 67
The sheer breadth of the footprint of this new kind of building and the accompanying
parking lot produced a very stretched out landscape, one inconvenient and unappealing to
walk through. It created a wide landscape only intended for drivers, rendering
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automobility requisite for functional cultural membership. The landscape of malls is, like
the acres of Cape Cods unbroken by retail, industry, or open space, scaled only to the car.
Malls and strip malls’ operating on economies of scale (and piles of tax breaks)
allowed shopping malls to aggressively outcompete historic retail districts in downtowns
across the country. Mom-and-Pop stores simply could not remain solvent when pitted
against Home Depot, the Gap, and Supercuts. Economic activity zipped from downtowns
to edge-towns, and with it the automobilized population. 68 Retailers, artisans, and service
providers that were local to that town were undercut by national chains; the predictable
out-priced the personal. Developers would build around shopping malls, which kept the
freshest profits at the urban edges. This in turn catapulted further-out mall designs into
still-cheap farmland, banking on the continued expansion of suburban housing.

1.3.7 Stuck in the gridlock of automobility
By the dawn of the third millennium, suburbia encompassed the bulwark of
American life. While the vast majority of Americans live in post-war suburbs, suburban
culture has spilled out far beyond their numbers. 69 Suburbia’s culture of consumerism,
automobility, isolation, and materialism are pervasive, present as far as you can drive.
Barnes & Noble, Applebees, and NASCAR bars appear in city, suburb, and country alike.
As a free-floating cultural phenomenon, it permeates the national life, radio waves, and
websites. As a guarantor of income and national strength, suburbia’s consumer culture
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(now untethered from suburbia) has made consumer spending become 70% of the U.S.
economy.70
The fact is: suburban architecture and geography is here to stay. Suburbia and its
accoutrements are a continental tattoo inked with exhaust pipes, sale tags, and mile
markers. America has built up a massive culture and infrastructure around the car, and an
economic juggernaut which depends on the car’s continued expansion. Our turn lanes and
parking lots and cul-de-sacs aren’t going away any time soon. We Americans are a carscaled culture living in a car-scaled land and car-dependent economy. Our lifestyle
patterns and values have been as thoroughly reworked by petroleum-powered
automobility as the landscape we cherish. America’s republican selfhood devolved into
motorized consumption by the car has now made into commodities even particular
neighborhoods, where to choose one’s place betokens American success.71 Nothing has
escaped the car’s impact, including how we relate to the divine, and to that we now turn.

1.4 Automobility’s Historical Legacy in the American Church
1.4.1 Mapping the silence
One of the more remarkable things about studying how American Christianity has
related to suburbia and automobility is the almost total lack of moral discernment along
the way. Churches across the spectrum took suburbia for granted, and indeed variously
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adapted to it. In my searches, I only discovered two significant books72 on the topic in the
entire twentieth century. Several articles were published, but so few that you can count
them on one hand.73 If publishing is to be counted as a valid indicator of a broad ecclesial
discernment on a topic, this is a baffling silence.
To be sure, in the pages ahead it will be seen that churches responded to suburbia
and automobility left, right, and center. Few, however, ever seemed to give critical
reflection. Indeed it seems as if suburbia was mostly engaged by church through
combating its symptoms instead of suburbia itself (and automobility) as root causes. A
sort of dispersed series of proxy battles over family, loneliness, consumerism, church
growth, sexual promiscuity, individualism, divorce, and materialism has occurred, while
a more tangible culprit has remained thus far untouched.
Most broadly, church responses to and reflection on suburbia and automobility
can be charted along two axes (see Figure 2, below): one a spectrum between critical
reaction, cooperative obsolescence and/or static non-response in the middle, and
competitive hyper-adaptation. The other axis slides between defending suburban values
and norms, and aggressiveness regarding the above-mentioned topical proxy battles
caused by suburbia and automobility.
Figure 2
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First, churches adapted to automobilized, consumerist suburbia through various
levels of accommodation, adaptation, and acquiescence. From drive-in churches and
church reader boards to seeker-sensitive market savvy and multi-site megachurches,
many evangelical churches have adapted to suburbia phenomenally. That is, they
provided the religious goods and services for a car-shaped America better than anyone
else. At the other end of the spectrum are the mainline and Anabaptist traditions, who
were slow and stubborn to respond to the tectonic shift taking place in America.
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The second axis, by focusing on the volume of dissent churches gave in response
to suburbia and automobility’s effects, winds up blurring conventional conservative/
liberal dichotomies.74 For example, liberal issues like creation-care, fair trade,
consumerism, social justice, and opposition to oil wars are all responses to the symptoms
and effects of automobilized, consumerized suburbia. Likewise with conservative
advocacy regarding sexual promiscuity, divorce, and financial responsibility. All flow
from suburbia, and so this spectrum brings together what conventional readings tear
asunder.
It is worth celebrating that some authors did suggest localizing, and in practicing
it inadvertently found various degrees of satisfaction in resolving the impacts of
automobility otherwise fought through “battle of ideas” methods as its proxies. Included
here are house churches, simple churches, and the germinal forms of today’s new
monastic, emerging, and missional movements. Most of these, however, were responding
to the church’s wider capitulation to Christendom and the Enlightenment, not
automobility. As Section 1.5 will show, in attempting to relocalize church habits these
fresh thinkers are also undoing much of the suburban captivity of the church. 75
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1.4.2 1870’s to 1960: Church in crisis and flux
American cities historically segregated themselves loosely by ethnicity and
denomination.76 Local church buildings were stocked with people closest in proximity to
them; few persons commuted to get to a preferred church. Church choice was, after all,
limited by transportation technology – walking, horses, and, later, streetcars. Yet for the
most part, church affiliation was an inherited identity;77 it wasn’t “chosen” in the
contemporary sense of folks “church-shopping” to find just the right community for
them. Parishes and congregations were central administers of identity for neighborhoods
and, in an urban geography of mixed residential, commercial, civic, and industrial uses,
also became a stabilizing arena for cross-class unity.78
Workplaces in this era were generally close to residences. Thus cobblers lived
near, if not above, shoe stores, factory workers lived within a reasonable walk of a
factory, and so on. This tight tapestry of mixed land uses kept a walkable, tight radius for
where most of urban life occurred, and for where worship was shared. This human-scaled
neighborhood decreased choice and homogeneity from the pool of possible personal
associations because in a human-scaled world, most goods and services need to remain
available close to where life is lived. 79 Unlike today’s array of affinity-associations, from
MeetUp groups and league sports to choosing to live in cultured enclaves of a kindred
subculture, by and large one in this era was stuck with the diversity of folks within an
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economically-bonded district measured by the foot instead of the mile. You were in
Christ with these people for better and for worse.
Human-scaled geography also involved a democratizing overlap between workers
and business leaders, between the poor, blue collar, and emerging white collar classes.
Amid industrialism’s emergence, economic interdependence was still visible at the
neighborhood level because most services were still scaled to foot and hoof.80 The impact
of low wages were visible outside factory walls as workers and owners of the means of
production still had to live relatively close to one another. The consequences of economic
life were embodied, not abstracted, in our neighbor. One broke bread with those who
bake their bread. It was an urban geography organized by our pragmatic interdependence,
thus elevating our common humanity even as it made more evident our social
differences.81
Community, then, was found largely in the neighborhood and open market’s
various networks of kinship, commerce, and street-level interaction – not, necessarily, in
churches.82 Instead, Christendom-style churches were administers of ethics, experience,
worship, and activism. At their best, churches of this era were not so much communities
as community centers providing coherence of identity, stability of presence, and
catalyzing social uplift. Culture in these churches was only as homogenous as its
neighborhood, often only bearing class divisions as far as the neighborhood already had.
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The emergence of the middle class during this period changed the relative class
diversity of congregations and neighborhoods as many in this burgeoning bourgeoisie
moved to the streetcar suburbs and pre-war suburbs at the edge of the city. A combination
of increased pay with new transportation methods invoked the possibility of choice of
residence into urban life. Many families arriving in the middle class, upon reviewing the
pollution, squalor, and crime exigent to urban life, opted for the automobilized promised
land outside the industrial-financial core of central cities. Thus, the moneyed middle class
who would become the foundation of a more consumerism-saturated post-war suburbia
departed urban neighborhoods and churches. Their liberation from those old digs was
brought about foremost by easy automobility and single-use land patterns. Those
departed central city congregations, meanwhile, suffered from underfunding in the midst
of their increasingly poor neighborhoods.
Another factor adding leverage to the middle class’ centrifugal migration was
race. Two million black Americans moved from the South to the Northeast, Midwest, and
West between 1910 and 1930.83 Their arrival created racial tension in white city centers
and forced a cultural crisis in congregation life.84 Music, theology, behavior, training, and
liturgical differences between black and white Protestantism only reinforces Sunday
morning segregation. Mainline and conservative traditions alike hadn’t produced faith
communities able to meaningfully adapt to this racial and cultural flux; they “were never
designed for ministry in a rapidly changing metropolis.”85 Rather, they were adapted to
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relatively settled cultures inhabiting the economically-connected and class-diverse
neighborhood surrounding them. Thus, whites fled to the quickly-growing suburbs in
their cars. Automobility and its suburban landscape laid the foundation for race and class
divisions existing in today’s churches.86 Without cars America’s racial history may have
been quite different.
Churches in pre-war suburbia and into the 1950’s became renewed loci of
community and identity to a middle class increasingly divorced from the living patterns
of economic interdependence and urban social life which had hitherto provided
community and identity.87 In a homogenized suburban culture of middle-class whites, the
need for socialized identity was rampant, yet such socialized identity had never really
been much a product of choice. Socialized identity was an incidental where one lived,
buoyed by the geographically-anchored web of economic interrelationships between
neighbors of diverse fiscal means. Urban dwellers’ choice in friends and associations was
diverse, but also relatively static, in a neighborhood where one was also likely to find
much of their extended family and fellow church members, along with their teacher,
butcher, baker, and minister.
Suburbia provided little of this diversity, and that was part of its charm. One’s
choice in friendships and associations was about as diverse as the housing options in
Levittown: six nominally different versions of the same vanilla house. What mattered was
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the safety of that choice, that one knew what they were getting. 88 A de-homogenizing
effect on the neighborhood was a crisis of not only identity, but the choices behind that
identity. Note again the importance of choice in the identity-forming power of
consumerism, a force we see beginning to emerge in social patterns even here. The move
to suburbia as a choice was an identity-forming act of class assertion and consolidation
which in turn demanded that suburbanites choose whom to relate. In the landscape of
suburbia, where residence and commerce are kept at car’s length, few spaces beyond
immediate neighbors – no choice at all – allowed for nurturing middle class identity
through relationships. Everyday “real life” interactions with people on street corners and
corner markets sufficed just decades prior, but suburbanites would turn to choosing
associations as a site to grow their identity. Churches were right alongside rotary clubs
and bowling leagues in providing this service.89
Previously the church’s organizing principle was geography; personal preference
and denominational affiliation came second in a low-mobility world. In suburbia, though,
stratified by class and race, the organizing principle was choice – again, consumerism
lurks in these early decades of the suburbanizing of the church. And almost immediately,
church choice was one based on similarity and affinity. Gibson Winter writes that the
church of this culture and land “is first and foremost an economic peer group; it is
secondarily a believing and worshiping fellowship. …it is a vehicle of the social identity
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of middle-class people.”90 These churches would succeed insofar as they coddled this
class distinction and provided tradition to a traditionless people. Writes Winter:
Congregations are explicitly organized around similarity in social and economic
rank; in fact, their survival generally depends upon the degree to which they can
maintain likeness in their memberships. A few highbrows and a few low-brows
can be thrown into the congregational mix, but the core has to be drawn from
similar occupation, income group, educational level, ethnic background, and
residential level if the congregation is to survive. 91
Long before Bill Hybels let the church world in on what marketers knew all along,
Winters’ words show that the homogenous growth principle promised at the gates of
suburbia was seen in his day as foundational to suburbia’s church. As with race and class
divisions, again we observe the crucial leverage which automobility and suburbia
provided in creating affinity, niche subculture, and similarity as organizing principles in
today’s evangelical churches. If the church was to flourish in suburbia, it would have to
adapt to suburbia’s singular narrative of the middle-class choosing a homogenous
association in which to belong.92
Suburbanizing the church also created a geographic gap between middle-to-upperclass people and the poor. Levittowns, highways, and class-homogenous churches help
people remain distant from the impoverishing consequences of their lifestyles93. The
automobilized citizen can choose not to see it by not living, worshiping, or working there.
Cars, then, provided a way out from Jesus’ claim that “the poor will always be among
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you.” Already careening in response to the social gospel movement, evangelicalism could
cultivate in suburbia a spirituality, gospel, and hermeneutics that were as segregated from
concerns of social uplift and justice as their own homes and churches were from those of
the poor. Preaching and ministry for the therapeutic and existential agonies of the middle
class was able to proceed unchallenged by the more holistic needs that can be so readily
seen in economically heterogenous neighborhoods and parishes.94 Poverty was now
abstracted from real-life relationships and increasingly seen as a public policy crisis, and
was no longer personal.95 Thus automobility once more added leverage to an already
unhealthy divide, this time between the justice-minded mainline traditions and the
justification-minded evangelical traditions.
This segregation of income levels made the preservation of historic central city
congregations difficult. Tithing, education, and participating membership all evacuated to
the suburbs.96 This in turn drew denominational attention away from poorer
neighborhoods and toward the bourgeoning bourgeoisie of suburbia. Winter again has
much wisdom to share:
The Protestant retreat, in this instance, meant a radical impoverishment of the
ministry to these areas and unchurched large numbers of rural in-migrants. The
derelict churches which remained could not provide adequate ministries for their
own constituencies and lacked the vitality and interest to recruit substantially
from the newcomer groups. These weakened churches provided vulnerable points
for invasion by left-wing fundamentalist groups. Protestant gains in membership
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through movement to the best residential areas were counterbalanced by heavy
losses in churches and memberships in the central areas of the city.97
With denominational inertia and contextual inertia moving in different directions, many
mainline congregations were stuck between a rock and a hard place as they could not
effectively adapt to the demands of either.98 Their way of organizing, both locally and
denominationally, were unable to weather these radical changes.99 The decline of the
mainline denominations in America was in large part a consequence of their inability to
adapt to or critique suburbia. They were dying in the cities; might the grass be greener on
the other side of the beltway?

1.4.3 Mainline comity
The mainline response to suburbia was, at best, concerned cooperation. Still
thinking geographically, mainline church leaders saw the new residential sprawl as
basically unchurched and desperately needing new congregations. The most common
solution in many cities was to form church federations across denominational lines to
evaluate suburban demographics and projected sprawl. These federations would then
practice comity, wherein the construction of new church buildings would proceed in a
noncompetitive and evenly distributed mode. “The theory behind comity,” writes Etan
Diamond, “was that competition among denominations and churches was detrimental to
religion as a whole. It was unseemly for churches to market themselves in an aggressive
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manner and to ‘steal’ members from other churches.”100 According to one 1950 comity
report cited by Diamond, “an area should be considered ‘adequately churched’ when it
had a ratio of one congregation to two to four thousand people. Churches of the same
denomination were to be no closer than one and three-quarters of a mile apart, while
those from different denominations could be closer if their proximity did not create too
much competition.”101 The mainline federations frowned upon crass market-of-religion
approaches that saw suburbia as a commons to be plundered rather than a pie to be neatly
divided. Comity would be slow and feel bureaucratic, but it was their best thinking on
how to suburbanize without competing.102
The comity practices were, for all their civility, ultimately crippled by one glaring
omission from their cultural analysis. In a word, automobility. The neat distribution of
suburbia into a soft parish system forgot that the historically pedestrian limits to church
affiliation were left in the dust of an automobilized nation. Churchgoers do prefer to
minimize travel regardless of that travel’s mode, true enough. But what’s an extra five
minutes of driving if it gets someone to a congregation they prefer? In a car-scaled
society, there is little to stop someone from breaking out of the mainline’s soft parish
system and finding the best bang for their tithing buck. Automobility thus trumped
comity in making a market where many congregations sought no such thing.
Corollary to ignoring automobility is the mainline’s misunderstanding of what
drives suburban culture: choice. Suburban identity is rooted in choice, and will choose
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between congregations whether the denominations intended it or not. Short of a strict
parish system, federations trying to neatly divide the spoils of suburbia cannot finally
compel anyone to forsake choice in these matters.
Congregations which best provided religious goods and services to the middle
class thus prospered in suburbia, even within those practicing comity. Two Lutheran
churches in the same suburban county, for example, could in the spirit of cooperation
over competition still ultimately compete with one another by providing a more splendid
cultural homogeneity, better parking, or a more fantastic Sunday School class for new
parents. Comity’s even division of land did not ensure even division, over time, of
members or money.
Mainline denominations had shifted their assets and tithing channels to suburbia
under the assumption that this land was their land, and nothing would foreseeably alter it.
Though they may incidentally be competing with one another, this new focus on the
middle class was a strategic move by church leaders to curry the attention and tithes of
suburbanites with excess income. Writing in 1962, Winter again is useful here:
Denominational leaders have watched [suburbia]... with greedy eyes. These are
largely middle- and upper-class residential areas; they have adequate resources for
constructing church buildings; their residents are responsive to religious
programs; in fact, denominational leaders call these “high potential areas,” – and
they do not mean potential for prayer. In recent decades almost exclusive attention
has been given to establishing churches in suburban areas. 103
Mainlines thus essentially sacrificed the city churches to squalor as they banked on
suburbia to be their safe haven for cultural and financial security. Yet they were not the
only Christians in town.
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1.4.4 Evangelical invasion
The coup de grace for the mainlines’ plans for peaceable suburban flourishing
were those congregations who bypassed comity federations and non-competition rules
entirely. These nonconformists – typically Baptist, nondenominational fundamentalists,
or Pentecostal – planted with little regard for other congregations in an area and,
reminiscent of gas stations competing on corners of the same intersection, often even
built directly adjacent to comity-seeking congregations.104 To be fair, evangelical’s
suburban priority was driven by their contempt for urbanity as havens of secularism and
immorality, and by similar tithing/financial challenges in cities faced by mainlines.105
Their motives, in other words, weren’t simply about their own market-shrewdness.106
Still, their abruptly competitive actions were not well received by mainliners. Stereotypes
of the mainlines as overly procedural and evangelical independents as overly cavalier and
individualistic were surely upheld throughout these events; indeed, mainline leaders
sneered at the independents as sects and cults who were “positively war-like in their
aggressiveness.”107 They had expected suburbia to be a haven from the Bible-waving
fundamentalists that they felt were invading city centers.
Uncivil though the conservative churches may have been, they were eager to
grow the evangelical movement in suburbia and seemed to have little problem competing
with mainline congregations for members. Unwittingly only perhaps at first, they were
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appealing to that narrative of choice so core to suburbia. But choose evangelical churches
the suburbanites did. This marketplace dynamic, enabled by automobility, is what helped
launch to such success the conservative churches on the very soil the more liberal
mainlines had bet their future on.
Yet again automobility reveals its crucial role in another contemporary church
crisis: the demise of the mainline traditions. While other explanations for this carry
various levels of argumentative freight – capitulation to liberal theology, the end of
Christendom, culture’s distaste for high church, culturally irrelevant worship, etc. – they
remain at the level of ideas untethered to the technological and architectural changes
happening in real life. The failure of the mainlines to either adapt to or openly rebuke
suburbia,108 combined with the conservative church’s uncritical adaptation to it, ought to
be more richly considered in future tellings of 20th century American church history.

1.4.5 Changing Tides: Freedom of choice in religion
Spirituality in 1960’s America sanctified choice as a core religious virtue.
Although religious self-determination was a deeply held national value, it rarely took on
new meaning and vitality in a decade of questioning all authority and exploring new
vistas in politics, sexuality, music, and religion. The virtuous narrative of leavingauthority-for-discovery embedded in America’s founding documents found a rhyme in
the mix-and-match spirituality that flourished in these years as many youth left the
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church, experimented with Eastern faiths, and ultimately matured in the decades ahead in
the muddled New Age spirituality still thriving today. 109
It’s not coincidental that such a shopping for spirituality arose at the same time as
consumerized suburbia was coming of age. As sociologist of religion Robert Wuthnow
notes, “the emphasis that many Americans placed on questioning established social
conditions was itself rooted in social conditions. Freedom of choice was the rallying cry
of consumers even more than it was of civil rights activists and hippies.”110 If choice was
emerging as an identity-consolidating value in the shopping mall and real estate market,
the same was true in matters of faith. To be sure, that “Americans were deliberately being
taught to shop as never before” was not missed by religious entrepreneurs, who quickly
began marketing spiritual paraphernalia in shopping malls and church foyers.111
“Spirituality, like hamburgers, was increasingly something one could get quickly and in a
variety of ways.”112 Likewise spiritual truth and experience became a commodity,
something that could in many circles be hodgepodged together like assembling a
wardrobe. We could be a Methodist, but also hang Tibetan prayer flags, read Gnostic
gospels, and decorate with energy crystals.113
The impact of suburbia and automobility on minority faiths should not be
overestimated here. What counts is how suburbia’s children, consumerism and
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individualism, produced the right cultural context for such an explosion of pluralism and
elevation of religious choice.114 Post-war suburbia’s first children were reared in houses
designed, as noted earlier, for the cultivation of individualism; they were also the
television’s first children, soaked increasingly in advertisements, shopping malls, and
supermarkets all encouraging people to get out and decide with a choice what is best for
them. That commodified religious pluralism would blossom in this generation should
have surprised no one.
Those who did not finally leave the church still may well have left their church
for another one down the road. The choice narrative fueling pluralism paradoxically lent
a rhetorical force to those invading evangelical churches competing for suburban
adherents. If people wouldn’t leave Christianity categorically, then perhaps they could at
least leave higher-church traditions (as may be found among some mainlines) in favor of
the incoming low churches. These churches were likely rewarded simply for having the
minority report at that time in American church history.
Churches would in the years to come fight pluralism, postmodernism, and New
Age faiths, but do little to explore the consumerist values and choice narratives
undergirding them. It may well be the case that this inability to more deeply reflect on the
shopping elements of pluralism is a form of willed ignorance by church leaders unable to
acknowledge their own dependence on those very values and narratives.
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1.4.6 Consumerism helps churches adapt to suburbia
It has been shown that suburban culture is rooted in automobility, and blossoms in
consumerism, a cultural matrix of identity-formation rooted in choice-narratives.115 And
central to those choices is how to memorably tell different choices apart, what is usually
called branding. It’s how we differentiate Pepsi from Coke, identical products marked out
by the stories their advertisements tell. Their branding is how we tell them apart, and
perhaps why the “blind taste test” is so compelling: deep down we know they’re the
same, but love the vindication of knowing that without their branded stories, somehow
we really could tell a difference. Without there being a real difference, the choicenarrative which undergirds consumerism collapses.
Attractional branding among the churches was well underway before
automobility, as urban churches found themselves competing with the city’s alternative
socialities of leisure and theater.116 Automobility accelerated a consumer-market dynamic
among churches, which in turn accelerated church branding. One of the earliest examples
of church leaders deploying this technique to local congregations is the roadside reader
board. Where churches in pedestrian-scaled eras had scarcely needed to mark out their
buildings from one another, the explosion of automobility allowed Americans to
reasonably choose from among many churches. How would they tell one Baptist
congregation apart from another? These marquees – signs used more recognizably
outside movie theaters and other dens of entertainment – could help establish story and
identity for the local church among a people group who experienced most of their world
115
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through their windshield. “Such signs,” writes James Twitchell, “opens up a fascinating
subject: How do churches position themselves, how do they separate themselves from
one another, how do they break through the clutter of not just other religions but other
denominations?”117 The answer to those questions has been born out in the 50-plus years
since J.M. Stewart’s first church marquee, “The Witness,” was manufactured: snappy
politics, bite-sized wisdom, brimstone scaremongering, and sundry fifty-character streetside slogans. The highway thus became a contested space for church choice and
competition as they began “to separate and – again in adspeak – brand the specific
church.”118 These signs signaled not only the theology of the church, but a wider shift
among the churches as they scrambled for members as if they were a scarce resource.
Nowadays church branding has expanded to websites, attire, music, and ministry events.
This marketplace approach to pastoring and church planting came into maturity in
the 1980’s as a new breed of pastors applied lessons from advertising, retail architecture,
and brand savviness to the Bride of Christ. George Barna’s words in 1988 aptly capture
the wisdom of the age: “The major problem plaguing the church is its failure to embrace
a marketing orientation in what has become a market-driven environment.” The
mainlines were in full-scale decline relative to market-savvier and suburbia-suited
evangelical churches, but few had dared name what was happening. Here Barna was
finally naming the elephant in the room: if churches want to effectively attract new
members, they must capitulate to the reality that church affiliation in an automobilized
world is first and foremost a choice.
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In the landscape of plenty of churches, Barna and church planter Bill Hybels were
the mouthpieces of the church growth movement, ostensibly a trend of churches
capitulating to their need to adapt to suburbia’s commodification of religion. More to the
point, Hybels and Barna taught the clergy the art of customer feedback.119 What potential
church-shoppers say matters in this paradigm, and brand identity should match what
they’re looking for. Surveys said suburbanites didn’t like pews, big crosses, guilt-tripping
sermons, or dull music. And, sure enough, the churches of Hybels and others succeeded
in rapid growth as they took their cues for architecture, liturgy, language, and ministry
from what shoppers wanted instead of from prayer or scripture. Sunday morning became
about creating an inoffensive “seeker-sensitive” environment for worship and preaching.
Not unfairly, these ministers have been dubbed pastorpreneurs for their savvy more as
CEOs than as spiritual shepherds.
One of the church growth movement’s most notorious tactics was the
homogenous growth principle, or HGP. Following HGP’s basic premise that people are
likelier to join a voluntary association or social network when people are like them,
churches were encouraged to primarily seek growth through catering to specific
subcultures, economic rungs, and life stations – segregations sanitized as “people
groups.”120 Granted that automobilized prospective members have choice between
churches (and whether to church), this technique was what marketers call niche
marketing: a brand tailoring itself to best appeal to a target demographic. This is, almost
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verbatim, what Gibson Winter lamented in 1962 as the suburban captivity of the
churches, a whittling down ecclesiology to a social club for the rootless bourgeois.
Much has been said elsewhere of the church growth, seeker-sensitive, and
megachurch movements as overt capitulations to consumerism’s mindset, techniques, and
priorities.121 These critiques variously appeal to the Bible, cultural studies, and a wider
assault on social injustices associated with consumerism. They argue against the
suburbanization of the church, in other words, with a battle of ideas. What’s not often
noted is the role of automobility in the choice-narrative laying at the driving core of
seeker-sensitive and megachurch dominance. As this section has demonstrated over and
over, and which any reader may confirm by simply trying to walk to their preferred
church, such ecclesial consumerism and church choice can scarcely exist without the
automobile. These critics are making the same basic mistake as the mainlines did in the
decades culminating in their marginalization. Their comity federations were vain efforts
in civility to refuse the eclipse of the local church by the forces of choice and
competition, finally toppled not by a better idea but by the automobilized American’s
expanded ecclesial marketplace. So also with critics of the Hybels crowd, who are
unlikely to succeed in significant alternatives without confronting the foundational role of
automobility in delocalizing and commodifying churches. Cars and their attendant
geography of sprawl have made church choice very hard to be undone. Church
consumerism is unlikely to be reversed or challenged without a stubborn relocalizing of
ecclesiology and ministry at every level.
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1.4.7 Refrain: Pick your Sunday
Consider briefly how many churches the average urban or suburban American can
reasonably drive to, many of whom are catering to a fairly particular cultural niche. Thus
it’s possible to find a congregation with great kids program, sing our favorite songs, don’t
use wine in Communion, are racially similar to us, whose preaching is just as progressive
as we are, and whose café has tasty enough of lattés. And if the music changes, there’s
probably another church nearby that marks off a sufficient amount of those boxes. There
are so many churches to choose from for the automobilized American, it’s like trying to
choose an ice-cream flavor at Baskin-Robbins. It’s the 31 flavors of the body of Christ!
We can get just the right Sunday for us, and it’s up to you to choose which one.
This is an identity-forming choice-narrative at the foundation of ecclesiology. Any
sense of “belonging” in Christ with or to others is here ultimately an expression of one’s
choice. Fully eight percent of American Christians – evangelical, mainline, Catholic –
change churches annually, reflecting “a remarkably fluid religious environment.”122
Loyalty, fidelity, and stability become optional for this lowest-common-denominator of
body life. Parker Palmer’s proverb that “we might define true community as that place
where the person you least want to live with always lives,” and the Quaker saying, “True
community exists when the person you dislike most dies or moves away and someone
worse takes that place,” become tremendously irrelevant. 123 Church attendance and
participation in such settings can become expendable, throw-away, commitment-optional.
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1.4.8 Big-box Christianity?
The homogenous growth principle and many other church growth strategies have
combined to prepare the way for the megachurches. Here defined as congregations
constituting over 2,000 regular attendees, the number of these churches have exploded
along with suburbia in the late 20th century. Figure 3 shows that they swelled from 10 in
1970 to over 1,200 in 2005.124 At the conservative rate of one church crossing the 2,00
per-week threshold, as happened in 2005, it can be estimated that there are now 1,730
megachurches in America – about as many Lowe’s big-box hardware stores as there are
in the United States and Canada combined.

Few things are more telling of the megachurch’s success in its capitulation to
suburbia than their architectural resemblance to the rest of suburbia’s consumerist
subdivisions. They are “the culmination of the integration of religious practice into the
124
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freeway-driven, market-savvy, franchise form of American life.”125 Indeed, church
planters with dreams of going mega look at development and traffic patterns just like big
box retailers do, and even tend toward the same sites by the freeway.126 Automobility,
while under-critiqued by the church, has certainly been latched onto as a core concept to
be exploited for high-aspiring pastorpreneurs.
There also seems to be a very self-conscious decision among megachurches and
mega-bound churches to attempt to divorce their building styles from those of brick-andmortar traditional church buildings. 127 Instead their architectural cues echo the shopping
mall, movie theater, big-box outlet, and airport terminal. The message sent seems to be
not unlike the “I’m a Mac” commercials mentioned earlier; an eager attempt in
architecture to demonstrate “we’re the cool and hip ones; they’re the clunky and
anachronistic ones.” In this way even architecture becomes part of a brand.
There are acres of parking around a sprawling flagship campus building, which is
frequently facaded like a Best Buy with the church’s own brand logo. Wide lobbies with
flat-screen TV’s announcing upcoming events and missionary updates conclude with
easy-to-read arrow signs directing possible newcomers to childcare, a welcome desk, the
church’s retail strip (bookstore, music station, and café), and various worship venues.
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This is a finely-tuned organization engineered to optimally meet the felt needs and
experiential desires of attendees. 128
To be sure, while glorifying God and seeking the kingdom are undoubtedly the
driving concern for the tens of thousands on staff at these churches, in this car-capitulated
culture all their efforts tend to culminate in producing an entertaining Sunday morning.
It’s what Southern Baptist church consultants Thomas White and John Yeats call
“theotainment… an attempt to use entertainment to fill the spiritual needs of the church
attendees.”129 Highly-trained musicians, flawlessly-delivered messages that can be
remembered either with a podcast or with fill-in-the-blank sermon notes for iPads are all
designed to ensure a spiritually satisfying experience for all open hearts present. These
events are engineered to give attendees a spiritual high. Some churches even offer
multiple simultaneous worship services according to what you prefer – traditional chapel
hymns, contemporary worship, dance club, or drum circle – each manufactured and
staffed like a high-end cruise line venue.130 It all makes for an astoundingly well put
together performance worthy, if not of tithe dollars, then at least of applause.
Theotainment is another adaptation to suburbia, an effort to win over
automobilized church shoppers with the best product available for adults and kids alike.
It’s a church building and experience tailor-fit to the culture’s expectations for
satisfaction, instant gratification, and affinity groupings. What these may lack in biblical
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discernment or inspiration “they more than make up for in social adaptation.”131 West and
Yeats bravely note with regard to youth groups and those coming of age in this kind of
Christianity:
Society has trained them to be careful consumers, with an uncanny ability to ferret
out what best suits their personal desires. Christianity, for many in American
culture, is simply a selection on the Buffet of Religion. If they buy into
Christianity through entertainment, the show must go on to keep them engaged.
Thanks to the law of diminishing returns, that same show must continue to attract
their attention with newer or greater things, or else these shoppers will find
another, more interesting show down the road, which may or may not be another
church.132
Automobility’s commodification of religion, then, has produced another sort of religion
entirely. Rather than challenging Mammon, it plays by its rules. Instead of cultivating
fidelity, it strains only to keep our attention. The purpose of the gathered worship of the
church becomes not edification and exhortation, but entertainment.
Where have the Christians attending these churches come from? Overwhelmingly,
they’ve come from smaller local churches (44%) but also draw 28% from people new to
the area entirely (that is, new church shoppers). 133 Churches that so consciously scaled
themselves to the automobile, as megachurches have, are like the shopping malls and big
box stores described earlier that, in also scaling to the automobile, were able to
outcompete mom-and-pop stores in historic downtowns. Each could provide a similar
product, if possibly more cheaply made and overhyped, at a lower cost. Automobility in
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megachurches has created the equivalent effect of “economies of scale” for religious
associations. The little guys just can’t compete with these Wal-Marts of worship.
Their imitation of Wal-Mart styles of commerce reveals a new, deeply ironic trend
among suburban megachurch architecture. Retail chains such as Wal-Mart have been
widely credited with collapsing the economic vitality of local businesses in downtown
areas across the continent, leading many to lament the loss of America’s most livable,
walkable, and most idyllic neighborhoods. Indeed, while most Americans choose to live
and shop in suburbia, the most preferred setting to live in continues to be the small
town.134 They sense something has been lost, and dream of returning to it. Megachurches,
being the market-sensitive adapters that they are, have realized this and begun to include
fake small town plazas and commons into their architecture.135 It’s a move that another
engineer of suburban delight, Walt Disney, incorporated half a century earlier in his first
theme park’s first steps with his gimmicky Main Street USA. And like Disney, it’s all
designed to be predictable for the consumer and profitable for the provider: many of these
ecclesial re-jiggings are stacked with church-owned businesses. The New York Times in
2002 reported the following of two such churches:
For Fellowship Church in Grapevine, Tex., attracting young congregants, and
keeping them, has helped it grow from 30 families to 20,000 members in a dozen
years. Fellowship offers a 40,000-square-foot youth center with a climbing wall
and video arcade and is creating a lake to encourage father-son bass fishing.
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Prestonwood Baptist Church in Plano, Tex., has a youth center so elaborate that
some have called it Preston World: 15 ball fields, a 1950's-style diner and a fitness
center, as well as classrooms and a 7,000-seat sanctuary. It is adding a $19 million
school, coffee shop, food court, student ministry center, youth building, an
outdoor prayer walk, a chapel and an indoor commons, modeled on the idea of
Main Street. ''We're not a large church,'' said Mike Basta, the executive pastor.
''We're a small town.''136
Rather than advocating or investing in returning neighborhoods to this walkable, human
scale, megachurches have simply offered a simulacra of it, a sadly plastic memorial
Mayberry to the once-lively neighborhoods upon whose demise their religious styles
have long depended.

1.4.9 Automobilized diaspora of the ministries
It’s not just Sunday morning theatrics and building styles that have been infected
by automobility and consumerism. Even how ministries are provided and organized
ultimately capitulate to these forces. Consider the common division of ministries into,
broadly, the following six categories: fellowship (home groups), scripture (Sunday
School classes, Bible studies, etc.), mission (soup kitchen, missionaries, AIDS relief,
prostitute outreach, etc.), recovery (drugs, divorce, porn, alcohol, etc.), Sunday efforts
(music, audio/video, youth group, ushers, etc.), and affinity (snowboarding, life-stage,
knitting, etc.). When the desire to grow deeper in the life of the church is expressed, these
are the common places to find opportunities to serve and be served. Discernment for how
to live into spiritual gifts and talents is not made; it’s an individual, yes, choice. And
shifting from one to another, or shopping for the right one? Also, a choice.137
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The fellowship groups suffer acutely in this choice-based organization of church
life. Although named after their neighborhoods, they are regularly stocked with people
commuting past closer fellowship groups to get to their preferred one. If there are too
many single people, or not enough, or too many End-Timers, or too few, or the kids are
too loud, or whatever: all these are unquestioned criteria for how people decide on where
to grow. Affinity and similarity become, as Gibson Winter lamented, once more the
organizing principle for the church within a given church. The naming of these groups
after neighborhoods or quadrants of town thus perform the same fallacy as comity
federations decades ago, in neglecting the power of automobility over civilly-suggested
localism.
Now map these hypothetical ministries, relative to where participants live and
where the church building is. There’s little overlap. Fellowship groups are dispersed
throughout the city and sprawl, the youth group only meets in the church building, and
the compassion ministries variously serves soup downtown, combats sex trafficking on
the north side of town, and helps the elderly near the Olive Garden get their groceries.
Afterwards, each participant leaves the ministry setting, returning to their dispersed
homes. Again, there are likely only incidental correlations between ministry site and the
participant’s housing. We love our neighbor on the other side of the city, but remain
estranged from our neighbor next door.
Finally to be considered is the impact of segregating these ministry contexts from
one another on their makeup, faithfulness, and spiritual health. In a choice-shaped,
automobilized church, the social justice people will sort themselves into the compassion
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ministries, zealots join the evangelism team, the exegetes will flock to the Bible studies,
and the fellowship groups organize by affinity and life stage. Thus, to risk caricaturing
the situation: the justice crowd burns out by not being nourished with scripture and
fellowship, the Bible studiers don’t translate their studies into mission together, the
addicts might only know other addicts, and the singles and families stay apart from each
other.
Each becomes, in other words, an echo chamber and a dead end. Those studying
scripture can, divorced from the poor and oppressed, develop theologies that blindfold
them to the scriptural mandate for justice and compassion. Evangelists, meanwhile, can
continue to nurse worries that the justice crowd really only is about the social gospel. And
so on. The expected pillars of biblical discipleship – mission, community, personal faith –
become separate pillars of an automobilized ecclesial bureaucracy that Christians can
choose from, separate, and ultimately pit against one another. There is no place in the
geography of nowhere for these three things to interlock. What God meant to go together,
the suburban church is able to tear apart.
And what suburbia has torn apart (families, neighborhoods, identity, contexts for
community), the suburban church has promised to bring back together in its many
splendid ministries and theotainment venues. The suburban church has, in short, adapted
brilliantly to America’s automobilized landscape by attempting to fill the voids created in
suburbia’s wake.
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1.4.10 Other shifts
Before concluding this extended study, several brief impacts of suburbanized
Christianity will be considered. Along with each are questions for deeper reflection and
further study. Note that all are conjectural and sometimes anecdotal, thus meriting further
study for confirmation, refinement, or rejection.
Commitment fears. Fidelity and commitment to making things work out in a
congregation are, in a mobile society, increasingly optional. The hardships and damage
caused by infidelity, addiction, or anger can simply be driven away from. Likewise, one
can avoid committing to a congregation in such a society and keep their cards as close as
they feel comfortable. In a culture torn apart by sky-high divorce rates, and accustomed
to consumer goods only getting better every year (think of the iPhone’s liturgical calendar
of renewal), there has developed in many a deeply seeded fear of commitment in all
aspects of life. This is a fear automobility has only given leverage to; just as cars made it
easier to get to a preferred church, so also our dispersed automobilized lives also make
escaping tough or undesirable churches much easier. Detangling ourselves from tough
situations is much, much easier. How might the suburban church’s capitulation to
spiritual consumerism be stalling restoration and fidelity in these matters?
The “One Anothers”. Much discipleship in contemporary evangelicalism is
focused on biblical knowledge, ministry participation, and therapeutic self-help. But
there’s little about the “One Another” commands in the New Testament. Christians are
taught that they are forgiven, but not how to forgive one another; that God bears with
them in mercy, but not how to bear with one another in mercy; that we are reconciled to
God, but not how to be reconciled to one another; to consider God greater than ourselves,

60

but not how to consider others better than ourselves. Yet these teachings are precisely the
elements that non-automobilized, localist churches like house churches and new-monastic
communities focus so much on. The reason for this, frankly, returns to the issue of how
easy it is to escape tough situations and relationships, rooted again in how astoundingly
mobile we all are. The Christian disciplines that are most needed in a high-commitment
community of reconciliation are much less important for delocalized, individualistic
contemporary life patterns. We may no longer believe, in other words, that the “One
Another’s” are all that necessary. How can churches create contexts that make these skills
not only celebrated, but necessary? What shapes of ministry might churches pursue that
give plausible context to the “One Another’s”?
Family and Gender Roles. As has been shown, much that Americans assume
about gender roles and normative family life is radically shaped by suburbia. 138 The
single-family dwelling segregated from extended family and those in other stations of
life, wifehood centered on the purchasing (rather than production) of goods and services,
fathers working far from home and children, children getting jobs to buy junk rather than
to help around the house, elderly in care facilities, and families moving every few years
due to dad’s promotion are all symptoms of the car’s impact on families. And this
automobilized family is basically what conservative evangelicals have been defending as
a biblical view of family. This is ironic in light of Sections 1.3-4, which has shown
suburban economics and automobility to be chief enemies of families. How can churches
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celebrate family and defend it from the economic and technological forces that array
themselves against its health?
Sex. Driving from its earliest decades, as has been shown, has changed how
humans understand the values of chastity and fidelity. More than that, they’ve made
promiscuity – the patent evasion of chastity and fidelity – easier than ever. As the
churches struggles to celebrate a biblical sexuality of chastity and fidelity, how can
acknowledgement of this relationship between sexual license and a driver’s license be
mined for renewed purity?
New Church Activities. Automobility and accessible intercontinental travel have
permitted weekend retreat centers, Bible camps, and short-term mission trips as new
rhythms of faithfulness to the petrol-driven Christian. How have these hit-and-run
spiritual practices impacted how Americans relate to the divine, to a sense of sacred
space, and to other countries? Moreover, how has the explosion of itinerant missionaries
from America changed the world? How has the option of furlough changed how
missionaries embed in their fields?
Evangelism. Rodney Stark has shown that the early church’s remarkable success
in witnessing and evangelizing laid in its organization as extremely human-scaled.139 It
was even more human-scaled and kept at the size of real life than church life in the
Byzantine, medieval, or post-reformation ages. Meeting in courtyards of apartment
buildings, penetrating all social strata, and living ethically together at this scale provided
an immeasurably compelling witness, particularly in hard times. Most importantly when
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a local “lost soul” had a higher percentage of Christians among their neighbors,
acquaintances, and friends, their own conversion was much likelier. Yet automobilized
life is thoroughly dispersed and decentralized, thus making evangelism much more
difficult. As important as pluralism, Enlightenment thinking, and postmodernism are as
challenges to evangelism, from a sociological perspective the dispersed nature of church
life in automobilized societies must be explored. How can the church redeploy the
evangelistic lessons of the early church’s hyperlocalism in a car-shaped society?

1.5 Testing the Argument So Far
We can look for an impulse toward localizing church, defragmenting our lives,
and re-appreciating place and proximity among ministry innovators and thought-leaders
to test out whether my immense arguments on automobility’s changes to American
Christianity are even half true. Like the old story of blind men apprehending parts of the
same elephant as different objects we should expect American Christians to be
responding to automobility’s wake under other auspices.
This extended excursus’ “blind men” are the missional church, megachurch, new
monastic, and emerging church movements. Although others have likewise sought to
unify these movements through the rubric of post-Christendom – a conclusion I
constructively agree with – I contend that a narrative purely of competing abstractions
has insufficient explanatory power for these movements’ emerging harmonies. The
radical rejiggering and de-localizing of society wrought by automobility, suburbia, and
consumerism must also be considered as a key stimulus behind them. Behind each is the
impulse to re-localize ecclesial habits, precisely because of automobility’s enormous
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ecclesial shifts noted earlier. This subsection will, in sum, outline the elephant these blind
men have been feeling out, and show it to be in the shape of, however oddly, a car.

1.5.1 The Blind Men
First I will review church’s leading movements with special consideration to how
they seem to respond to automobility’s delocalizing of the church. The impulse to
relocalize will be seen through the common denominators of contextualizing mission,
valuing embodiment, pushbacks against individualism, and return to a shared life. I will
spend a disproportionate time reviewing the missional church conversation because of its
comparative prominence both now and seemingly in the future.

1.5.1.1 Missional
The missional church movement, provoked by the steady crumbling of
Christendom and a steady decline in church attendance, begins with a paradigm shift
calling for a missionary encounter with Western cultures. This encounter summoned
Christians to wholly reconsider how to exegete culture, what the nature of the church is,
and how the gospel embodies in different cultures.140 As wave after wave of questions on
God’s purposes for a church within society lapped up against Christendom’s brittle
edifice, Western theology’s usual answers felt less and less satisfying; the need for a new
vantage point was evident. Amid this identity crisis, the church needed to extricate itself
from the cultural moorings that held captive its theological imagination.

140 Michael Frost, Exiles: Living Missionally in a Post-Christian Culture (Peabody, MA:
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This crisis of the church’s story was resolved by submitting it to God’s bigger
story of God’s mission to reclaim and inhabit creation. 141 Thus the church’s nature
becomes embodied at the intersection of gospel and culture, regaining her ecclesial
imagination through exploring how to live within God’s mission in their place and time.
Missional thinkers use the model of the Incarnation for ecclesiology. God’s
mission was advanced by God’s inhabiting creation, becoming fully human and
tabernacling among us. Alan Hirsch and Michael Frost write that they “believe the
Incarnation should inform our mission in God’s world – how we, as the fruit of God’s
Incarnation, should ourselves be and become incarnational. … We believe it
[incarnation] must define and change the way we do mission in any context.”142 Hirsch
and Frost focus on the Word’s incarnation as Jesus of Nazareth as a wellspring of
ecclesial inspiration whose waters tend stubbornly to trickle toward the primacy of place,
locality, and geography in post-Christendom faithfulness:
• Identification: As Jesus redeems through identification with cracked humanity,
so the church lives in identification with the people of a place/culture. It is the
biblical norm for joining God’s mission to the world.
• Locality: Jesus participated in God’s mission in one particular place, among one
particular people. His legibility there, and comparative illegibility to us 2,000
years and 6,000 miles away, testify to the excruciating particularity and
provinciality embedded within the logic of Incarnation.
141 Alan Hirsch, The Forgotten Ways: Reactivating the Missional Church (Grand Rapids, MI:
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• Real and Abiding Presence: God’s Incarnation reveals God moving into a home
(creation) while it’s still messy. God’s steady presence brings transformation.
Rooted stability, likewise, lets church be present to the world’s wounds.143
The missional-incarnational approach thus relentlessly assaults many dividing
lines (ideological or geographical) between sacred and secular. Christendom quartered off
church property for church activity as sacred space. In automobility’s fragmented
landscape this quarantining of the Holy became even more caustic and dangerous to the
ecclesial imagination. Christendom church buildings at least blended with the fabric of
commerce and residence, resisting momentarily its own fragmenting impulse. But
asphalt-ensconced suburban chapels, removed from “real life” settings, caricatured
Christendom’s sacred-secular segregation to the point of tragedy. “Church life,” in
automobilized Christendom’s worldview, happens in designated places; an antiincarnational logic that even many house churches succumbed to.
The missional church has thrown all its might at tearing down this wall. To the
question, “Where is the Lord at work?” the missional church would reply a resounding,
“All over! God is not locked up in the church, much less a church building. God’s
mission is happening everywhere, and the church is a sign, foretaste, and herald of that
work.” Therefore an incarnational church’s shape emerges from genuine engagement
between gospel and culture. And that means “joining God in the neighborhood.”144 It
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means a patient participation with God in what God is already up to. The shape of the
church, not only oral presentations of the gospel, is dramatically contextualized.
Locating the church between gospel and culture invariably assumes place,
locality, and neighborhood. What, after all, is culture without place? It is pop culture: an
exportable, decontextualized, consumerist ellipse of dissatisfied voracity. The gospel can
hardly contextualize for long in such a de-tethered, withered, and shrink-wrapped notion
of culture. Efforts at contextualizing the gospel to contextless culture results in an
emaciated, spectral shape of the church contoured by desperate strains at relevance,
theotainment, and attractional sentimentality. No: the gospel of the Word becoming flesh
is meant to be embodied, and this means contouring it to the particular lives and stories,
bullet holes and buildings, vegetation and artifacts of this place. It becomes good news
for this neighborhood.145
It isn’t just missional’s frameworks that assume a re-localized church; their advice
assumes a neighborhood-scaled faithfulness which de-fragments church polity and our
scattered lives. Missional writers Alan Roxburgh, Darrell Guder, and Alan Hirsch will
now serve as field guides, demonstrating the place-based nature of their advice.
Alan Roxburgh’s arguments are “born out of a passionate desire for local churches
to embrace the missio Dei in their neighborhoods and communities. The heart [of my
work] is to address these questions: What is God up to in our neighborhoods and
communities? What is the nature of an engagement between the biblical imagination and
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this place where we find ourselves, at this time, among these people?”146 Where many
missional writers use culture, note Roxburgh’s forcing the issue of place: he rarely uses
the word culture, preferring instead neighborhood. After reflecting on the post-Christian
nature of many neighborhoods and the wider culture, Roxburgh writes that “the local and
ordinary are keys to how churches in America will reform themselves to join again with
the mission of God in the world.”147 He advises churches stuck in a dying Christendom
paradigm forwardly, paraphrasing Jesus’ commissioning of the 70 in Luke 10:
If you want to discover and discern what God is up to in the world just now, stop
trying to answer this question from within the walls of your churches. Like
strangers in need of hospitality who have left their baggage behind, enter the
neighborhoods and communities where you live. Sit at the table of the other, and
there you may begin to hear what God is doing.148
Elsewhere Roxburgh extols the parish system in conjunction with a Jeremian
ecclesiology as fruitful ways forward for the local church.149 He is “appealing for the
recovery of the local and particular ways of calling forth the personal once more in the
towns and neighborhoods where we live. For me, this is about dwelling among, working
beside, and eating at the table of the men and women who live in our communities.”150
Roxburgh concludes with ten marks of a missional-local church. The first five
focus on re-localizing the church. They are, with extracted summaries, this:
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1. Go Local: “Develop habits and rules in our local churches that help our people
move back into their neighborhoods… as the focal location of Christian life
and rule.”
2. Leave Your Baggage at Home: “…learning how to have basic, simple,
ordinary human relationships with the people in our community without any
other strategy or intent.”
3. Don’t Move from House to House: “settle into the neighborhood, bloom
where you’re planted, and stop imagining there’s a better place or the grass is
greener on the other side of the fence. … There could be nothing more
powerful as a witness ... than Christians who take this vow to stability and
make their own neighborhoods the primary location of their lives.”
4. Eat What is Set Before You: “readiness to enter into the world of the other on
his or her terms rather than our own.”
5. Become Poets of the Ordinary: “It is in the safe space of table and
conversation that we hear the rhythms and stories of our neighbors. This is the
context in which we can become poets of the ordinary who connect people’s
stories with God’s great story.”151

Roxburgh’s vision of the missional church bravely relocates our diaspora within God’s
mission by relocalizing, re-sacralizing, and de-fragmenting our lives. His lucidity in this
regard nearly breaks this subsection’s controlling metaphor, for Dr. Roxburgh’s clear
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move into locality is the blind man who, grasping the elephant’s tail, apprehends it not as
rope or tail but discerns the entire beast!
Darrell Guder, compiler of Missional Church, has likewise assumed a localized
faithfulness as appropriate response to contemporary North America. Unlike Roxburgh,
Guder tends to engage the symptoms of our automobilized contexts: urbanized life,
fragmenting of time and space, the modern self as consumer, and resource-abundance as
identity-forming.152 These are all intertwined with automobility and suburbia, though
Guder never quite brought automobility into focus. The symptoms were never
successfully harmonized to reveal the deeper diagnosis of automobility; the elephant was
never discerned.
Apropos Guder’s theological frameworks bend toward the local while rarely
saying so. As with many of this subsection’s “blind men,” a re-localized church is the
most natural setting to perform Guder’s theology. For example, Guder’s vision of the
gospel is God’s rule, as God’s shalom-bringing to creation. 153 Where does this happen but
in particular places, invoked by particular people? The gospel of God’s rule is revealed
contextually, which means the church of this creational gospel can ask, “What would it
look like for our neighborhood, for this place, to bear the mark of this gospel, to have
shalom? And what might God already be up to here, in giving shalom?”
It is much harder to scale these questions to the non-local meta-culture. Suddenly
ecclesial responses to (say) poverty become entangled in electoral politics, rather than
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embodying as a personal, local alternative to poverty-making systems. This is old hat for
Anabaptists, but as post-Christendom churches detangle the State from their
imaginations, they will realize that a healthy relationship between church and culture can
only be regained by attending to the local and the particular. There is no one-size-fits-all.
Guder’s church-and-culture section, appropriately, sounds suspiciously Anabaptist.154
This reveals Guder’s gospel-shaped ecclesiology: “The church represents the
divine reign [the gospel] as its sign and foretaste. … We live as the covenant community,
a distinctive community spawned by God’s reign to show forth its tangible character in
human, social form.”155 This means that the church of Boise looks different from Tacoma,
because the gospel will look different there. Why? The gospel of reconciliation, reign,
and shalom incarnates uniquely. This incarnational ecclesiology does not scale legibly to
the para-local because culture is most authentic when it is rooted in a particular place. As
noted earlier, de-localized forays into applying missional theology to placeless pop
culture finally corrode into gasping grasps at relevance in a perennially shifting culture of
cool. Franchising a one-size-fits-all version of Guder’s missiological ecclesiology misses
the point entirely: missional ecclesiology is not exportable, but only analogical. They are,
like Jesus, utterly unique local incarnations.
Finally, Guder’s ecclesiology leans strongly toward locality in its emphasis on a
church’s life bearing gospel witness.156 In our fragmented automobility, where is witness
given? Usually in designated “church” contexts or “evangelism” contexts. Missional
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witness-bearing assumes, though, that there is something about the church’s shared life
which heralds the gospel beyond Christendom’s quarantines. But where else in our
automobilized diaspora can Christians together herald the gospel? When we live far from
each other, our children attend different schools, we frequent different bars, and we don’t
work together, there is little sense of shared life. We are too fragmented for Guder’s
ecclesiology to take shape and for the church to publicly be the church. Christian
hospitality and reconciliation is rarely visible. Only de-fragmenting our lives through
relocalizing them together permits biblical witness. Again, this seems ever to be on the tip
of Guder’s tongue.
Widely-read Alan Hirsch recently co-wrote a lay-level book on missional with
Lance Ford that shows how strongly the movement bends toward locality.157 It shows
how a lay-targeted explanation of missional invariably returns to neighborhood, place,
and locality. Their book is so comprehensively aware of the need to de-fragment and relocalize that it has an entire chapter dedicated to the automobilized suburbia’s mammoth
challenges to missional Christianity. They seem to get it: faithful embodiment of the
missional conversation is most native to the context not of generic and impersonal sprawl
but to the local and particular. Place is the natural place to be missional.
In summary, the church’ post-Christendom identity crisis demands fresh ways of
imagining the role and identity of the church. The ways forward emerged by
subordinating ecclesiology to missiology, by shaping the church between gospel and
context. We have seen in the works of three prominent missional figures that this

157 Alan Hirsch and Lance Ford, Right Here, Right Now: Everyday Mission for Everyday People
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2011).

72

framework stubbornly assumes a re-localized, de-fragmented mode of being God’s
people. At times they are forceful about this; at other times, blankly unaware. They are
responding not only to post-Christendom, but also automobility.

1.5.1.2 Emerging/Emergent
By engaging postmodern cultures through inhabiting post-Christian cities and
universities, emerging church practitioners arrived at similar embodiments, priorities,
critiques, and language as missional folk. Engaging postmodernism and postChristendom in academia, that is, resulted in a different theology than engaging them
face-to-face. To be sure, emerging and missional have many differences. Yet a deep
consonance in each’s theological contours is in their assuming place, proximity, and
context as the proper arena for ecclesial creativity.
Emerging Christians are often disposed more toward orthopraxy than
orthodoxy. 158 If your faith doesn’t embody itself, queries the emerging church, then who
cares if it’s all that accurate? Embodiment matters, incarnation matters; the words we
confess must become flesh.159 And so, like the missional church, emerging Christians
pursue an immersive, whole-life faithfulness. Emerging from a Christianity that distanced
faith from works, these Christians seek to reunite them. And they won’t settle for

158 There is much more to it: emergers realized the shortcomings of reason in faith formation. If
reason feels less trustworthy, then what can we anchor truth in? Many turn to the validity of personal
knowledge, as something to tether our discourses to. Little wonder, then, that Michael Polanyi is cited by
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Polanyi’s vision see Esther Meek, Loving to Know: Covenant Epistemology (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books,
2011).
159 Tony Jones, The New Christians: Dispatches from the Emergent Frontier (San Francisco, CA:
Jossey-Bass, 2008): 157-162.
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embodying the faith in sanctioned church contexts; incarnation is for them a pioneering
act done in “real life.” The fragmentation of faith and life, public and private, sacred and
secular, discussed under missional again rears its head among emerging Christians.
Answers to their prayers won’t be a church program, but something lived out in their
neighborhoods, bars, and workplaces.160 No wonder so many emerging churches gather
in pubs, cafes, art galleries, and other third-places.
This incarnational trajectory flows from a richly creational theology that rejects
Christendom’s hasty dualisms of heaven/earth and sacred/secular. The popularity of N.T.
Wright’s creational eschatology and Wendell Berry’s agrarianism among emerging
Christians testifies to their abhorrence of even the slightest whiff of gnosticism.161
Salvation is the redemption of our bodies, and indeed of the whole cosmos. If this is true,
emerging Christians reason, then Jesus’ good news must be good news for this world and
this life.
To press this point, a creational gospel must take root somewhere. If God is
redeeming all of the cosmos, then the Emerging Christian is called to view right where
they’re at as a place of redemption. Echoing Guder’s gospel-shaped church, emerging
Christians’ next step is to root this theology over their fences, at their public schools, and
in their neighborhoods. The move toward embodiment and the de-fragmenting of heaven
and earth is a return to place.
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Lastly, many emerging Christians emphasize connective community, deep
fellowship, as core to Christianity. 162 This impulse is also most legible within place;
living in proximity to other Christians doesn’t guarantee community, but it certainly
facilitates it. Their shared, communal faith de-fragments and re-localizes Christianity.
The emerging church, while diverse, has common affections for a creational, communal,
and contextualized faith – all of which assume localization.

1.5.1.3 New Monastic
Of all the movements in this subsection, the new monasticism is the most
recognizably re-localized. Originating from a network of North American Anabaptist
intentional communities, the new monastic movement defines itself in part by its
localized nature: nurturing a common life, relocating to impoverished neighborhoods, and
geographic proximity are all foundational marks of such communities.163
Little ink needs to be spent on persuading the reader on this “blind man” touching
the elephant, for it seems this one has already written several books on raising elephants!
Yet one curious note that is worth further study is the startling overlap between the neoAnabaptist theology nurtured among new monastic communities, on the one hand, and
the missional church on the other. It seems as if the post-Christendom church and the
post-automobilized church are arriving at a manifoldly Anabaptist theology.

162 Sherry and Geoff Maddock, Tony Jones (ed.), “An Ever-Renewed Adventure of Faith: Notes
from a Community” in An Emergent Manifesto of Hope (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2007): 79-88.
163 The Rutba House (ed.), School(s) for Conversion: 12 Marks of a New Monasticism (Eugene,
OR: Cascade Books, 2005): 10-25, 97-111, 124-136.
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1.5.1.4 Megachurch
Finally, and surprising not least to myself, is the interest megachurches are
suddenly taking in neighborhood-scaled expressions of church. As noted in 1.4,
megachurches are churches uniquely adapted to thrive and grow in automobilized
suburban culture. Their paradigm has abandoned place and neighborhood in favor of
region and choice.
The megachurch paradigm is bumping into the very real challenges to faithfulness
posed by the culture that gave it life.164 As some missional consultants have tried grafting
missional into megachurches, the crisis of lifestyle fragmentation has become evident.
Because suburbia is the architecture of individualism, megachurches have also found
authentic community increasingly difficult to engineer in small groups, still less to
accelerate that fellowship into outward-bound mission. This blind man isn’t so much
aware of the elephant by holding its trunk as being thwacked upside the head by it. The
limits to church growth are being felt.
Most observable is the explosive development of satellite campuses and multisite-churches, of which there are an estimated 3,000 comprising over 5 million people. 165
Instead of planting new churches or expanding a central campus, multi-site churches now
have micro-gatherings across their region. Some of these worship venues are self-built,
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while many set up shop inside gymnasiums, schools, or cafes. Two thirds of these sites
electrically feed a sermon from the central campus.166
Multi-site churches are a baby step toward relocalizing, for they are only relocalizing the Sunday gathering, not the rest of church life. But the thing about baby steps
is, the first one is the biggest deal. What multi-site churches have done is legitimate
geography and proximity as the organizing principle of the church. Granted, some multisites define their venues according to stylistic preferences (alt-rock, hymns, parlor
chillax, etc) – consistent with the choice-driven narratives of suburbia. Yet generally
multi-sites are a real step toward the neighborhood and mending the sacred-secular
fragmentation of urban areas.
Other mega’s, such as Salem Alliance, use their financial girth to build
compassion-oriented buildings in needier neighborhoods. Visiting SAC’s four-story
Broadway Commons, I learned that many of the building’s uses were included after
extensively polling 650 neighbors and non-profits. The staff I talked to hadn’t considered
issues of gentrification or the possibility of members bringing renewal through
incarnational presence, but noted that a couple families have “under-the-radar” pizza
nights at their nearby homes.
Some have attempted to implant missional values into existing ecclesial patterns
and programs, often pointing toward the impulse to re-localize. One example of this is M.
Scott Boren’s Missional Small Groups, which echoes Roxburgh’s use of the word
neighborhood as the organizing principle and primary arena for small groups, renewal
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ministries, and outreach. The only way to make small groups do what most churches
want them to do, Boren insinuates, is for them to organize by place.167 Missional small
groups are another way larger churches are re-localizing to the neighborhood.
Finally, many megachurches have recognized that they ultimately cannot become
missional; it is incompatible with that paradigm. Instead, they are nurturing missional
communities within their wider faith franchise. Now, some megachurch pastors are
insisting, “Y’all are priests. Look what the scriptures say: You’re a royal priesthood. You
have a parish, a particular people, a particular place that God has called you to.”168 At
other times, maps are being used for attendees and members to proclaim particular places
as their calling. 169 These megachurches summon their flock into mission in their
neighborhoods! Some are even writing of a need for “macro” and “micro” expressions of
the church to partner together in the renewal of their cities and the church.170
There is a discernible undercurrent toward neighborhood among megachurches.
There are varying levels of awareness and forwardness on the topic, but the trend is clear:
small is the next big thing among megachurches.
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1.5.2 The Elephant
The blind men have told us what they feel, and our elephant has clearly emerged.
In their pursuit of contextual mission, shared-life ecclesiology, holistic praxis, integration
of sacred/secular, and an embodied faith, we have the shape of de-localized, highly
fragmented living. Their unity amid their diversity is an attempt to bring together what
our car-scaled landscapes have kept apart.
Thus if Figure 4 is a map of Churchtown, AnyState, we can easily move forward
in diagraming how each movement attempts to re-integrate the disparate. The following
diagrams are mild caricatures and generalizations that misses the complexity and
diversity of each movement. Their heuristic utility is nevertheless worth exploiting.
Figure 4: Scattered Life
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1.5.2.1 Missional
Missional writers return the life and mission of the church to the neighborhood.
This de-fragmenting of life often involves adopting or operating a “third place” business
such as a cafe, which is diagrammed here as the anchor of this missional church. 171 Thus,
all are encouraged to join God in the neighborhood of that cafe. The diversity in the
missional movement does not always represent this radical relocalizing. Indeed,
sometimes it may only involve a fading of the church building, and perhaps the relocating
of home and church friend to the cafe’s neighborhood. All the same this is a massive leap
forward in responding constructively to our automobilized diaspora.
Figure 5. Missional Map
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1.5.2.2 Emerging
The emerging church is the most difficult to map because of its radical diversity
of expression. Common strands of embracing community and inhabiting third places thus
permit us to diagram an emerging church with proximate/co-housing community and
pioneering enterprises like coffee shops at/near their gathering space.
Figure 6. Emerging Map
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1.5.2.3 New Monastics
The New Monastics take relocation and re-localization as a first-order act of
faithfulness, overwhelmingly in poorer or blighted neighborhoods. Thus the anchor here
is the soup kitchen, representing a poor area. New Monastics either form their own sort of
simple/house/organic church or, as with frontman Jonathan Wilson-Hartgrove, submit to
a nearby church. Entrepreneurial efforts like the cafe figure less prominently among new
monastics, and so are not featured as re-localized components here.
Figure 7. New Monastic Map
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1.5.2.4 Megachurches
Megachurches are inching toward re-localization in a variety of ways, including
neighborhood-uplifting campus facilities, satellite campuses, and neighborhoodorganized small groups. Salem Alliance’s construction of the Broadway Commons is
diagrammed above, though diagrams for megachurches’ relocalizing steps could also be
drawn. Like emerging churches, megachurches do not have a set way of re-localizing,
and so it is rare to find one church that could express in diagram all these shifts.
Figure 8. Megachurch Map
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1.5.2.5 Conclusion
This subsection set out to test my earlier work on automobility’s massive impact
on American ecclesial patterns by seeing if popular movements appeared to be
responding to said impact through adaptation and embodied critique. What has been
discovered is an immense undercurrent across the missional, emerging, new monastic,
and even megachurches toward re-localizing the faith. The diversity of those moving in
this direction, and in how they are re-localizing, affirms the earlier thesis that
automobility has indeed been an identity crisis for churches. The blind men have,
together, helped us discern the elephant we suspected all along.

1.6 The Problem in Our Past: We’ve Told Our Story Poorly
There are limitless ways to tell a story. Each version textures distinctly. Consider
the synoptic gospels: remarkably similar, yet each draws to the fore very distinct themes
and visions without excluding the themes and visions of the others. Thus Mark’s
“kingdom of God” and Matthew’s “kingdom of heaven” function as signposts to the same
reality in non-competing ways which, rather than limiting each other, permit a
reciprocally-enlightened reading of each text. What is rejected in the pages to come, then,
is a false dichotomy way of reading these texts, data, and history that pits them against
one another.
This dissertation’s arguments arise from a more synergistic way of letting
narratives texture a topic. Each is a different mode of knowledge that enhances a shared
understanding of the subject. This may also be likened to the different tools needed to
construct a chair; no lone tool can build the whole thing. Or again: adding a green and
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blue light to a red-lit room affords a full-spectrum understanding of the room’s contents.
Different bulbs, different narrative modes, should ultimately yield richer
understanding.172
Challenges arise in scholarship when its storytellers become stuck in one way of
narrating their topic, to the neglect of its other narratives. In telescoping toward some
essentialist “core” to the subject, we become oblivious to other ways of knowing and
narrating it. Elsewhere the particularity of our knowing collapses into provincialism, as
when jurist Hugo Grotius crafted an atonement narrative too gratuitously from his
professional expertise.173 Such scholastic dead-ending is classically captured by
Wittgenstein's maxim that our metaphors have a way of dragging us along with them.
“The model we choose to use to understand something,” says Iain McGilchrist,
“determines what we find.”174 The man with only a hammer tends only to see nails.
The discipline of history has long been acknowledged to suffer in this way, of so
arguing for a unified telling of a history that it tends to become exclusive to other voices.
The “Big Ideas” (history is a sequence of big ideas like liberalism or industrialism daisychained together) and “Big Men” (history is a bunch of powerful men asserting their
power) for history-telling looms steadily here. In response to these totalizing histories, in
the 20th century the discipline burst into a salvo of ever-bifurcating sub-disciplines.
Natural history, herstory, populist history, botanical history, geographic history, race
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history, and myriad others have crowded out the usual narratives of “Big Ideas” and “Big
Men.” Each provided fresh insight into aspects the dominant narratives left out. They are
new bulbs in a monochromed history.
These alternative modes have produced some of the most celebrated historical and
anthropological works of recent memory. Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel slew
older theories of race, divine favor, and cultural superiority of explaining the ascension of
the West to its present hegemonies by demonstrating the massive role of geography and
ecology beneath it all. Big ideas and great men certainly contributed to that rise: but that
they achieved such significance is due in no small part to the web of ecology, technology,
and industry in which they ripened. There is no Luther, for example, without Gutenberg’s
paper press.
The American church has proven remarkably slow to learn from all of this.
Important treatments of American church history consistently remain at the level of the
“Big Ideas” level. The roles of technology, architecture, and living patterns feel almost
incidental to their arguments. Consider consumerism’s treatment in several major works.
Darrell Guder’s seminal Missional Church explores consumerism in society and church
as it relates to postmodernism,175 while Robert Wuthnow’s acclaimed After Heaven
understands religious consumerism through the prism of 1960’s cultural upheaval. 176
Each is an important angle which have yielded much fruit. But the physical stuff by
which consumerism finds embodiment is an afterthought at best.
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Future-bent studies of tomorrow’s church are likewise guilty in only giving lip
service to technology. In their writings, technology like blogs, smartphones, and social
media primarily service an enhanced exchange of big ideas. While that is certainly true
enough, just how those technologies will impact church and spirituality patterns (still
less, relational patterns and home life) remains basically undiscussed. Tom Sine’s The
New Conspirators, Gabe Lyons’ The Next Christians, Tony Jones’ The New Christians,
and Phyllis Tickle’s The Great Emergence all variously chart out the future’s church
primarily through the lens of big ideas broadcast (but only mildly shaped) by technology.
The discipline of church history to date, in only exploring the topic through the
history of Big Ideas and Big Men, has come to be assumed that these ideas
(postmodernism, pluralism, marketing, whatever) would have causally emerged from
their predecessors. We’ve inherited a sort of “hearts-and-minds” determinism where ideas
and values emerge, evolve, spread, and eventually die without much regard for the
architecture, technology, or other artifacts of their context. In this view, postmodernism
was a tensed coil that would have burst out of modernism sooner or later, and its environs
were of little import to the final shape it took. The church’s historians have focused on
nature, not nurture; genetics, not context.
Contemporary responses to challenges in faith and life remain at the level of
ideas. The history of Big Ideas’ response is changing the hearts and minds of
churchgoers. This is all the more ironic at a time when themes of embodiment, creational
theology, and a renewed focus on praxis’ relationship to faith are all so en vogue among
Christian intelligentsia. Far more tragic than this coy irony is the tragedy with which this
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hearts-and-minds method has failed. 177 This failure is due in no small part to reducing
history and history-making to the level of Big Ideas. In this failure we’ve been trying to
build a chair with only a saw, to construct something with provenly inadequate tools. The
church needs a holist tool set for more honest history-telling, a timelier faithfulness, and a
more hopeful future.
We’ve only been lighting the halls of church history with one color of bulb, and
so have misunderstood it. We need more colors of bulbs. A full-spectrum reading of 20thcentury church history must include a history of technology and geography alongside that
of ideas and texts. We must consider what lies beneath these big ideas, in what
technologies, landscapes, and places they find embodiment, resistance, and
reinforcement. These in turn can help the church better engage its various contexts.
My extensive exploration on automobility’s role in church history showed how
much more richly we can tell our story as a faith when we tease out the links between our
physical and spiritual architecture. And because we’ve done so little of this for American
20th century church history, we’ve told it very partially. Automobility has not been
rigorously examined by academics or thought-leaders in the American church. At best,
their reflections are an aside within a bigger project.178 Practitioners of place-based
faithfulness and neighborhood-rooted Christianity have bumped into some of
automobility’s effects, though my research shows them rarely grasping the whole of it.179
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Indeed whatever grasping has been made does not seem to have substantially contributed
to the total issue. Telling our story so poorly has restricted our imagination for what is
possible in the future.

1.7 The Limits of Automobility’s Scope in History
We have shown that the past century of Christianity in America, particularly after
World War II, has been heavily shaped by automobility and suburbia. Cars, though, run
on oil – which means that the future of automobility and suburbia will be significantly
influenced by the future of oil. To cut ahead slightly in my argument, the gist of that
future is one of less and less oil. This is a hard reality to face, and even sounds crazy in a
time when humans consume over 31 billion barrels of oil annually. But that is only the
story above ground.
There’s more to the story below the surface of today’s oil-guzzling. Miles below
Arabia’s pumpjacks and the North Sea’s deep water rigs, and through thousands of miles
of refinery piping, a different reality is emerging. Today’s oil is harder to pump, ship, and
refine than last year’s oil. Next year’s oil will only be crummier. This is not a problem
with our infrastructure, regulations, or economy. It is an inescapable challenge rooted in
the unchanging physics of extracting oil from rock. That challenge is the bedrock
narrative of petroleum’s past, present, and future.

1.7.1 Oil from the rock
Petroleum settles in porous rock beds that are typically just below a lens of harder
rock that acts like a bottle cap. The oil varies in consistency from watery to tar-like based
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on how long a chain of carbon atoms is attached to that hydrocarbon’s molecule. The
longer the chain, the thicker and heavier the oil. Shorter strings like carbon monoxide are
gaseous and rest atop many petroleum deposits.180 These deposits, then, are like a
vinaigrette bottle with the olive oil settling at the bottom, vinegar on top of it, and air
above that.
Each deposit is uniquely composited by how it formed. Thus some oil deposits
have little to no natural gas above it, others are in more porous rock, and some have far
more pressure built up. Some deposits are easy to get to; others are much more
challenging. But one crucial constant is this graduated progression from thin to thick
stuff, which is closely tied to how we wrest oil from spongy rocks into supertankers.
When most oil deposits are first pierced by a drill, there is enough latent pressure
within the buried formation that the topmost oil – the thinner stuff – geysers up out of the
ground, Jed Clampett-style. The geysering doesn’t last for long. Journalist Sonia Shah
writes: “Once this initial natural pressure spends itself out, in order to keep the oil
flowing, drillers must start what is known as ‘secondary recovery.’ Their methods, using
pumps and shooting chemicals, gas, or soda water down the hole to keep the pressure
going, can stave off the inevitable decline in output.”181 These methods effectively
simulate that initial geyser-like flow. But as the thin stuff billows up the well, it leaves
behind the thicker oils in the rock. The longer a well is in production, then, the thicker
tomorrow’s oil becomes. Eventually, bizarre techniques are employed to loosen the goop
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into a liquid that the derrick can slurp up. In Canada’s thicker deposits, natural gas is
injected into the rock and then detonated. The resulting subterranean firestorm eventually
melts the sludge-like dregs without igniting it, rendering it extractable.
The extraction challenge doesn’t end there. Wells need more power to siphon the
sludge out – much as it’s harder to drink yogurt through a straw than water. Then this
sludgier oil yields less fuel-grade liquids (gasoline, kerosene, etc) than the thinner stuff
did, and likewise needs more energy to be refined into those products. Simply put, we’re
using more ... to get less ... more slowly.182
Eventually extraction costs exceed market prices, putting those wells on hold. The
pumps are turned back on as more of the sludgy oil becomes profitable with higher
prices. This is the difference between what the oil experts call reserves and resources.
Reserves are the oil deposits that are presently profitable and extractable; thus the market
defines whether a deposit is considered reserves or not. Resources, however, are the total
oil in the ground – including stuff so thick it would take more energy to extract than
would be recovered. It includes oil that will never be extracted.

1.7.2 Not all oil is alike
Conventional oil – light sweet crude oil – is what we have been discussing so far,
and it’s also the overwhelming majority of what is burned today. The ballooning in oil
prices since 2004 has resulted not only in an increase in reserves (see above) but also
opened up entirely new reserves of fossil fuels commonly dubbed unconventional oil. It
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is oil that never really has that “Jed Clampett moment,” for it was never much of an oil to
begin with. These unconventional fuels are:
• extra heavy oils, whose thickness varies from that of molasses to a solid, includes
the bottommost residues of most deposits and are only recoverable with a netenergy gain from some fields in bands of dirty, heavy oil;,183
• oil sands, which are blends of sand, clay, water, and extremely viscous petroleum
called bitumen;184
• oil shale, a fine-grain sedimentary rock soaked in kerogen, from which the oil
industry can produce an equivalent to conventional crude oil, albeit using extremely
energy-intensive and polluting technique;185
• coal-to-oil synthetics, a self-explanatory product of synthesizing fuel-grade oils
from coal which also requires much more energy to produce than conventional oil
needs to be extracted.
Together these unconventional oils exist all over the world, and in massive quantities.
We’re talking several trillion more barrels of oil, depending on who you ask. 186 That’s a
big deal, and one that has many pundits assuring the public that these reserves will power
industrial progress for another century or two.

183 World Energy Council, London, “Natural Bitumen and Extra-Heavy Oil” in 2007 Survey of
Energy Resources (London, UK: World Energy Council, 2007): passim.
184 Alberta Government, “Alberta’s Oil Sands,” http://oilsands.alberta.ca/resource.html (accessed
December 10, 2012).
185 James T Bartis, Tom LaTourrette, Lloyd Dixon, and D.J. Peterson, and Gary Cecchine. Oil
Shale Development in the United States: Prospects and Policy Issues (San Diego, CA: Rand Publishing,
2005): 1-3.
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That’s not the whole truth. While humanity will surely burn every last drop of
those recoverable extra heavy oils over the decades to come, their consumption rate
won’t remain anywhere close to today’s immense 86 million barrels per day.187
Unconventional oils suffer the same challenges as the remaining trillion barrels of
conventional crude oil, only worse. Unconventional oils need more energy to extract, and
still more energy to refine into the commercial fuel grades; those our entire modern
infrastructure was singularly built for. 188 Together this means lower net-energy gains,
which makes unconventional oils even less of a mitigating aide than is commonly
suggested. Most important for our purposes here, unconventional oil’s extraction rates
will never match today’s enthusiastic flows of conventional oil.
There is plenty of oil left that humanity will burn. But the easy oil is gone.

1.7.3 Oil production’s total lifespan
As oil fields mature, that goopier crude oil slows down production. Its rate of
production – how many barrels of oil it extracts every day – steadily begins to fall, no
matter how hard industry experts kick their pumpjacks into overdrive. More wells can be
dug and equipment fine-tuned. But none of it can compensate for the increasing
heaviness of the oil that’s left in older fields.
In the 1950’s, a Shell geologist named M. King Hubbert chronicled this
phenomenon. He studied declines of mature oil fields and extended their rates to younger
fields. He found that oil production for a given set of wells steadily increases initially,
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enjoys a long plateau of production for most of its life, and then finally declines. Around
the well’s 40th year, half of the field’s oil has been extracted. It is then that the production
rate peaks and steadily declines, even more so in the well’s final years.189 Because the
thinner oil has been extracted, the remaining thicker oil in field’s bottom half does not
permit a reversal of this decline. Various techniques may slow production decline, but
nothing can reverse it. When you add several wells together, the overall production rate
begins to form a bell curve, as seen in Figure 9.190 This, Hubbert claimed, was true of
specific fields, states, countries, and even the world. Local, national, and global oil
production always live within the shape of a bell curve.
Figure 9. Hubbert Curve, 8 Wells

189 Marion King Hubbert, “Nuclear Energy and the Fossil Fuels” in Drilling and Production
Journal. American Petroleum Institute (San Antonio, TX: 1956).
190 Paul Thompson, “The Wolf At The Door,” http://watd.wuthering-heights.co.uk/chartpages/h/
h3hubcurve8.html (accessed November 4, 2011).
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In 1956 Hubbert presented his findings to the energy industry. He calculated a
peak in US oil production around 1970, and worldwide around 2000. Thus 1956 also
marked Hubbert’s own peak in popularity; his paper yielded bitter condemnation by
executives and geologists alike.191 He had pointed out the plain fact that oil is finite, and
applied his expertise towards it. Telling this to a room full of oilmen in San Antonio,
Texas, however, is like telling a four year old that their birthday party will end in 10
minutes. Both only end in a tantrum. Hubbert’s career declined quietly.
The thing is: Hubbert was right. Around 1970, US oil production began to level
off. Within the decade America became a net oil importer. By the middle of the decade, it
was clear among oil and gas geologists that old Mr. Hubbert’s prediction was correct.
Unpopular though they may be within the industry, the validity of Hubbert’s curve
models have gone unchallenged in the 55 years since they were released. None can argue
with the simple science unpacked earlier of the natural grading of oil in the ground. Oil
production always peaks; oil production rates always decline.
What about M. King Hubbert’s prediction of a year 2000 global peak production?
He was probably only off by about five years. Energy expert Matthew Simmons
concludes with other observers that the “best data makes a convincing case that global
crude oil peaked in 2005.”192 Total liquid fuel (conventional plus unconventional)
production has been about flat ever since.
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Crummier, costlier unconventional oils are filling this widening gap between
declining production and increasing demand.193 How long these unconventional oils,
natural gas liquids, and biofuels will be able to offset decline remains to be seen. The
increase in market prices over the past decade has caused an explosion of exploration for
more reserves. But most of these searches have come back empty-handed.194 Some deep
sea deposits have been found, and the increase in oil’s market price has made tar sands
profitable, though each of these coming with massive costs to energy efficiency and the
environment. These newer wells – drilling as they are for crummier grades of oil – will
not be able to offset decline from the world’s once fast-pumping conventional oil fields.
Once again we return to the uncomfortable reality that the easy oil is gone.
Figure 10. Uppsala Global Petroleum Chart
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Reviewing the best publicly available data, conventional oil production likely
peaked in 2005.195 As unconventional oil projects have come online since then, total
liquid fuel production has risen slightly but remained in a basic plateau since 2004 (see
Figure 10).196 Some suggest an imminent descent from that plateau, while others have
suggested this is just a false summit, anticipating true peak oil to arrive sometime after
2030. Experts and institutions braving a guess at this timeline cluster around one of those
two times – decline beginning around 2013 or 2030.
I conclude that those proposing a late peak do so without warrant. The
International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook predicts a 2035 peak.197 Their
projection isn’t just an extension of the plateau for another two decades. It’s a claim that
daily liquid fuel production will increase to 96 million barrels per day – 10% higher than
today’s plateau around 87 million barrels per day. To raise production to that level and
offset anticipated production declines, humanity will need to find and bring into
production as much conventional oil as three Saudi Arabias.198
Where will those new Saudi Arabias come from? The IEA isn’t so clear on that, as
Figure 11 shows.199 The teal wedge emerging after 2015 is crude oil that we have no
proof of existing. They’re simply making it up. To be sure, there is recoverable oil yet to
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be discovered. But in an era of high-tech oil expeditions, there is no reason to believe
we’ve missed three Saudi Arabias of it.
Figure 11. World Oil Production by Type in the New Policies Scenario

Combined with the undeveloped fields and a convenient line is drawn across the
graph suggesting that conventional oil will remain almost precisely level for the next 20
years. International experts have picked their reports apart, consistently being
unimpressed by the scholarship behind it.200 Writes Dr. Kjell Aleklett of the University of
Uppsala about the IEA’s even rosier 2008 World Energy Outlook:
In summary, we find the production outlook made by the IEA to be problematic in
the light of historical experience and production patterns. The IEA is expecting
the oil to be extracted at a pace never previously seen without any justification for
this assumption. In theory, it would be possible to achieve such a rapid depletion
200
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if proper investments were made along with sufficient access to the fields, but this
must be seen as an extreme case. Instead, the production policies of OPEC as well
as recent financial challenges indicate that one can expect lower depletion rates in
the future.201
There is therefore every indication that the regulating industries and think-tanks appear to
be inflating their projections without warrant, and that a late peak is unlikely. Therefore I
expect oil production to wobble near current rates for a while longer, with decline
beginning between 2012 and 2015. Although “the actual peak could occur by 2012, […]
its attainment will not be apparent for a few years.”202 The remainder of this project will
assume the timeline of Figure 10 with the caveat that the exact year of peak and of the
onset of decline is not so important as the general window of years within which to
expect it.

1.7.4 Estimates & eventualities
“Prediction is very difficult,” commented atomic physicist Niels Bohr, “especially
when it’s about the future.” In the case of peak oil, it is important to keep Bohr’s words
close at hand. Yet we need not let uncertainty and the many variables involved in this
topic collapse all considerations of it. Uncertainty is not the end of inquiry, but its
beginning – granted, of course, that it launched in humility and patience.
Good data is before us on oil decline, and its experts have consistently reminded
us of what we don’t know. That is, more than Bohr’s wisdom we must consider instead
Donald Rumsfeld’s maxim: “There are known knowns; there are things we know we
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know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some
things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don't know
we don't know.”203 These words stand as an important guide for the future of this
research. The Uppsala model, for example, is based largely on known knowns. So also is
the bare truth that oil production will eventually peak. A known unknown is the exact year
it will be, and the steepness of production’s decline beyond that year, though we can
make remarkably educated estimations. Known unknowns also include the mitigating
effects of renewable energy, political willpower, urban redesigns, new technologies, oil
wars, market/demand dynamics, and new reserves will have on decline. Below are some
educated guesses concerning some of these known unknowns.

1.7.5 Economic demand, geopolitics, and other uncertainties
If geology were left to itself, we would expect a relatively smooth downward
slope after peak oil. This slope will likely be quite a bit choppier as we include “above
ground” factors such as economic swings and military activities. A slew of military
actions could disrupt oil supplies: Iran blockades the Strait of Hormuz, 204 Venezuela or
OPEC embargoes the United States, revolutions in western Africa or Mexico, and
imperial aggression from Russia, China, or the United States. These crises would sharply
escalate oil volatility and price, and their brief drops in production could also absorb peak
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oil’s blame for such supply crises. Peak oil, in other words, can hide in the fog of the
wars it provokes.
Figure 12. Price, GDP, Max Production Scenario
Oil Price

GDP/Demand

Maximum Potential Oil Production

Growth-oriented markets, too, may keep bumping into oil’s limits. This would
look like 2004-2012 on repeat. 205 That is, we can expect a steady cycle of growing
demand raising oil prices, a sharp economic contraction and recession leading to lower
oil prices, enabling recovery and another continued attempt at growth, which would again
bump into the limits of growth, and so on. Figure 12 shows this hypothetical, and reveals
that peak oil and subsequent decline may further hide in these price-shock-shaped
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crevices on the Hubbert’s downslope. Rhythms of ratcheting down, not a clean-cut curve
downwards.
Remaining uncertainties about future oil production rarely suggest that there may
be more oil than we think. If anything there’s probably somewhat less than has been
reported. Official reserve reports from the most productive net-exporting countries seem
willfully inflated for economic edge.206 These inflated numbers are not given due
criticism from many industry-forged reporting agencies (IEA, etc) and so bad data tends
to get mixed in with industry bias and good data to further confuse more honest studies.
Summarily oil’s future is characterized by decline in quality and quantity. We
have already experienced a leveling off in quantity, and the new hot topic in Congress is
going after the lower quality oils. Thus although the exact timing of peak oil is uncertain,
there is much evidence to signpost a peak evidencing itself by the close of this century.

1.8 The Problem in Our Future: An Un(der)charted Tomorrow
Today’s automobilized ecclesiality won’t last long. The future of oil and
automobility is one of less. We are entering an age of weaning, of constriction, of less.
We are entering an age of relocalizing in all aspects of life. Apropos we should expect the
petrol-driven church to go through the very same challenges: weaning, constriction, less,
and local.
But we have not prepared ourselves very well for that journey. We’ve not
considered how to transition our local congregations, missions, denominations,
ministries, publications, or spiritual lives for this Age of Less and Locality. It isn’t on the
206
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table, and feels sometimes that we are racing with our headlights off, carefree about what
may be ahead. This is our problem: because we have no frame of reference, we aren’t
even trying to prepare holistically for what seems to be ahead. We must turn on our
headlights, slow down, and begin listening to one another about automobilized
Christianity’s inevitable denouement.

SECTION 2: OTHER PROPOSED
RESPONSES & MITIGATIONS
2.1 Preparatory Reflections
The scope of this project mandates that we consider the narratives used to argue
that we don’t need to have the conversation that Section 1.1 identified and Section 3
proposes. This includes the alternative historical trajectories and (for those that have
accepted energy decline) the diverse responses to peak oil. We must consider each for
culture broadly and then churches specifically. I will focus most of my energy on the
ecclesial issues for the sake of space, and direct my more skeptical readers to the
appropriate footnotes for further reading on proposed culture-wide trajectories and
mitigations.

2.1.1 Solutions vs. responses
I will not use the language of solutions in this section. Solutions imply a
controlled, manageable situation – something which peak oil clearly is not. Worse,
language of “solutions” reinforces paradigms of ministry and humanity which cast
challenges as problems to be solved and which subsequently prescribe a quest for
solutions. I take this as a bit presumptuous on our part. By labeling adversity as
challenges, we have more humble and accessible options such as responses and
mitigations. This rhetorical shift also allows us to say Yes to responses that are good but
103
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incomplete. Rather than looking for a silver bullet for churches or society to slay peak oil
with (and thus rejecting small meaningful responses), we can affirm such partial
negotiations. A response/mitigation view of the future thus is a more affirmative
paradigm for considering alternatives in this chapter and for crafting my own proposal in
Section 3.

2.1.2 Guiding principles for Section 2
It is important for me to be upfront at this point about the temptation toward
intellectual hubris and combativeness in Section 2. The tone of doctoral research is to gun
hard for one proposal, yet in making claims as ambitiously panoptic as I am in this
dissertation, I must proceed with intellectual responsibility. The suggested scholastic
voice of strong argumentation, then, will not do here; I will not let my lofty arguments be
hamstrung by the perception of hubris. To be sure, I will argue forcefully against
alternative trajectories and mitigations only as discrete certainties. My research
repeatedly cast me headlong into strong visions of the future by many writers – visions of
apocalypse, infinite progress, church revival, and more. Many of them seemed to get
things partly right, and can’t be dismissed wholesale. That these proposals each seem
partially correct underscores the intellectual offense I took to the exclusivist tone they
were drafted in. Subtlety and openness to surprise felt lacking across the spectrum.
I am confident in my sense of where the world is heading, and hope to persuade
you about it. But the future is so open that it would be arrogant of me to, in the name of
scholastic gusto, reject the possibility that some of these alternatives may seep into what I
suspect will actually happen. Section 3’s strong proposals are therefore porous, and I
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expect some of what this section critiques will make their way into what actually
happens. More to the point: energy decline difficulty will be graded contextually because
it is a return to the local and particular. Context will again be king. Hasty dismissals of
technological salves or brutal desperation in the years ahead may only be warranted in
particular places. Sometimes technology will save the day, and sometimes things will get
grotesquely difficult. But painting the entire future with one of these and not granting
anything in between lacks intellectual virtue.
The proposed trajectories will generally be critiqued according to their likelihood.
Some trajectories are astonishingly remote, and will here only need a prompt kicking
over. At other times my plumb line will be the consequences of trusting in them. The
proposed mitigations and responses may corrupt our humanity and resist shalom; in this
regard I will reject them according to their relative wisdom. The shape of these critiques
thus echo how the Jewish prophetic tradition rebuked idols: they are not really gods
(likelihood) and they form us destructively (wisdom). As will be shown, many of our
beliefs about the future are rooted in some form of soft idolatry – be it of progress,
violence, or human potential. I will treat them accordingly.

2.2 Proposed Cultural Trajectories & Mitigations
The four trajectories used to understand our culture’s future that I will explore are
techno-progress, a greener status quo, collapse, and transition. The first two trajectories
extend from a metanarrative of progress while the third can be thought of as a darkly
alternative interpretation of where progress is headed. In the progress metanarrative
human suffering is lessened and flourishing increased through the steady application of
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technology, reason, and freedom. The collapse metanarrative, on the other hand, suggests
that our undoing is embedded within our collective hubris, that the monster will
inevitably get Dr. Frankenstein. The fourth option, transition, is a more positive and
collectively actionable version of collapse.
Some are culture-wide and others are scaled closer to the individual and
household. Each will, for this dissertation’s purposes, assume peak oil’s imminence and
be responsive trajectories to that.

2.2.1 Techno-progress & silver bullets
Techno-progress is the matured narrative of the Enlightenment hubris that
adversity to human flourishing can be melted by the proper application of science,
technique, democracy, and freedom. Lewis Mumford called this “march of civilization”
narrative1 “mechano-idolatry” precisely for its religious tone of an inaugurated
eschatology. 2 It is one of the most commonly broadcast sentiments out there, and is easily
found in our political discourse and periodicals.
It is also one of the most ludicrous. Worse than being cocky, the techno-progress
response to peak oil is really a soft form of denial of limits. Yet limits exist, and I will
show below that there is no combination of alternative energies or transportation modes
that can replace cheap, abundant oil’s role in our society. It is not a question of whether
there will be high-tech in the future, but whether we will have the energy to produce,
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ship, repair, and power those devices. We are very ingenious creatures, but cannot rely on
ingenuity alone to get us through this. Consider the various “silver bullets” often fired off
at peak oil (along with my demythologizing of them):
• There is nearly limitless petroleum: Section 1.7 showed the oil still in the ground
is mostly from dirty unconventional sources that cannot be extracted quickly
enough to compensate for declines. Reports circulate that it may not be so. Recently
Harvard’s Leonardo Maugeri’s “Oil: The Next Revolution” made headlines around
the world claiming in its summary, “Contrary to what most people believe, oil
supply capacity is growing worldwide at such an unprecedented level that it might
outpace consumption. This could lead to a glut of overproduction and a steep dip in
oil prices.”3 The report, though, has been thoroughly deconstructed 4, 5 as reflecting
“a poor understanding of the accuracy of oil data and his statements are in my view
political and not scientific.”6 Even supposing the industry experts are wrong in
refuting Maugeri’s claims, he has hardly refuted peak oil. All his numbers do is
argue for a slightly delayed inevitability.

3 Lenoardo Maugeri, “"Oil: The Next Revolution" The Unprecedented Upsurge of Oil Production
Capacity and What It Means for the World” Discussion Paper 2012-10, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22144/
oil.html (accessed November 5, 2012).
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• Economics: Techno-progressives of a conservative tendency often cite the power of
the market to solve problems and open up new reserves. It is part of the logic
behind Mr. Maugeri’s mad claims of a coming oil glut: higher oil prices made
grimier reserves economically viable, leading to tens of millions of new production
coming to market later this decade. The media and pundit’s tone about these
announcements suggest that it was economics that created the oil, and eradicated
the problem of peak oil.7 Their rhetoric, tightened for quick digestion by readers, is
that economists can eliminate the limits to economic growth; new oil projects didn’t
just kick the ball downfield, but netted the game-winning goal. Nothing to worry
about, game over, go home. As The Telegraph’s coverage of Maugeri opens, “So
much for peak oil.”8 This is dangerously naive. Naive, because the law of the
conservation of energy and matter are not vetoed by the Almighty Dollar.
Dangerous, because of the passivity it can engender. “If he’s right,” says one
leading British economics commentator of Maugeri, “we can indeed stop worrying
about a lot of things… It seems to be unadulterated good news all round.”9
Considering the urgent benefits of breaking our oil addiction, such passivity is not
what the world needs.
• Elbow Grease: Techno-progressives of a more liberal bent often believe that a
Manhattan Project or Apollo Program for overcoming peak oil will get is through
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this. They propose the “Yes We Can!” way forward: enough elbow grease and
courage and we can beat this thing. But look at the United States’ last election
cycle: both candidates were bragging over who will be able to produce the most
petroleum and coal! The political will is simply not in America’s hand at the
moment. Big Auto was bailed out but not refitted for a low-oil future. While I am
skeptical enough of boasts that we could outflank peak oil with enough American
ingenuity, these sorts of developments make me even more skeptical that we will
ever transition toward that possibility. Any elbow-grease mitigations that happen
seem like they will be very grassroots (see 2.2.4Transition Towns below).
• Electric cars: Electric vehicles (EV’s) are already partial mitigations of oil decline,
but they won’t come anywhere close to replacing internal combustion engine (ICE)
vehicles.10 The reasons for this are complicated. Infrastructure for getting electricity
to end-users is part of it, but it also has much to do with our maxed-out electrical
grids. The gist of the argument for a very limited rollout of EV’s is that we don’t
have the resources for it. It’s a great idea that our energy supplies cannot meet (see
the next two bullet points). Still, with a few significant upgrades and habits
instilled, it is possible to substantially electrify how Americans get around. Some
estimate that Europe’s transportation fleet could phase from ICE’s to EV’s with
only a 15% increase in continental electrical production. 11
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• Electricity via Coal: Coal is, like oil, an abundant but finite fossil fuel. Currently it
supplies 51% of America’s electricity.12 Proponents of EV ubiquity sometimes
suggest that America’s coal wealth will be what fuels the future. Questions of air
quality and greenhouse gasses from coal aside, coal extraction rates are likely to
peak by volume in 2025 and by net-energy gains sooner than that.13 Coal will be a
bedrock of the 21st century’s electrical grid, but the increase in production that
would likely be needed to charge America’s transportation fleet is staggering.
Production may go up a bit in the near term, but it cannot meet demand of a
growing user base that will steadily prefer EV’s. Peak coal also bodes ominously
for techno-progressive’s eschatology. We should not count on or too strongly assert
an affordable and ubiquitously high-tech future.
• Electricity via Clean Technologies: Wind, solar, and geothermal will figure large
in our future. But we cannot simply windmill our way out of our current
predicament – at least nowhere near overnight. The physical supplies necessary, and
the combined international will to see it through, to notably expand energy
production, is as immense as the potential on the other side. For example, the
European Union could receive all of its electricity by capturing the sunlight hitting
just 1/500th of the Sahara.14 Big potential… but that also means covering an area
nearly the size of Massachusetts in precious metal-rich solar panels! I am hopeful
for clean energies to locally power EV’s and embed resilience to a struggling grid.
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But the eyebrow I raised about the “elbow grease” silver bullet remains raised here.
I raise my glass and my eyebrow at grandiose clean energy plans. We should give
these technologies top priority, but in doing so not let ourselves off the hook. We
must be prepared for a future that is not dependent on clean energy delivering on all
of its marketed promises.
• Biofuels: One of Rudolph Diesel’s earliest engines was designed to run on peanut
oil, an option that was quickly drowned in the oil glut of the early twentieth century.
As the gas glut gasps, gas-guzzlers gulp greener grog once again. Today about
twelve percent of the American “corn crop is used to make ethanol from about 3.5
million hectares of land, or about 2.5 percent of the land used for crops. Even the
more modest proposals for expansion of the use of ethanol as a fuel speak to
sevenfold or greater increases in this use. Some speak to fifteenfold or greater
increases, which could require up to 40 percent of US cropland.”15 Converting corn,
sugarcane, or other popular fuel foods into liquid combustibles requires
extraordinary energy inputs, usually from coal.16 This amounts to feeding fossilfuel-fortified food to our Fords. We are laundering coal through corn. The net
energy gain is usually close to zero.17 Biofuels are a dead end.
• Hydrogen: Snake oil salesmen still exist in the hydrogen car industry. The product
seems too good to be true: cars that run only on hydrogen, whose only exhaust is
H20. It is too good to be true: hydrogen fuel cells are expensive, unreliable,
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unwieldy to store, and is produced by natural gas. 18 Like biofuels, hydrogen energy
is simply laundering fossil fuels through a clean-ish medium. While it isn’t turning
our food supply into smoke, hydrogen fuel cells are extremely “lossy” to charge.
Gilbert & Perl write that “the transition from electricity to hydrogen and then back
to electricity involves energy losses of between 57 percent and 80 percent.”19
They’re great local storage tanks for electrical generation during off-peak times,
such as near solar, wind, or hydro installations. Hydrogen fuel cells can thus help
reinforce the grid but not get us from A to B.
The verdict seems clear: with our noses plugged to the aroma of snake oils like hydrogen
and biofuels, we can confidently divest our hopes from techno-progresses sundry silver
bullets. Humanity may find better battery technologies, create better solar panels, and
erect better wind turbines, but she is not be about to invent her way out of an addiction to
energy supplies as massive, cheap, and easy to use as petroleum. Some EV’s will surely
be around, and we can expect those in power to develop as many energy sources as
possible. It just won’t extend today’s lifestyles into the future.
Holding fast to the techno-progress vision is at best a soft denial of limits and
responsibility sold to an under-informed public. The consequences of this soft denial is
that by deferring responsibility to the gatekeepers of government and industry we are
putting all our eggs in one basket. Our collective moral discernment will have confused
confidence with courage.
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More sinisterly this faith in techno-salvation is idolatry. We worship the creation
of our own hands rather than the creator, and therefore risk being handed over to the
consequences of that kind of worship. But God has a way of disrupting the convergence
of idolatry with human hubris.20
None of this is to say that the most cutting edge aspects of our world will be lost
to the sands of time. Today’s nuclear smokestacks may be tomorrow’s Easter Island moai,
but many aspects of higher-tech society will likely continue for decades into the future.
Consider the cost of charging an averagely-used iPhone for one year: $0.41.21 That is
very little, and means that many of the advantages of connective technology may be
around long after we’ve left our cars for good. In low-tech and low-power cultures such
as those of rural Africa many use mobile phones to get weather reports, order supplies,
and even test for AIDS.22 As dependable energy affordability and access recede, such
low-power local tools may prove even more functional than today. Whereas today these
technologies threaten to distract us from the real, 23 tomorrow’s energy austerity could
transition these technologies to becoming much more civically potent and realityrenewing artifacts. The servers that host, process, and pipe the internet take up 1.1% of
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21 Barry Fischer, “How much does it cost to charge an iPhone 5? A thought-provokingly modest
$0.41/year,” Outlier: Analyzing Opower’s Energy Data, September 27, 2012, http://blog.opower.com/
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global electricity.24 Google itself only takes 0.01% of the world’s electricity, and is
currently 33% powered by clean energy. 25 Thus low-energy handhelds and the servers
that power the internet will, barring constraints on rare-earth minerals and server uptime,
remain for many decades to come.
I am not advocating a belligerent skepticism of technology and human creativity.
There will be no time for a primitivist scoff. We will come up with many creative ways to
deal with energy decline, and it will be crucial that we give an engaged, participatory Yes
to all efforts to through innovation mitigate tomorrow’s encroaching challenges. We’ll
need every bit of help we can get in mitigating energy decline.
Techno-progress’ missing ingredient is humility. Arrogance and hubris is
dangerous enough, but this point is all the more urgent because gospel virtues of selfdenial, patience, simplicity, gratitude, and a shared humility can positively help us
mitigate energy decline. Where techno-progress offers supply-side mitigations, our
virtues of self-restraint and other-mindedness are demand-side mitigations – a direction
that does not rely on centralized problem-solvers or high-energy systems. Thus the
humility so absent from techno-progressives is more resilient to the unexpected.

2.2.2 Greenurbia
This is the more moderated, genteel, New York Times-reading version of technoprogress. Proponents of a greener status quo are confident that we will, with few bumps,

24 Jonathan Koomey, Growth in Data center electricity use 2005 to 2010. Oakland, CA: Analytics
Press. August 1, 2011, http://www.analyticspress.com/datacenters.html (accessed December 11, 2012).
25 Google, “Google Green: the Big Picture,” http://www.google.com/green/bigpicture/#/ (accessed
December 15, 2012).
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transition toward something like denser neighborhoods bedecked with solar panels. They
acknowledge more than the techno-progress crowd some difficulty in the years ahead, but
generally believe that our economy and society will healthily make the transition to a
low-carbon world. Popular voices here include Joel Kotkin, Thomas Friedman, and
Barack Obama. 26
Joel Kotkin’s The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050 is as happy-go-lucky as
this school of thought gets. The “long-term trends continue to favor suburbs,” he says.27
Kotkin’s arguments are typically sanguine about the power of economics to overcome
suburbia’s challenges, dismissing suburbia’s skeptics with economic data from the past. 28
For him, suburbia’s enduring hegemony is all about economic precedents. But past
examples are not trumps in addressing peak oil’s unprecedented future. More foolish still:
it is a category mistake to believe that economics can expand the limits of ecology.
Economics can efficiently get gasoline into your fuel tank, but it can’t get more oil into
the ground.
This scenario has the same challenges as techno-progress: namely, no silver
bullets, and no combination of mitigations that can fill petroleum’s deepening void. They
are correct that the future will certainly be greener, but wrong to so confidently believe
26 Joel Kotkin, The Next Hundred Million: American in 2050 (New York, NY: The Penguin Press,
2010); Thomas Friedman, Hot, Flat, and Crowded: Why We Need a Green Revolution - and How It Can
Renew America, Release 2.0 (New York, NY: Picador, 2009); Barack Obama, passim on energy issues. For
appreciating his sober understanding of peak oil, consider: “After all, oil is a finite resource. We consume
more than 20 percent of the world’s oil, but have less than 2 percent of the world’s oil reserves. And that’s
part of the reason oil companies are drilling a mile beneath the surface of the ocean – because we’re
running out of places to drill on land and in shallow water” in: Remarks by the President to the Nation on
the BP Oil Spill. June 15, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-nation-bpoil-spill (accessed December 23, 2011).
27
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that our current culture will simply extend into it. Kotkin and others propose many good
mitigations: wind power, denser living, lower-energy lifestyles, and more farmers are all
likely components of the future. But we have no reason to believe the transition toward a
post-carbon society will be so smooth and certain. As outlined above, we ought to brace
Kotkin’s vision of greenurbia with a healthy skepticism.

2.2.3 Collapse, doom, survivalism
Many in the earliest years of the peak oil awareness movement were thoroughly
doomsday in their forecast, and are still easy to spot to this day. They propose that peak
oil will unleash an inescapable collapse into darkness and apocalyptic grit: “global
population will have to be reduced from the current 6.5 billion to 2 billion… The coming
decade could see massive starvation on a global level such as never experienced before
by the human race.”29 Scary, right? With some warrant, that is their consistent tone.30
There are no solutions to peak oil, their bellicose diatribes seemed to proclaim, and there
are no good responses. Some of these voices are indeed worthy of the term doomers, for
they have little room for positive action or surprises in their discourse. Other peak oil
advocates have, in trying to show others the scope of peak oil’s challenges, been
mislabeled as Chicken Littles. Their talk of sobriety, in a techno-drunk society, is quickly
mistaken for severity and insanity.

29 Dale Allen Pfeiffer, Eating Fossil Fuels: Oil, Food and the Coming Crisis in Agriculture
(Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers, 2006): 42.
30 For doomer material, see the entries for Heinberg, Ruppert, Deffeyes, Pfeiffer, and Kunstler in
the bibliography.
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In my estimation doomers should be commended for their grasp (though perhaps
not integration) of the facts of peak oil and their iconoclastic insight on assumptions that
lead many to dismiss energy decline. Regrettably, doomer rhetoric also tends toward
exaggeration and shock. Collapse’s leading voices tend to make all-or-nothing arguments
by painting all other visions with techno-progress’s weaker points. But these arguments
aren’t as bulletproof as their confident tone suggests. For example, doomers tend to not
believe the electrical grid will be dependable beyond a fairly close horizon. Suggest that
cell phones and the internet may stick around in spite of a struggling grid, as I did earlier,
and they will scoff at you. Lectures about peak coal, our crummy electrical grid, and the
frailty of complex systems will ensue. Yet the emergence of local, renewable, off-grid
charging responses for mobile devices in rural contexts and the construction of data
centers near renewable energy sources subverts their blanket dismissals. It also shows
that they can lack the same patience for nuance, context, and locality as the technooptimists. Each group’s rhetoric favors the universal to the particular; soundbites win out
over subtlety.
Totalizing rhetoric isn’t the only thing doomers have in common with the technoenamored. John Michael Greer writes that either vision
Can have its roots in two completely different, and in fact opposite, sets of
assumptions and beliefs about the future. On the one hand, many people insist that
no matter what problems crop up before us, modern science, technology, and raw
human ingenuity will inevitably win out and make the world of the future better
than the world of today. On the other hand, some people insist that no matter what
we do, some overwhelming catastrophe will soon bring down civilization
suddenly crashing down into mass death and a Road Warrior future.31
31 John Michael Greer, The Long Descent: A User’s Guide to the End of the Industrial Age
(Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers, 2008): 31.
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Collapse, as noted earlier, is the minority report – or evil twin – of the progress myth.
Both assume strong determinism behind where their generation of humanity is heading.
This is fallacious as it is debilitating.
A likelier scenario than outright mayhem is what Greer calls “the long descent” or
“catabolic collapse.” Citing many solid historical studies he shows that, in agreement
with Jared Diamond, that almost all cultural and imperial declines are caused by
diminishing returns on energy invested – that is, resource scarcities. This mode of decline
or soft collapse is a long-term processes with punctuated cycles of a downward lurch,
partial recovery, downward lurch, and so on.32 Unlike collapse-obsessives, Greer’s softbut-certain vision of long-term contraction is much more actionable and culturallyaccessible because it allows us to anticipate the next down-step rather than flying off the
proverbial cliff. In refusing to succumb to their doomsday determinism Greer thus also
leaves the door open for significant mitigations of energy decline without appearing to
“sell out” to the myths of techno-progress or a greener status quo. Greer’s voice is
certainly on the darker side of this topic, but his tone is one I have decided to adopt in the
thesis: one that is affirming, actionable, and mindful of the deeper spiritual33 and
narrative dimensions at work.
In the ten years since peak oil began to enter the mainstream, “doomer” voices
have steadily lost ground to the more proactive Transition Town movement discussed
next. But because when Googling peak oil one quickly runs across their legacy it is worth
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acknowledging their voices here. It will be all the more important to address the collapse
proposal in my artifact because how quickly any talk of a decline in progress is aligned
with the doomer fringe. Affirming the wisdom of doomers while largely rebuking them
will be crucial for the goal of beginning a conversation within the church about peak oil.

2.2.4 Transition Towns
As sympathetic as I am to many of the points made by the collapse-obsessive, the
peak oil awareness movement has largely matured beyond the bookish hype and
survivalism of its adolescence. This is for the better. Its more mature form is the
Transition Town movement, a self-sustaining international network of activists taking
local action to prepare for energy decline.34 The Transition USA’s seven guiding
principles are:
1. Positive Visioneering
2. Help People Access Good Information and Trust Them to Make Good
Decisions
3. Inclusion and Openness
4. Enable Sharing and Networking
5. Build Resilience
6. Inner and Outer Transition
7. Subsidiarity: self-organization and decision making at the appropriate level35

34 The Transition Network, www.transitionnetwork.org (accessed November 1, 2012). Transition
United States, www.transitionUS.org (accessed November 1, 2012).
35 “The 7 Guiding Principles of Transition” on Transition United States, http://transitionus.org/
initiatives/7-principles (accessed November 1, 2012).

120

Most of their work operates at the local or citywide level, while a handful of circuit-rideresque leaders actively nurture the network. Several erstwhile doomers have become these
sorts of leaders.
The Transition Network’s two defining words, transition and resilience, are
telling. They have identified themselves and their goals neither by the challenge of peak
oil (such as CollapseNet.com) nor by pushing one solution (as done by energy mogul T.
Boone Pickens). Narrating energy decline as transition makes harsher words such as
collapse, survival, crisis, and decline subsidiary, and has a bit more forward-momentum
built into it than them. Resilience likewise is a more honest aspiration than, say, an empty
signifier such as sustainability. The latter is nearly impossible to arrive at, while resilience
is a more medium-term goal. That is, they stress “the fundamental importance of building
resilience i.e. the capacity of our businesses, communities and settlements to withstand
shock.”36 It’s not about the end goal of living in perfect harmony with creation (that
would be a solution), but the immediate steps towards that, focusing especially on
practices and institutions that resist attrition by the emerging crises.
This organization checks most of my boxes for what a good response to peak oil
would look like, and has a lot going for it. But one of its core failures is in engaging
Christians and churches. 37 Transition’s basically leftward stance and roots in the green
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out to the Transition movements in the UK and the US. Moderate or conservative branches are absent from
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movements of the UK and US mean that their spiritual disposition is not terribly friendly
toward church folks – a problem I wrote about for my undergraduate thesis.38
Consequently they may not know how to see churches as anything more than a base of
volunteers. More divisively, the “inner transition” the movement addresses may speak out
of worldviews (New Age, etc.) that agitate more conservative Christians. In many cases,
they simply may not know how to speak to one another. This reflects a broader
conundrum of Transition, which while having openness and inclusion as a principle is
also understandably left of center. Their ability to communicate “across the aisle” is a
lingering challenge.
That said, I believe that the conversation about peak oil and American Christianity
could have much to learn from the Transition Network. Their messaging, values,
equipping of local “lay” leaders, and generally engaged posture is, to me, incredible.
They seem uninterested in waiting for experts to solve problems, like the techno-progress
crowd, and confess the debilitating futility of doomer survivalism. Though lacking an
ecclesial presence, there is much to learn here.

2.3 Proposed Church Trajectories
The American church has few widely-known futurists – part of the problem
outlined in 1.8. Their silence, though, is ending. A few well-publicized international
thinkers have begun to correct our myopia by offering bigger narratives and trajectories
in widely-distributed methods ranging from Ivory Tower to pulpit to pew. Their proposed

38 Brandon Rhodes. “A Relevant Cause: Reconciling Evangelicals and Environmentalists.”
University of Oregon Undergraduate Thesis. August 2005.
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futures are a techno-adapted ecclesiology, a heavily post-Christian culture, and an
epochal spiritual awakening and renewal. These futures are heavily intertwined, and are
not as mutually exclusive as their authors suggest. For my part, rather than focus on
critiquing them, I will take it as given that the weakness each has is their ignorance
regarding the re-localization already underway. Their weakness, if I may be so bold, is
their unpreparedness for my thesis.

2.3.1 TGIF (Twitter, Google, iPhone, Facebook)
No Reformation, many have observed, without Gutenberg. No petrol-driven
Christianity, I have argued, without fossil fuels. And none of American Christianity’s
current upheavals, Leonard Sweet and others now argue, without the internet. The shift
from Gutenberg to Google, as Sweet calls it, is changing all of culture.39 We relate
differently, learn differently, and have vastly new priorities. Trivia lacks lustre in a room
of smartphones, tough questions are cloaked in the anonymity of online forums,
pyramidal authority is flattened alongside Wikipedia, and talk is cheaper than ever in the
tweet-stream. We’re wiring our brains differently in the hyper-connective society that is
emerging. The Arab Spring and Kony 2012 reveal the global potency of what is
underway.
Many now ague that for better or worse (usually better) the church is in the midst
of its own Arab Spring. The way we fellowship, study the Bible, minister, organize, pray,
and relate are wholly different in the world of Twitter, Google, iPhones, and Facebook

39 Leonard Sweet, Viral: How Social Networking is Poised to Ignite Revival (Colorado Springs,
CO: WaterBrook Press, 2012): 1-60.
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(TGIF). Some churches are dabbling in TGIF on Sunday mornings by including live
tweet-responses-to-the-sermon screens on the overheads, and others are gathering for
common prayer times on Google Hangouts. Others attend “virtual campuses” of realworld churches. But mostly TGIF culture has changed how we are relating rather than
how we are playing church on Sundays.
The possibilities are much deeper than these sometimes ornamental forays into
TGIF. Sweet, as the title of one of his book suggests, believes that “the TGIF revolution
will be a spiritual revival of Christ’s body within the world.”40 The TGIF cultural
priorities of relationships, story, and participation are just what the church needs and has
always been called to be about.
This prescription for the future of the church is incomplete. TGIF’s seers
prophecy its values as foundational components of the future of the church. The hole in
this thinking looks like the three holes in each of our walls: electrical supply. Gutenberg’s
revolution was scalable and low-energy. Google, though, and the internet as a whole
depends on a heavily fossil-fuel-powered electrical grid. I wrote earlier that I believe
locally-sourced clean energy supplies will keep the internet around for decades more, but
perhaps not with ubiquity beyond the second half of the 21st century. Gutenberg’s
innovation is with us after centuries, but Google may not last that long. Comparisons
between the two should not assume the indefinite extension of dependable internet access
into the future.
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TGIF’s cultural shifts, though, may not require the perseverance of the sprites.
The explosive reorganizing of priorities, understanding of authority, and ways of
perceiving the world have been let out of the box, and they may endure beyond the
duration of the technologies that enthroned them. The oracles of TGIF therefore have
given us a glimpse of what church and culture at the level of ideas may be like for the
next century, even as they may have forgotten to address the longevity of the physical
catalysts of those ideas.
TGIF’s more lauded values of relationship and participation are well suited for a
re-localized future, regardless of the gizmos they are tethered to. Life in tighter proximity,
which Section 1 argued is part of our future, is all about relationships and participation. I
will address this further in Section 3’s “How God May Be at Work in All This” section.
TGIF may thrive not in digital abstraction but perhaps in a richly shared embodiment.

2.3.2 Peak Church
Church is becoming less and less prevalent in American culture, and there are
many reasons it will continue to do so in the decades to come. The low church attendance
and self-identify-as-Christian numbers of Europe that American Christians gasp at are
really not that far down our own road:
• 3,700 churches close their doors annually;
• church attendance is likely around 17% and will be below 15% by 2020;
• as far back as 1998, teens raised in the church leave it outright by their
sophomore year of college;
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• 15% of Gen Xers and 4% of Gen Y are born-again Christians.41
America, it seems, has long past “peak church” and has entered decline.
Church decline may not have the last word. Like those addressing peak oil, there
are many innovative minds trying to mitigate, reverse, or slow decline: new technologies,
resilience efforts, new theologies, and recalibration of structural priorities are all in the
works. The techno-progressives, greenurbia advocates, doomers, and transition activists
all have their corollaries here. The missional movement and others are feverishly
deploying thousands of ecclesial experiments in an attempt to understand what
expressions of church and mission hold their ground better than conventional
expressions.
Decline statistics, it should be noted, do not reflect the large segment of society
that practices faith in Christ but is not part of a conventional Christendom-style church.
Much is afoot “under the radar” of ecclesial head-counters, and this will be addressed
below. Suffice to say the church is marching into obscurity. Regardless of peak oil,
American churches are already in the midst of a very live conversation about coming to
grips with how to be faithful in a post-Christian world. As noted in 1.5, a common theme
in their proposed mitigations is locality, embodiment, and community. The synchronicity

41 All

of these stats are cited in Tim Morey, Embodying Our Faith: Becoming a Living, Sharing,
Practicing Church (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2009): 26-27. I am cautious about defining the
state of the churches by institutional and attendance-based metrics (how many churches close, how many
folks show up. It doesn’t count those in house churches or similar lay-led ecclesial expressions.
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between this and where this dissertation proposes the church is heading is remarkable,
should be part of the conversation Section 3 proposes. 42
The role of affluence, expendability, distraction, and mobility in church insularity
and decline has been argued in 1.4.43 Peak oil therefore challenge’s the church decline
narrative’s own “doomer” fringe because it entails the steady rollback of many of these
cultural shifts being held responsible for that decline. With less affluence, less
expendability, less media distractions, and less mobility, how might the Christianity that
emerges ascend once more as a palatable option? Peak oil could help facilitate a
rapprochement between its own harsher consequences and Christianity.

2.3.3 The Great Emergence / Great Awakening
A cottage industry of writers and speakers from across the theological and
political spectrum have begun to identify an enormous shift that seems underway in
American and European Christianity – almost a cocooning period before a dazzling
future ahead. 44 The narrative of “peak church” is infused with an eschatology of hope,
and they are confident that clunky old religion in America will be replaced by a more
42 Documented decline in American Christianity after World War II also bodes ominously for the
long-term fruitfulness and wisdom of automobilized Christianity. Why, in a market-driven form of
Christianity, could it not adapt effectively to changes in context and culture? My sense is that the choice
narratives of automobilized Christianity led to a rush for “product differentiation” between churches, and so
instigated a more expendable, ornamental, and cheap form of the faith. This is just my personal hunch –
one I intend to tease out more legibly in the book manuscript that is subsequent to this dissertation.
43 Also

see Wuthnow, Shopping for God, passim.

44 Phyllis Tickle, The Great Emergence: How Christianity is Changing and Why (Grand Rapids,
MI: Baker Books, 2008); Gabe Lyons, The Next Christians: How a New Generation is Restoring the Faith
(New York, NY: Doubleday, 2010); Brian D. McLaren, A New Kind of Christianity: Ten Questions That Are
Transforming the Faith (New York, NY: Harper One, 2010); Diana Butler Bass, Christianity After Religion:
The End of Church and the Birth of a New Spiritual Awakening (New York, NY: Harper One, 2012);
Reggie McNeal, Missional Communities: The Rise of the Post-Congregational Church (San Francisco, CA:
Jossey-Bass, 2011).
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organic, communal, creative, spiritual, and compassionate Christianity. Mainliner Diana
Butler Bass’ observation of a constellation of changes underway that parallel harbingers
of great awakenings throughout American history leads her to call what is emerging “The
Fourth Great Awakening.”45 Evangelical Gabe Lyons writes that “the death of yesterday
becomes the birth of a great tomorrow and the end of an era becomes a beautiful new
beginning. In this way, the end of Christian America becomes good news for
Christians.”46 “The Christian movement,” he writes, “is entering a time of transformation
on par with the Protestant Reformation.” Christian historian Phyllis Tickle notes that
every five hundred years or so, the church reconfigures itself drastically (Chalcedon,
Charlemagne, Reformation, and today), and that we are ripe for just that. 47 Tickle has her
hunches as a historian for what is pushing us into this, but is less confident in describing
inbreaking features than Diana Butler Bass.
These folks rightly observe the many beautiful, courageous, obscure, and creative
things going on at the margins of the faith. Butler Bass and Tickle’s revival-preceding
patterns are in place. I err with Tickle, though, in not wanting to be too confident in the
future of the faith’s finer points. The tenor of this crowd also tends to paint the future
with their deepest hopes, a sort of selective forward-projecting memory. Evangelical
Lyons sees the best of evangelicalism surviving; mainliner Butler Bass sees a tidal shift
toward the best of her tradition. Each supports their prophecies with intellectual integrity,
but also seem to texture it with their own wish-fulfillment. There is good reason to wince
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at evangelical authors predicting an evangelical-ish resurgence, and mainliners predicting
at a mainline-ish resurgence. Their hopefulness may need some humility.
Still: the templates they propose do compellingly point toward some forms of
revival this century. What is not included is how its converging challenges of constricting
energy supplies, climate collapse, and their corresponding geopolitical shifts, may
mitigate or inform this future. What would Lyons’ renewal or Butler Bass’ Fourth Great
Awakening be in a re-localizing, turbulent century?

2.3.4 Our future’s blind spot
Most driving blind spots are behind us, but it seems that church futurists have one
right in front of them. Each commendably sees some likely curves in the road ahead – the
massive changes of ubiquitously connective digital technology, the crisis of “peak
church,” and a religious revolution in the making. But all assume relative cultural
stability. Upheaval from megatrends such as constricting energy supplies are simply
excluded. Yet the very oil that they ignore is behind many of the changes leading up to
their forecasts. Much work by the respective seers of these trajectories should be done to
first detangle automobility from the trends leading up to their topics, examine it, and then
give fresh analysis of how less of that oil might affect their forecasts. We’ll navigate the
road ahead much better if we work together to point out and fill in blind spots as big as
peak oil.
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2.4 Proposed Church Mitigations
Not all ecclesial responses to energy decline will be consciously performed as
such. They may simply be acted out with a shorter historical horizon in mind – say, that
of offering a savvier response to church decline. Thus I will engage what I believe to be
the likeliest candidates for how the churches of America will mitigate peak oil. All are
already underway.
Some of these – namely Virtual Church – are not mutually exclusive with others.
For example, the ultra-local church I have belonged to since 2008 uses a variety of cloudbased services to facilitate the clunkier parts of life together.48 We’re decidedly in the
parish-missional camp and as Anabaptists often techno-skeptical, but certainly not
backwards. And many of what I will identify as the colonial strand of missional churches
has strong echoes of broadcast churches. So once again I invite readers to remember the
occasional porosity between these mitigating ecclesiologies.
I will esteem these options according to both theological/ethical integrity and their
likely resilience to peak oil. Multisite, for example, will certainly be a useful mitigation,
but is theologically bankrupt. I will try to tease out the pragmatic from the ethical in like
manner as I have done throughout Section 2.
Peak oil’s opening notes will be heard in the cost of mobility, though as I will
unpack more thoroughly in Section 3, it has drastic ramifications elsewhere. Therefore I
will focus here on ecclesial mitigations of prohibitively costly mobility issues. How will
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Google Drive to store meeting notes, our Covenant, our Songbook, and other pertinent
documents; Venmo and Splitwise to exchange money on the fly; Google Calendar to have our common
schedule in sync, and GroupMe to synchronously SMS across smartphones, dumbphones, and browsers.
This all allows for significant efficiency in an otherwise slow way of being the church.
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churches retain tithing members, negotiate their identity, and engage culture when the
commuter-attractional model is strangled by the gas pump hose?

2.4.1 Virtual Church
Some churches will test out disembodied modes of belonging, worship, and
mission to cope with increased mobility costs. Whether as outright “online only”
churches or “virtual campuses” untethered to a particular brick-and-mortar congregation,
the ability to deliver religious goods and services through connected devices will become
an increasingly tempting option for many Christians. Why spend $50 per month to hear a
sermon and sing songs when they can be experienced from the internet at home for the
same cost (and in my pajamas!)? With every price spike at the pump virtualized
attendance will become more and more tempting.
Virtual churches aspire to reach an unreached people group, on the one hand,
while also providing an alternative “worship experience” for certain demographics of
existing church members. ChurchOnlinePlatform.com, an online-church-in-a-zip-file
provider, says their clients are typically divided between:
• Distant: people who are outside the physical reach of the Church
• Curious: people who would prefer to explore their interest in spirituality in an
online context
• Mobile: people who are a part of our church, but are looking for an option to
worship together because they are traveling or displaced
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• Digital: people who prefer to experience much of their community in an online
context 49
These forays into a disembodied ecclesiology take the most troubling elements of
automobilized Christianity and take them to their logical extreme: capitulation to
placelessness, rootlessness, worship-as-marketable-good, and choice-narratives.
I expect many churches to open up online campuses in the years ahead to cope
with peak oil, but it will be a short-lived phenomenon. My reasoning is that virtual
church is a gross extension of the attractional church – an expression of church that
assumes Christendom and depends on automobility. But we have seen that the
attractional church models are not slowing church decline; they lack resilience to the
emerging post-Christian culture of America. Replacing the attractional mindset is a core
goal of the missional-incarnational movement as outlined by Alan Hirsch and Michael
Frost.50 Regardless of peak oil, virtual church would have remained a marginal adaptation
to more efficiently delivering religious goods and services to a placeless and
excarnational Christianity.

2.4.2 Broadcast/Multisite/Satellite Church
Multisite and satellite churches were the first effort to cope with an automobilized
church stretched too thin over the land. 51 The multisite church movement includes
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Church Online Platform, “Is It For Us?”, http://www.churchonlineplatform.com/is-it-for-us/
(accessed November 8, 2012).
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Frost & Hirsch, The Shaping of Things to Come, 41ff.

51 Bob Smietana, “High-Tech Circuit Riders: Satellite Churches are Discovering a New Way to
Grow the Body of Christ” in Christianity Today, September 2005, p. 62.
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medium and large churches opening up new Sunday venues and small churches merge
under one ecclesial umbrella but multiple locations.52 Larger churches find opening a new
campus or worship gathering location is financially and tactically easier than planting a
new church. Mergers help small churches economize and streamline clergy and program
costs. Many multisite churches live-stream the sermon from the central campus to
satellites; others have local pastors preaching from the same notes. Satellites sometimes
are branded according to different worship styles and life-stages. Multisite churches are
by their own admission franchised churches,53 establishing a recognized brand to their
markets in a way that denominational identity used to provide. In this regard they enact a
catholicity of consumption and choice: our unity is grounded in our branding. All told
there are over 5,000 multisite churches in America. 54
Multisite is the matured expression of suburban Christianity, even beyond the
megachurch, and so is also likely to carry on with that tradition’s ability to reorganize to
megatrends of aesthetic, desire, and scaling of the built environment. They will try to
adapt. As tithing money dwindles and people become less friendly to driving to a central
campus, multisite will become a shrewd survival tactic. Beyond conventional churchfunded campuses, I also imagine many megachurches investing in small groups as an
even more financially efficient multisite strategy. Gatherings in elementary schools or
similar medium-scaled neighborhood sites may also increase. Instead of a church with
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Ken Walker, “Let’s Play Together: More Mergers Driven By Mission, Not Survival” in
Christianity Today, September 2011, p.14.
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Smietana, 63.

54 Adelle M. Banks, “Multisite Churches are Outpacing Growth of Megachurches” in Christian
Century, September 19, 2012.
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seven 1,000-person campuses, I imagine a tighter economy and higher oil prices will
drive churches to becoming, say, a church with seventy 100-person cafeteria gatherings.
This begins to have some resonances with the colonial-missional model outlined next.
I believe that multisite will be the dominant evangelical mitigation tactic in the
next two decades – first for peak church, then for peak oil. Eventually the attractional,
excarnational problems that megachurches were already struggling with will overtake this
model. Multisite is designed to better package the product to latent church-shoppers
(existing Christians). They still enact an ecclesiology of provider-and-marketer-ofreligious-goods-and-services. But in a culture where that demographic is dwindling I
believe that attractional multisite churches will eventually reach market saturation.
My sense is that the remaining two mitigations are where many Christians will go
as they become dissatisfied with multisite churches, as they prefer not to drive at all to
the weekly gathering, or as multisites become financially compromised55 amid the downratcheting economy proposed in Section 1.

2.4.3 Missional: Colonial Edition
As energy decline unfolds, many multisites will transition and strain toward a
missional posture, but I suspect may finally be colonial. This is already alive, active, and
heavily published about in American church. Franchised missional churches are a murky
hybrid of multisite’s efficiency and missional’s imaginative engagement with culture.
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One well-known missional church56 is being lauded nationwide as a promising template
for missional churches, and has seized the opportunity to help others transition into their
model as affiliate churches, a sort of hybrid between incarnation and multisite.
The many churches in its sway frequently empower neighborhood-oriented small
groups (often called missional communities) toward lifestyle mission. But their direction
and equipping is done by a “central office” leadership rather than the on-the-ground
stakeholders within that missional community. Decision-makers, in other words, are not
necessarily stake-holders; worse, they may not have any corresponding practice or
context to ground their ecclesial authority in. Colonial-missional entails rootless leaders
telling small groups how to root in neighborhoods, without having done much of that
themselves. It is the same “living above the land” placelessness that characterized
modernity, automobility, and suburbia, but will decreasingly characterize our future.
Colonial-missional is not multisite, nor is it denomination, and because of the
strongly pyramidal power relationship between central office and satellites I will not use
the term network to describe their model. I wish there were a more neutral term for it. The
best words for it that I have come up with are colonial, franchise, or empire. Distributed
affiliates paying dues to and receiving orders from a central office have historically been
recognized with such words. I hold those kinds of power relations to be antithetical to the
cross, and so strongly hope this will not be too much of the future of the church.
Yet I expect it to be. This will be a more long-term mitigation of both peak church
and peak oil because its overtures to missional praxis imbue it with resilience to the
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former while its distributed, neighborhood-oriented, rarely-a-central-campus structure
gives it resilience to peak oil’s disruptions. Colonial-missional churches may have their
headship in the clouds, but their feet are blessedly on the ground.
Colonial Christianity’s greatest tactical challenge going forward is the same it has
always had: when decision-makers aren’t in the arena of consequences and/or don’t have
a corresponding practice, new initiatives and counsel risk hubristic ignorance of how they
will actually play out. From the perspective of the laity, they may be more disposed to
listen to leadership than their neighborhood for discerning how to be a faithful presence
there. This can greatly hinder witness, personal formation, and sensibly contextualized
mission.
My sense is that in this staggering restructuring of American life back to the
particular, local, and contextual, the centrality of decentralized decision-making and
place-based wisdom will blossom. So also, though, will the temptation of colonial
mission.

2.4.4 Missional: Parish Edition
A diverse constellation of Christians across North America, though, are beginning
to forge non-colonial modes of missional life in the neighborhood. This broad web finds
expression under the banners of the New Monasticism, the New Friars, Slow Church, the
common good movement, intentional Christian communities, house/organic churches,
and a large swathe of the missional church movement. The Parish Collective, a network
of place-based practitioners whom I have worked with since 2010, is the only group that
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has successfully networked this wide crowd of place-based Christians.57 The catch-all
buzzword they’ve taken to using is “the New Parishioners.”
New Parishioners are not as cleanly-packaged as the other mitigations, and that is
part of the point. The polished “one consistent brand” that franchised faith expressions
excel in is lacking in those seeking a more contextually-legible Christianity. Part of the
reason is, the network isn’t primarily targeting brand-expanding agents like church
planters or pastors. They are eager to join hands with Christians at any level of
(dis)organization that are seeking their neighborhood’s shalom. Disposing a network
toward the mustard seed workings of God is, in a celebrity-obsessed church culture,
refreshing. But at times focusing on those marginalized practitioners can both hinders and
helps cultivation of resilience for a peak church-and-oil future.58 It helps by:
• discovering extremely contextual ideas and best practices;
• offering a non-colonial vision of the faith;
• affirming place-based wisdom;
• honoring the small activities of day-to-day life that make for resilience and
durable community;
• narrating faithfulness with practices instead of ideas;
• often lending itself to sustainable activities such as gardening, sharing, and lowcar lifestyles.
An obsession with the small can hinder resilience:
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• many New Parishioners don’t feel a strong need to link with others;
• stories of parish life are so small they can be hard to broadcast (you can’t write a
book or promote a conference on little things in a culture that values big things);
• community life can be so overwhelming that life outside the parish is seen as a
distraction.
The New Parish movement is my preferred ecclesial mitigation of peak oil. It’s
accessibility and simplicity lend itself to resilience and ease of adapting to America’s
diverse parish contexts. And its theological preference for the small, meek, slow,
embodied, communal, and Spirit-led resonate with common strands of those anticipating
a Great Emergence this century. Their focus, too, on placemaking practices overlaps
positively with the aspirations of the Transition and resilience movements. They aren’t
just peak-prepared, the New Parishioners are often unwittingly part of a wider response to
the emerging energy crisis.
The New Parishioners will also be the most difficult mitigation to document.
Virtual, multisite, and colonial-missional churches will always have websites, networks,
and so on – they’re easy to count, and so easy to assume make up the bulwark of what
God is up to. The organic and under-the-radar nature of the New Parishioners means most
of the church may never know about their mustard seeds of faithfulness. Yet as peak
church settles in and stifles big church hegemony and as peak oil settles us all back into
our neighborhoods, these “undocumented un-migrants” may become the quiet and
unwitting majority of the 21st-century church of America.

SECTION 3: THESIS
3.1 Full-Court-Press Conversation
Although most studies of American Christianity’s next 100 years assume the
indefinite extension of today’s post-industrial high-tech and hyper-mobile lifestyles, I
claim it will be largely shaped by the steady relocalizing and de-industrializing of
everything because of the irreversible decline of liquid fuel supplies projected by energy
experts, because the electric grid is unlikely to be sustained beyond current levels, and
because our modern way of life is possible only because of massive amounts of
dwindling fossil fuels. I have shown this involuntary weaning from our petrol addiction
will be foundational to our future.
Other proposals of the church’s future are unaware of energy decline and so have
not adjusted their existing narratives to account for it. The problem, as outlined in Section
1, is that we have not begun to reflect on energy ascent’s ecclesial contributions and do
not currently have a live conversation about energy decline’s role in the future of the
American church. The church is speeding into the future blindfolded.
It is time to remove the blindfold. I propose that we begin an accessible,
actionable, and affirming conversation about the American church entering the emerging
energy crises. The partially-grasped effects of automobility and the not-at-all-grasped
effects of its coming decline must be woven together. Intuitions must be brought into
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focus and into discussion. The entire scope of Christian discourse in America should be
employed in advancing this conversation:
• books, blogs, ebooks, and online videos targeting diverse demographics;
• conference presentations;
• high, middle, and low-brow reflection;
• music and art;
• sermon resources;
• small group discussion materials;
• radio and podcasts;
• higher education;
• cross-pollination at “seam points” between churches and other groups;
The conversation ahead will be difficult: peak oil a touchy issue that can feel
debilitating, deconstructive, and judgmental. It cuts at peoples’ metanarratives, and so can
be a minefield of revealing how strongly people place hope in technological redemption,
the Invisible Hand of the Market, or any other secular savior. Therefore some goals,
priorities, and guardrails should be set up for those advancing this conversation.
To clarify what kind of future I suggest we begin discussing, I will briefly share
my educated conjectures of the shape our low-oil future will take. Then I will summarize
how I believe churches will experience and adapt to energy decline. Next I will contour
the conversation with some priorities and cautions. This prepares the way for Sections 4
and 5, which outline one possible outworking of my thesis.
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3.2 The Conversation’s Conjectures
3.2.1 Everything will relocalize
The evidence is clear: this will be the century of relocalization of all aspects of
life, a steady rollback of globalization and industrialism, and a re-skilling of humanity
(and first-world cultures in particular) for work in the food production sector. The
premise of this dissertation is that we must begin conversing about that future, though as
noted in Section 2 all attempts to sketch out this future should be done in pencil, not pen.
My lightly drawn sketch of the future makes certain assumptions. None of them
are certain, but I feel confident based on the synthesis of my research thus far in building
on their foundation.
• Peak/Plateau 2004-2013: Global conventional oil production has been
relatively flat since 2004, and will begin to decline in 2013. Unconventional oil
will prolong the plateau in total liquid fuel production for a bit longer, but even
that number will begin to decline by 2025 at the very latest. The future of
petroleum, then, is marked by decline in quantity and quality. On a planet of
increasing population and an economy predicated on growth this is a recipe for
high prices and supply shortages.
• Grid endures, mostly1: Economic struggles will lower demand for electricity,
allowing it to continue in most parts of America through 2030. Electric vehicle
adoption may cause local brownouts before then. As more Americans return to
the farming sector we may also expect electricity flows to struggle to reach
outlying areas freshly re-populated.

1

Gilbert & Perl, 223-312.
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• Proxy wars only: Although some geopolitical analysts fret that global
superpowers will eventually come to blows over the world’s diminishing oilproducing regions and oil-transporting waterways,2 I will assume instead a
relatively cold war effected through proxy states. A global hot war over oil
would be such a drastic catastrophe as to overshadow the acute challenges of
peak oil considered within this project.
• Food shortages, not starvation: Our food system is dependent on massive
inputs of fossil fuels,3 but that doesn’t mean it will buckle overnight. Doomers
anticipate mass starvation as energy decline sets in, loosely following the logic
that less oil and natural gas means less food. This will probably not be the case.
We will certainly have less food, and more local food, but the transition toward
that will be gradual. Urban-to-rural migration, urban farming, and low-meat
diets will all contribute to a leaner but not enduringly languishing food supply.4
Building on those educated assumptions and the oil productions outlined in 1.7.4, this is
my approximate timeline for the 21st century as it relates to oil and energy issues. I am
basically following the data provided by Gilbert and Perl in chapters 5 and 6 of Transport
Revolutions.
• 2004-2008 – The Bubble and the Plateau: Conventional oil production
flattened out, provoking a steady up-ratcheting in crude oil prices. This in turn
2 The most prominent intellectual voice on these matters is Michael Klare, The Race for What's
Left: The Global Scramble for the World's Last Resources (New York, NY: Macmillan Books, 2012). He
doesn’t definitively anticipate a hot war, but doesn’t close the door to it either.
3

Pfeiffer, passim.

4 Thomas A. Lyson “Civic Agriculture” in Raymond De Young and Thomas Princen, The
Localization Reader: Adapting to the Coming Downshift (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2012).
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opened up exploration and excavation of unconventional oils, biofuels, and
demand-side responses such as hybrid cars. Meanwhile the American economy
is inflated by the real estate bubble, begins to deflate in late 2007 under the
burden of higher oil prices and ponzi scheme financial chicanery. Those high oil
prices are what eventually pops the bubble in 2008, leading to the Great
Recession.5
• 2009-2013 – The Plateau Continues: Conventional oil production remains flat,
while total liquid fuels increase somewhat as new projects are brought online.
Conventional production begins to decline in 2013,6 although this fact is hidden
in the shadow of another recession. The middle class begins to favor living in
urban and walkable neighborhoods over car-dependent suburbs.7
• 2014-2020 – Hindsight in 2020: Analysts have conceded that conventional oil
has been in permanent decline since 2013. Oil prices spiked with every
economic recovery, slowing globalization and furthering the migration of
upwardly mobile Americans back to cities and small towns. The poor inherit the
suburbs.8 Several waves of recession and partial recovery steadily erode the
myths of American exceptionalism and techno-progress, while also deflating the
doomer eschatology pathos that any systemic failure leads to rapid collapse.9
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• 2021-2040 – Hot, Farmed, and Dispersed: Humanity is only able to extract as
much oil in 2030 as they did in 1990. This drastic energy decline begins to
reorganize all of society, propelling many into the farming industry. Small
towns continue to be re-populated. By 2040 extremely high oil prices have
rendered the internal combustion engine into a rarely seen relic. Oil-guzzling
airplane transportation levels off and after 2025 recedes dramatically. 10
• 2040 and beyond – A New Humanity: Oil is rarely traded internationally.
Producers keep what they extract out of necessity but also due to maritime
insecurity. Declining global coal production leads to a failing grid. Dependable
electric service rests on proximity to production, leaving many rural Americans
in the dark. Humanity has adapted to creative re-uses of oil-based infrastructure
and increasingly looks back on the late 20th and early 21st century with disdain
and lament.

3.2.2 Church will relocalize
Automobility’s divorcing culture from context will shift into reverse as energy
decline emerges. Particularities of a specific church in a specific context will characterize
the emergence of the post-oil church. Energy decline’s first stretch will be diversely
experienced and diversely responded to. How churches encounter peak oil at a
megachurch in sprawling Los Angeles will be different from Tim Keller’s urban
Calvinists of New York City will be different from a new monastic community in Philly
will be different from a small-town Methodist church will be different from a hipster
10

Gilbert & Perl, 232-233.
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church in Portland. Churches will adapt through a long process of what De Young and
Princen call “adaptive muddling,” where “explorations are pursued at the smaller scale
while stability is provided at a larger scale.”11 Adaptive muddling “supports the
application of local knowledge to local situations; different people applying different
knowledge to the same situation creates a variety of potential solutions. It is such
enhanced rapid, and diverse creativity that localization needs.”12 This strategy thus
thrives as a diverse network of experiments and negotiations helping the totality of a
culture respond effectively. 13 I am not only suggesting that adaptive muddling should be
the way forward for churches: it will be how churches relocalize.
Adaptive muddling is contrasted with the “pursuing one solution at a time” that
organizations tend to pursue but commit the fallacy of putting all their eggs into one
basket, engendering needless risk. 14 Surely many “single solutions” will be proposed akin
to what was considered in the multi-site and colonial-missional sections above (2.4.2 and
2.4.3). But the small changes in pastoral priority, spiritual formation, theological focus,
budget shuffles, moral discernment, and programmatic innovation will happen at the
grassroots everywhere, and thus is a less risky mitigation tactic. A platform which
promotes the exchange of adaptive muddling mitigations will be of tremendous help in
the years to come.
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De Young and Princen, 291.
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Ibid., 287.

13 Adaptive

muddling as a dispersed wisdom and epistemic act reminds me of Michael Polanyi’s
epistemological principle of “subsidiary-focal integration.” See Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge.
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Peak oil’s cutting edges for churches will be in the cost of transportation to
ministry sites and sufficient tithing in a tumultuous economy. Throughout energy decline
will be the low boil of feeling that our narratives are in crisis and transition. But churches
will need to tackle first things first. John Michael Greer suggests that wise resilience
involves preparing for each wave of the crisis one at a time, while being mindful of what
comes next.15 Thus rather than recommending permaculture and complete sustainability
(a long-term goal) he suggests prioritizing the nearer-term consequences of facing the
consequences of our unsustainability. Don’t set yourself for disappointment by trying to
get your home off the grid: instead get a couple solar panels and know that your fridge
will keep running in the event of a blackout. Greer’s vision is resilience writ realism; it’s
more about greenly buffering than establishing pockets of green utopia.
Greer’s buffering principle is easily portable for churches,16 and figures elegantly
within the broader “adaptive muddling” efforts that will be underway. Churches won’t
need, for example, to have every ministry be 100% walkable in the near-term. Even
transitioning core ministries toward walkability, planting new churches that are totally
walkable, or making their existing neighborhood may be more medium-term (though
crucial) goals. But perhaps even walkability is a bit far-reaching. To really indwell
Greer’s wisdom for ministry application, churches may want to convene business-owners
from their membership to provide jobs for out-of-work people – thus buffering against
low tithing from the next recession. Think of it as grassroots nepotism within the family
15
16

Greer, chapters 4-6.

Churches won’t be the only kind of Christian structure needing resilience buffers: colleges,
seminaries, para-church groups, mission boards, denominations, church planting networks, publishers, and
entertainers will all face similar challenges. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to explore them. But
precisely the point of the dissertation is to begin a conversation that encompasses them in time.
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of God. But it’s just such a tactic that provides resilience for economically hard times
because an employed laity may be a more dependable ministry revenue stream.

3.2.3 Pastoral priorities
Adaptive muddling and brace-for-the-next-wave resilience will define churches
that mitigate peak oil most effectively. But survival and “last-church-standing”
techniques aren’t everything. Over the course of my research I have become convinced
that the most important tasks for Christians ready to face peak oil will be not external and
technical transition, but relational and interior transition. It will concern the internalized
narratives and affections that externalize in us creating what we do. We can’t miss hearttransition as we encourage churches to organizationally and physically re-localize. To be
sure, brick-and-mortar responses are non-negotiable. However they remain incomplete
without inner transition work. Christians can learn much from the wider Transition
movement on technical matters, freeing a uniquely Christ-centered participation in
transition and resilience to involve the deeper and longer-term work of pastorally
transitioning Christians for this future.
I am not suggesting a sloppy dualism where Transition deals with solar panels and
we with souls: Christianity is a religion of embodiment, not interior journey. Yet many of
the embodiments of a post-oil church have already been prefigured in the transition
movement. Therefore the ecclesial task will be to make such embodiments culturally and
theologically safe and legitimate. This will be a wide, deep effort of sowing seeds now
whose harvest will be so meaningful in the years of relocalizing ahead of us.
Discipleship, homiletics, and pastoral etiquette will need to:
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• prepare Christians for hard times by cultivating gratitude and celebration;
• healingly confront automobility’s darker changes in identity formation such as
our obsession with choice-narratives;
• affirm the small and mundane as the locus of God’s work in the world;
• direct the wider identity crises that will accompany humanity’s involuntary
weaning off of fossil fuels;
• re-define personal and ecclesial success from growth, speed, and bigness to
slow, steady faithfulness;
• address false hope in the idols of market, technology, and progress;
• find hope in the downcast narratives of peak oil and peak church;
• prepare Christians for the transparency of local life with the spiritual disciplines
of reconciliation, forgiveness, and peacemaking; and
• integrate this transition with an eye to the global works of God (such as the
expansion of the church in the global south and in China).
Prioritizing the pastoral concerns – the people more than the organization – is also much
more future-proof than only brick-and-mortar responses. We have seen that the future
will broadly be marked out by less energy and therefore less mobility and placelessness,
but with so many variables this future is indeed difficult to prepare for with much
precision. We may have emphasized walkability, for example, when the real challenge
turns out to be food security. The pastoral tasks just outlined have a powerful way of
preparing us for “all of the above.” They are training for all likely scenarios rather than
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outfitting us for a few of them. Pastoral concerns prioritize raising up better adaptive
muddlers instead of jumping right into adaptive muddling.

3.3 The Conversation’s Contours
Peak oil and the rolling back of automobility will be a hard for most Christians to
hear. Its halo of consequences include economic tumult, less travel, higher food prices,
and even rumors of war. Harder still: it doesn’t comport with our dominant narratives for
where the world or Christianity is going. Many Christians, in my experience, simply raise
their eyebrow at it as a quirky non-sequitur. It’s just too big to handle, too hard to
integrate, or is frequently messaged with little hope.
There is another way to discuss peak oil with Christians.17 The conversation can
be contoured in a variety of ways that make it accessible, affirming, and actionable.
• Accessible: most folks don’t need all the technical details. Modes of discourse
such as books or conference presentations may warrant a deeper look at
alternatives and the like. But the simplified outline of a long-term trend toward
localizing, simplifying, community, and an era of consequences for our 20thcentury priorities will suffice for most. Another component of accessibility will
be its integration with existing challenges, trends, and values. In other words:
make it legible and graftable to the ecclesial narratives already being enacted.
• Affirming: Many audiences will need the peak-oil-and-Christianity pitch with
as little judgement as possible, both regarding suburbia and its churches.

17 These contours are my theologically-processed distillations of what I observed to be the best
practices and lessons of the Transition movement and select texts such as De Young & Princen, Gilbert &
Perl, Greer, and Mellen and Neil Hollow.
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Therefore as we tell suburban Christianity’s story with the uncomfortable
honestly I attempted to indwell in 1.4, we must also speak with a caring,
confessional tone. Affirm all good you can muster. As Len Sweet taught in our
cohort, all of God’s No’s flow first out of God’s Yes in Jesus Christ. So also with
discussing some of the No’s of automobility and peak oil: we must couch them
in a deeper Yes.
• Actionable: Dovetailing an affirming tone, the conversation should also inspire
its participants to realistic responses. Reflecting on automobility’s past and
future has, as discussed in section 2.2.3 concerning doomers, can be
debilitating. The church’s conversation about it must be actionable from
wherever the newcomers are presently at. Small town churches, multisite
empires, emergent expressions, and house churches should all be able to
respond positively to this conversation.
The conversation ahead summarily needs a tone of opportunity and responsibility,
not fear and shame. We face a challenging future not made any easier by peak church in
North America and Europe. But if God works in all situations for the good of the Church,
then we must face such a future with humble hope. In the long run the Lord may produce
tremendous good through the years ahead – though perhaps in a bittersweet way akin to
the vitality of the church following Jerusalem’s 70 AD destruction.
The conversation has many potential and specially vital forks ahead. Limiting it to
one of these will not be enough, but across the many mediums outlined in 3.1 it must
begin. Specialties in the conversation ahead include:
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• actionable steps for lay and clergy;
• pulpit resources;
• small group resources;
• academic and lay journalism along the way about how churches are responding
to the emerging energy crisis;
• niche ministry implications such as retreat centers, kid’s ministry, missions, and
higher education;
• academic, ministerial, and lay level overviews of the topic;
• online and local exchanges of adaptive muddling best practices and stories;
• further reflection on automobility’s role in current ecclesial phenomena;
• theological and ethical reflection on faithfulness in place and what our sojourn
through the wilderness of placelessness accomplished;
• theologically narrate peak oil, climate change, and other consequences of fossil
fuels through the lenses of empire and idolatry;
• diversely narrate peak oil and the historical blip of automobility within the
wider work of God overcoming evil and nurturing Christ’s Body; and
• reflection on the intertwining of cheap energy with modernity and
postmodernity, and how the decline of cheap energy may unravel each.
• Imitate Arnold Toynbee’s A Study of History,18 which finds lessons by
comparing parallel situations in history, in church history. What can we learn
from the poverty of the Great Depression, Europe’s plagues, church decline in

18 Arnold

Toynbee, A Study of History (Volumes I-XII) (New York City, NY: Oxford Press, 1987).
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20th-century Europe, and the Cuban church’s transition as their country lost
most oil imports overnight in the 1990’s.

3.4 Cautions for the Conversation
Not all the forks in the road ahead will be worth following. I have tried to point
out many along the way and will restate them here.
As argued in 2.3.2.3-4 on multisite and colonial-missional we risk many blunders
if we wait on professionals to administer “silver bullet” solutions for churches. The
transition and resilience journey must begin now through a broad network of adaptive
muddling because it minimizes risk, maximizes creativity, and empowers churches of all
sizes and degrees of renown to get busy cultivating resilience.
Another wrong turn will be a tone of arrogance or shrill confidence about these
matters. While peak oil is an observable geological fact and its consequences are
reasonable to infer, the conversation ahead must not be too strident. The future is open,
and pinning it down too tightly only creates more reasons for people to dismiss the
general premise of the conversation.
We’ll be at a dead end if we narrate automobility and suburbia with unbridled
judgment. Telling the story as if things were peachy before the Model T and Levittown,
and then it all went to hell, is dishonest. Nor should it be told as if everything about the
suburban church was bad. I am tempted to tell it with such a judgmental slant, and yet
also realize that carriers of this conversation must learn the difference between winsome
rebuke and self-righteous judgment.
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A more subtle wrong turn will be to sugar-coat this. I have suggested that the
tenor of the conversation be hopeful and one of opportunity. But there were many
mistakes made in our suburban sojourn, and our road ahead will be tough. We must be
honest about the unpaved surface of the road ahead.

SECTION 4: ARTIFACT
DESCRIPTION
To begin enacting my thesis, my artifact will be a book proposal that introduces
peak oil and its ecclesial consequences to American Christians in an educated but not
academic tone. The conversation has been prefigured in the common impulse toward
locality and place among thought-leaders; we have seen through a glass dimly. The
artifact should contribute to bringing those prefiguring impulses into focus and
incarnation. To return to the metaphor in 1.5, the elephant this conversation reveals must
be legible to the blind men. They should be its primary audience.
In Section 3 I suggested this conversation be characterized by the following:
• Accessible: my tone will be thoughtful but avoid stuffiness;
• Affirming: God has been up to much in our automobility’s historic blip that I
will honor;
• Actionable: the book will include stories, ideas, and directions to online
resources for readers to begin adaptive muddling today.
• Pastoral Priorities: the book will be written in the first-person with many of
my own experiences included, thereby opening up many opportunities for
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pastoral reflection on peak oil. I will also ensure that my review of
automobility’s past ecclesial impacts will
• Adaptive Muddling and the Buffering Principle: I will promote these as
healthy ways to enact the conversation.
• From Commuting to Community: I grew up in the suburbs but have spent
most of my life in intentional Christian community. The book will reflect that
journey and affirmingly call readers along a similar trajectory.
• New theological narratives of our times: I will weave together peak oil with
other emerging realities including peak church in its historic centers of Europe
and America, and also the return of Christianity to the global south and China. I
will attempt to narrate peak oil and automobility with humility, hope,
confession, and a sense of opportunity. New narrative trajectories will be as
legible and continuous with evangelical and missional theology and narrative as
the topic permits.

SECTION 5: TRACK 02 ARTIFACT
SPECIFICATION
5.1 Artifact Considerations, Standards of Publication, and Action Plan
I will write to a wide readership of American Christians, though as an evangelical
will speak primarily to that tribe. I will specifically write to trend-watching and futureleaning Christians that are probably already conversant with one of the big conversations
(emerging, missional, new monastic, new parish) underway.
The partial manuscript is over 35,000 words, and I am dedicating February 2013
through late March 2013 to finish it. I will solicit publishers concurrent to that writing.
Section 5.2 will deviate from Turabian because my academic department provided
a Turabian-deviating book proposal template. It is in its lengthiest form, consisting of all
sections a publisher may wish to hear. The proposal will be adapted accordingly to each
publisher solicited. Though some typesetting imperfections exist, this is only a template:
actual proposals will have better typesetting than is offered below. It begins afresh on
page 156.

5.2 Book Proposal
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Book Proposal
Possible Titles & Subtitles
Re-Placing the Church: Missional Opportunities in the Emerging Energy Crisis
or
Blip: How Oil Briefly Revolutionized Church, How it Won’t Last Much Longer, And What
to Do About It

Author
Brandon D. Rhodes
8821 SE Henderson, Portland, OR 97266
m: 503.317.8105
t: @BrandonDRhodes
f: facebook.com/bdrhodes
e: Brandon.D.Rhodes@gmail.com
v: www.bdrhodes.com

Overview
When Edwin Drake’s drillhead slipped six inches farther than he meant below
Pennsylvania’s cold bedrock, a new world bubbled forth. In just a few decades, petroleum
changed everything about how humanity related to itself and the land. Cars transferred
passengers, freight, and new ideas faster than the horse-drawn carriages left in their dust.
Airplanes carried bombs, missionaries, dignitaries, and commoners to distant shores.
Trains provided fruit, meat, and vegetables year-round. The fabric of American life from
cities to farms was rapidly reworked around the burning of Drake’s discovery.
That discovery radically transformed Christianity. For 1900 years, the faith was
organized and expressed locally; it was scaled to the pedestrian. Who you went to school
with were those you went to Sunday School with, and you broke bread with those who
baked your bread.
In automobilized America, that kind of religion is now dead. A fundamentally new
one, scaled to the tire, replaced it. Petroleum-powered vehicles define today’s North
American Christianity in ways largely unacknowledged. Yet the fossils fueling
Christianity are, once considered, impossible to ignore. Our easy-motoring ecclesiology:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

permits church shopping and church competition;
catalyzed the collapse of the mainline denominations;
fills an identity vacuum for suburbanites needing a tribe;
segregates church from the rest of our lives;
reinforces sacred-secular divisions
is market-savvy and growth-centered toward churchgoers;
promises coping mechanisms for our social isolation;
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• climaxes in technique-savvy mega/multisite-church values & architecture;
• promotes outreach without relationship.
Oil-powered automobiles were the driving force behind the largest religious revolution
since the Protestant Reformation.
But unlike the Reformation, this revolution isn’t sustainable; there is only so
much oil in the ground. Two trillion barrels, to be exact. Since Edwin Drake’s feat,
humanity has already burned, spilled, and plasticized half of it. The second trillion is
being burned at an extraordinary rate: one billion barrels every 11½ days. Such plain
physical limits reveal that today’s automobilized Christianity is an extremely obscure and
temporary historical blip. Beneath the hum of our tweets, conferences, bestsellers, and
buzzwords, there is the dread sucking sound of oil derricks slurping up less and less of
the stuff that’s made it all possible.
That makes automobilized Christianity a blip in it’s long history.
In Re-Placing the Church I will explore the story of that blip, especially second
trillion barrels of oil, as preparation for subsequent re-visioning the future of North
American churches within it. Re-Placing the Church connects with those who sense that
our lives, and our churches, are simply too fragmented. We worship in one corner of
town, serve soup in another, and attend Bible study in another. There’s no sense of
overlap in our lives, and there’s no sense of responsibility to where we live. This book
will clarify what is behind that sense and provide an energizing narrative and reflection
on how to creatively proceed.
I am convinced that the changes churches can make to prepare for a postautomobility world will also help them more fully and faithfully be the church.
Relocalizing the church will both help prepare society for an energy-constricted,
relocalized future and more effectively de-fragment our ministries and lives as the people
of God. More to the point: localizing can be a catalyst for church renewal at the same
time it can empower Christians to join the missio dei to heal the world.

Purpose
This book will:
• Retrospectively examine the effects energy abundance and automobility had on
North American ecclesial habits;
• Constructively reveal contemporary church trends as responses to energy
abundance and automobility;
• Projectively explore what effects energy scarcity will have on churches;
• Prospectively draft initiatives of practice, narrative, and theology for today’s
church to better transition into that future.
• Slyly demonstrate that these changes will, regardless of peak oil, help churches
have more holistic, faithful, and effective ministries.
• Promptly begin a wider conversation about place and locality among American
Christians.
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Manuscript Status
Over 60% is completed (39,000 words so far). The final word count will be between
60,000 and 65,000. I should be able to complete the entire manuscript by June 2013.

Book Format & Chapter Outline
This non-fiction first-person book has many endnotes and a few graphs. I texture my
arguments with first-person vignettes and deeper reflections as “Scenic Viewpoints.”
Scenic Viewpoint 1: Where is my church?
Vignette: I explore the tensions between commuting to church but having fellowship with
my neighbors in the suburbs of my youth. This is the kind of Christianity cars created.
Introduction
Cars catalyzed a revolution in Christianity on the order of Gutenberg’s printing press
catalyzing the Reformation. Unlike the press, automobility depends on a non-renewable
resource: petroleum. That makes this religious revolution a historical blip. Gutenberg’s
Christianity will long outpace gasoline’s. Yet we’ve not considered any of this – a
problem partly of how some narrate history. Lastly I summarize the book’s arguments.
PAST
Scenic Viewpoint 2: Connecting Dots
Reflection: Suburbia, automobility, consumerism, and suburban Christianity all go
together. I summarize their interlocking, mutually-reinforcing relationships and
automobility’s primacy within it. Together they reinforce choice-based identity formation.
1 - Let There Be Oil… and Cars… and Suburbia
Oil and cars create a new kind of humanity. I narrate the history of oil production, the
ascendance of the automobile, and the arrival of the car-scaled built environment we call
suburbia. Cultural priorities and challenges of this car-scaled culture are outlined.
2 - The Petrol-Driven Church
Oil and cars create a new kind of Christianity based in no small order on an open
religious marketplace. Such a context led to the rise of evangelicalism, the decline of the
mainlines, rewarded megachurches, enabled church shopping, and provoked a series of
cascading identity crises for churches and denominations. Ministry technique organized
around the car. Much of this more matter-of-fact than strategic.

PRESENT
3 - Suburban Diaspora and a Global Faith
The church at the top of automobility’s blip is in heavy flux. We can’t easily go back on
automobility’s changes, and must struggle to live well in a placeless society and church.
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Yet church participation is also in decline in America, affording our faith less and less
overlap with other spheres in our life. Suburbia’s scattering thus reinforces our exile from
culture. But the flip side is that God used the era that decimated our faith to seed the
world with the gospel, kindling gospel movements old and new in the global south.
Scenic Viewpoint 3: Planting a Pedestrian-Scaled Church
I am part of a neighborhood-based church in Portland called Springwater, wherein
locality has deeply shaped our practice. But it has also created new challenges. I reflect
on the challenges of that journey in an era where automobility’s aroma is still strong.
4 - The Elephant in the Sanctuary
The impulse toward neighborhood, place, and community are latent in all the big
ecclesial movements underway. They’ve been subconsciously responding to
automobility’s fragmentation of society and ministry. I show the common shift toward the
local in the missional, emerging, new monastic, and multi/mega church movements.
5 - Coal, Natural Gas, and High Tech-Christianity
Reflection: Coal and natural gas power, warm, and even feed us. As fossil fuels, they’re
part of the blip. I’ll quickly review their role in creating and maintaining much of modern
life and ministry, consider their future, and provide theological engagement.
Scenic Viewpoint 4: Thinking Carefully About Technology
Many cultural and theological postures collude to slow our ability to practice discernment
about technology. Accessibly summarizing the thoughts of Neil Postman, Murray Jardine,
and Wendell Berry, I apply their concerns about technology generally to automobility
specifically. These thoughts should haunt readers as we progress through the book’s final
stretch, where a temptation to see technology as a savior will be strong.
FUTURE
6 - Oil’s Future
Petroleum is a finite resource, and by all estimates we’ve burnt up roughly half of it.
What’s left is harder and harder to produce, and for geological reasons we will be
producing less and less every year. This widely studied phenomenon is dubbed “peak oil”
after the bell-shaped curve of oil production rates. I explain all this with minimal
technicality, and respond to headlines suggesting wells won’t dry up any time soon.

7 - Our World’s Future
Less oil means less driving – period. But it means a good deal more than that. We’ve
reoriented our way of living in the land around easy, abundant oil, and so we’ll have to
reorient our lifestyles around less and less oil. Alternative fuels and technologies will
significantly help us wean ourselves off of oil, but it won’t be easy. Beyond that, peak oil
entails longterm relocalizing, deindustrializing, and decentralizing of all of life. Our
placeless ways won’t last the first half of this century.
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8 - Our Christianity’s Future
Christianity, too, will re-localize. Car-scaled churches will have many coping tactics for
this transition, and some are wiser than others. I outline how I think various church styles
will enter into this era of energy decline, and what church styles may develop. Key ideas
introduced are resilience, adaptive muddling, peak church, and transition.
9 - Rethinking, Retelling, Re-Placing
This isn’t the future we’ve been sold – nor is it quite like the history we’ve been told. I
invite readers to reimagine ministry in its light, re-tell the history of the blip’s church, and
sow seeds of resilient transition. Purposes God may have for the blip are considered.

10 - Stories of Re-Placing
Many churches, parishes, and communities have begun to return to the neighborhood. I
tell the stories of five groups who have done just that: Englewood Baptist, Zoe Livable
Church, Springwater, Embrace Richmond, and Communality.
Scenic Viewpoint 4: Re-Placing is worth it no matter what
Peak oil may be farther out, and its ramifications may not be as difficult as I have argued.
Still, relocalizing the church and nurturing resilience for such a transition would be very
healing for the world and could unlock renewal for the American church. We should
relocalize no matter what.
Benediction: Turn and Greet Your Neighbor
My argument is summarized along with lingering questions and possible next steps.

Competition & Uniqueness
Although many of today’s en vogue movements assume place and locality at some level,
only a few recent books have related place to ministry and theology. Though mentioned
in several recent books, no book to my knowledge has explicitly studied oil and
automobility’s effect on churches. And while some Christians will hint at peak oil in their
writing, no one has addressed our re-localized, de-industrialized future beyond the
swiftest passing mention. The three books that most closely compete with my book’s
premise, topics, and recommendations are:
• The Wisdom of Stability, by Jonathan Wilson-Hartgrove (Paraclete Press, 2010).
Stability and hypermobility are addressed through the lens of monastic witness
and pastoral care. Strong focus on personal/communal formation.
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• Missional: Joining God in the Neighborhood, by Alan Roxburgh (Baker, 2011).
Insists that authentic missional expressions happen most richly in specific
places and by joining the Holy Spirit already at work in your local context.
• AND: The Gathered & Scattered Church, Hugh Halter and Matt Smay
(Zondervan, 2010). Hub-and-spoke model of church that assumes dispersion
without fruitfully addressing locality.
Some have talked about suburban culture’s effect on churches, but no one has
asked how the architectural form of suburbia affected Christianity.
Some have talked about dispersed gatherings of big churches out of a concern for
size and scale, but no books have let place be the platform for a pedestrian-scaled
ecclesiology.
Some have suggested co-housing and communal lives, but few have made their
place-based praxis legible or translatable outside of their radical discipleship niche.
Some have encouraged Christians to address global warming and resource
scarcity, but no one has written about how those emerging realities will affect churches.

Intended Readers
Primary Audiences
• Missional Ministry Leaders interested in innovative, holistic responses to ministry
challenges in an emerging culture.
• Place-rooted practitioners looking to historically locate how we lost a sense of
place and locality, and how we can return to that way together.
• Forward-leaning trend-watchers eager to discover fresh takes on the future of the
North American church.
• Church Planters and Domestic Missionaries desiring to furnish community
churches instead of commuter churches.
Secondary Audiences
• Peak Oil Activists wanting to partner with churches and missional communities
• Creation Care Activists seeking to greenify existing ministries
• Lay folk interested in 20th-century church history or cross-disciplinary reflections
on ministry.

Promotion and Marketing
Marketing directions include promotion through:
• regional Parish Collective events;
• the annual Inhabit Conference in Seattle;
• Parish Collective’s e-network of 1100+ betoken a larger circle of churches;
• Leadership in the New Parish Certificate program (Seattle School);
• speaking engagements of other Parish Collective author-speakers;
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• word-of-mouth marketing from Mike Morrell’s TheSpeakeasy.info.
• The Other Journal’s book review board;
• blogged reviews via Len Hjalmarsen, Jamie Arpin-Ricci, Bryan Dormaier, Bob
Hyatt, Dwight Friesen, Sean Benesh, Mark Van Steenwyk, others.
• alumni networks & bookstores of University of Oregon, Multnomah University
& Biblical Seminary, and George Fox Evangelical Seminary;
• the Nurturing Communities Project;
• in my anticipated classrooms as a professor in 2013;
• Twitter and Facebook;
• Cross-marketing through Transition US, Resilience, and ASPO.
Follow-up material, supplementary writing, and future projects:
• Possible Christianity Today article
• Teaser video explaining the book’s hottest questions
• “Responding to” book or blog series with chapters/entries by church leaders
engaging the book’s arguments.
• “Parish Portraits” book of stories about localized church life
• Consulting with denominations & church planting networks
• Presentations with ASPO, Transition US, and other
• multi-author volumes exploring niche aspects of peak oil & Christianity
Possible Endorsements & Blurbs
I’m confident...
• Dwight Friesen – Thy Kingdom Connected
• Leonard Sweet – Aqua Church, So Beautiful, Jesus Manifesto
• Jonathan Wilson-Hartgrove – The Wisdom of Stability
• Sean Benesh – View from the Urban Loft, Metrospiritual, The Bikeable Church
• Chris Smith & John Pattison – Slow Church
• Mark Van Steenwyk – The unKingdom of God
• Jamie Arpin-Ricci – The Cost of Community
• Tom & Christine Sine – Mustard Seed Vs McWorld, The New Conspirators
• Tony Kriz – Neighbors & Wise Men
• David Janzen – The Intentional Christian Community Handbook
• Kelly Bean – {title forthcoming}
• Paul Sparks & Tim Soerens – Founders of Parish Collective & authors of The New
Parish
I’m optimistic…
• David Fitch – The Great Giveaway, The End of Evangelicalism?
• Michael Frost – The Shaping of Things to Come, Exiles
• Bill McKibben – Eaarth, The End of Nature
• Shane Claiborne – The Irresistible Revolution, Jesus for President
• Alan Roxburgh – Missional
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• Mark Scandrette – Practicing the Way of Jesus
• Tim Otto – Inhabiting the Church
• Jamie Arpin-Ricci – The Cost of Community
I can dream…
• Phyllis Tickle – The Great Emergence
• James Kunstler – Geography of Nowhere, The Long Emergency
• Richard Heinberg – Peak Everything, The Party’s Over
• Alan Hirsch – Right Here Right Now, The Shaping of Things to Come

Author Bio
I grew up attending a suburban megachurch. I had cultivated a ruggedindividualist spirituality that was caustic and thin. The first sermon I heard in college,
though, was “the kingdom of God is all about relationships,” which resonated with what I
was learning in my ecology classes about the connectedness of all things. That sermon
was being lived out in a couple of community houses near campus. That next fall I helped
launch the first guy’s community house there, where I lived for the remainder of college.
Community life proved to be quite the furnace of conversion for me, teaching me a richly
relational and holistic faith. My degree in Environmental Studies further helped me see
that God is redeeming the total ecology of humanity – physical, spiritual, relational, and
mental.
Heading back to Portland for graduate studies at a conservative seminary, I
dabbled in several expressions of intentional Christian community and learned even more
along the way. I worked as a Communications & Campaigns Director for a creation-care
nonprofit, where I connected deeply with my activists’ hearts but grew wary of lobbyistactivism that didn’t also embody their agenda locally.
In 2007 I was part of the founding team of folks who by 2008 launched a lay-led
missional church rooted in Portland’s eclectic Lents neighborhood. We’re called
Springwater, and doing place-based ministry with people of all ages has been one of the
most fascinating, enriching chapters of my life.
I am completing doctoral studies at George Fox Evangelical Seminary on the
ecclesial effects of automobility’s rise and pending-decline. I work with the Parish
Collective, an expanding network of practitioners rooted in neighborhoods and linked
across cities.
I joyfully married Candice Rose in September of 2011. My hobbies include
lifestyle bicycling, podcasting about simplicity, web design, and vegetable gardening.
Education
B.S. 2005 – Environmental Studies & Political Science – University of Oregon
M.A. 2008 – Pastoral & Intercultural Studies – Multnomah University
D.Min 2013 – Semiotics & Future Studies – George Fox Evangelical Seminary
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Professional Connections
I have relationships with those in the missional, radical discipleship, and new
monastic movements. My current vocation with the Parish Collective has me building
connections in the Pacific Northwest with place-rooted practitioners. Our network is far
wider than the few dozen I know, spreading to thousands across the continent.

Speaking & Social Media
I have led workshops on creation care, peak oil, community living, and postChristendom faithfulness regularly for several years. Current speaking engagements
include annual workshop facilitation at the Inhabit Conference and. I have also been
invited as a guest presenter, lecturer, and consultant at Warner Pacific College, Golden
Gate Baptist Seminary, Multnomah University, and The Seattle School.
I have extensive experience with blogging, social networking, and leveraging web
services to catalyze conversation. Connections at Christianity Today may further
accelerate awareness of this book.
Uniquely suited for this project
How peak oil will affect churches is a question that burns deep within my heart
ever since I woke up in winter of 2005 with a clear sense of calling about the matter. This
will be a defining issue in the shaping of the church in its 21st century, and I am so
excited for how God may use it. I can’t wait to share this hope with others, especially
those who may process peak oil with despair instead of hope. Indeed, having lived with
such an uncomfortable topic in my heart for years now, I have been able to discern the
topic much more healthily than I did in years past, moving from frustration toward hope.
And such a long knowledge of it has allowed me to sift the world through its implications
for more time than those whose knowledge of the issue is comparatively fresh.
Additionally, my near-decade of living in various expressions of intentional
Christian community, in contrast to my suburban upbringing, give me special insight into
the differences between commuter and community expressions of church. As a student of
the peak oil movement for eight years I am also well-read and prepared to discuss the
relevant topics.
Publishing Credits
• Book Chapters: “The Landscape of Disintegrating Community and Our Longing
For It” and “Contours of Resistance to Community” in The Intentional Christian
Community Handbook by David Janzen, Shane Claiborne, and Jonathan WilsonHartgrove (Paraclete Press, October 2012)
• Book Review: The Localization Reader (Englewood Review of Books, Summer
2012)
• Book Review: Kingdom Calling (PRISM Magazine, Spring 2012)
• Web Article: “Church-'With': Small Churches Find Their Future in Neighborhood
Renewal” (Christianity Today, February 2012)
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• Web Article: “Where No Church Planter Dare Go” (Christianity Today, November
2011)
• Co-Editor & Columnist: ParishCollective.org (2011 to present)
• Article: “Mis-Placing the Church” (Inhabit Conference Zine, April 2011)
• Co-Editor & Columnist: JesusManifesto.com (2008-2009)
• Theology Journal Article: “Writing With Both Hands: Thoughts on What’s Moving
Under the Church Carpet” (Cultural Encounters: Journal of the Theology of
Culture, Winter 2007)
• Communications & Campaign Director: RestoringEden.org (2005-2007)
Future Projects
• Book Chapter: “How To Plant a Church in Portland Without a Coffee Shop” in
Gentrification and Church Planting, edited by Sean Benesh (est. Q2 2013)
• Print or Web Article: “Kickstarter and the Church” (Christianity Today, Q2 2013)
• Print or Web Article: “[story of Zôe Livable Church]” (Christianity Today, Q1/2
2013)
• Print or Web Article: “[story about Vocoform]” (Christianity Today, Q1/2 2013)
• Print Article: “The Petrol-Driven Church?” (Christianity Today, est. Q1 2013)

SECTION 6: POSTSCRIPT
6.1 Execution
George Fox’s staff did a fantastic job preparing us from the beginning for writing
this dissertation. Library use, argument-formation, and technical assistance online
combined to provide a fantastic dissertation-writing experience. I felt like my cohorts and
the staff in Newberg and Tigard were all rooting for me with their prompt, personable
assistance. Particularly helpful in my research was the counsel to write my term papers as
chapters for the final dissertation – advice which shows itself on half of the pages you
have by now read! The only challenge in this was an inconsistent voice on my part, which
became hard to even out. Hopefully the hours spent doing just that, and revising the
“connective tissue” between sections, have contributed to a more rhetorically unified
work.
Chuck Conniry’s exhortation at the Orcas Advance – “This is not your magnum
opus.” – likewise helped me cull many pages of ancillary argument and supplementary
inquiry (see 6.3). The final project was much, much sharper than I would have made it. I
am immensely thankful for his humbling words, for they served as a gracious companion
in the final month of writing.
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6.2 Efficacy
My context and my research topic was challenging to fit into the suggested
scholastic arc of a D.Min, a program designed for professional ministers facing a specific
problem for professional ministry. I work part time in a parachurch ministry and am part
of a lay-led neighborhood church; my proposed “ministry problem” was the significantly
retrospective and less localized than what the program is designed for. I wasn’t arguing
for a solution to a problem as much as beginning a conversation about something I had a
hunch was really, really important for churches. Thus the proposed outline problem,
alternative solutions, proposed solution did not quite work. The Section 2 became a
sparring ground with “arguments for why Brandon’s argument is unworthy of discussion”
rather than proposed solutions, and it and even had some of Section 3 creep into it by the
end. My perspective, not surprisingly, is that this has more to do with my topic breaking
the seams of the formal dissertation outline than discarding it. One might say I embarked
on this topic within this scholastic discipline not to abolish it, but to fulfill it.
I remain confident in choosing a praxis-oriented discipline within which to pursue
this research question. The trajectory of my argument leans toward a return from head
knowledge and toward embodied, shared knowledge – a return, in other words, to place.
My research question suggested responses of practice, not only rhetoric. It accessibly
summoned readers out of modernity’s ideas-only exile and back to an ecclesiality of local
life together. Writing within this discipline, in other words, anticipated and expressed my
thesis.
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Writing a book proposal still feels merited. Nothing seems to so evoke an
authoritative voice among American Christianity like an author speaking out of their own
story. As a child of suburbia who has dabbled in local life for over ten years, I feel wholly
proper about my decision to write a book proposal for my artifact. Alternatives avenues –
pedagogical resources, a presentation, a website, etc. – can in turn form a subsequent
subsidiary to the focal effort of a book.

6.3 Concluding Thoughts, Lessons, and Trajectories
I believe a major gap has been exposed in American church history by Section 1.4
alone, and hope that students of the formal discipline of history can carry that section’s
questions forward and make them their own. I hope statisticians and demographers can
likewise give more precise texture to my arguments. I anticipate that as the full spectrum
of churchly scholarship engages Section 1.4’s theses many of its points will be shown
weak, and many quite strong. I eagerly welcome both.
As to the future-bent side of my research, I suggest more exercises of imagination
and roleplaying be done with churches of all sizes, places, and styles concerning energy
decline. How would a megachurch in Clackamas, Oregon cope with that kind of future?
Charrette-style exercises could surface possible tactics for cultivating resilience and
prefiguring transition. Connective spaces between the Transition Town movement and
churches could also be a formative space for collaboration and the mutual energizing of
imaginations.
My own ministry among place-based Christian communities and my practice
within a neighborhood church were both enriched by this study. I gained compassion and
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patience toward just about everyone as I observe the unwritten script of automobility in
their spiritual journey. Specifically, the “Pandora’s Box” nature of automobility: no
matter how hard we strive to live locally, the ability to look elsewhere and betray fidelity
to one’s place will ever be present. Short of peak oil’s full onset, automobility cannot be
put back in the box.
I leave the scholastic phase of this project deeply thankful and hopeful. I see
God’s hand in using the blip of automobility pruning and forming the Church. These are
epic times for church history. What an exciting time to be alive in Christ!
I am haunted by the challenge ahead of us. I fear the pedagogical elements of replacing the church: how are we to actionably awaken others to automobility’s blip? I fear
the revival-creating power of this transition could be lost by the Church’s fear of facing it
honesty, and therefore of the task of cultivating ecclesial resilience being relegated to a
souring Jeremian refrain. I confess pride in this fear that the potency and scope of my
thesis will face marginalization as a voice crying in the wilderness. Yet I take heart in the
Bible’s witness that voices crying in the wilderness tend to be the ones best remembered
by the People of God. Marginalized today, remembered tomorrow: in Christ we get there
together.
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⤴ Scenic Viewpoint 1: Where is my church?
I grew up in the suburbs of Hillsboro, Oregon. My family was two houses away
from the urban growth boundary that ran down West Union Road. Such boundaries are
our state’s none-shall-pass rules for would-be developers that preserves farms and
encourages denser development. Consequently, across West Union Road was alfalfa
fields, Douglas fir groves, and the occasional scrub oak. That field’s wildness crossed
into the Rock Creek neighborhood in the form of snakes, coyotes, and raccoons. One
year, Rock Creek itself flooded and cut off our through-street from the nearby strip mall.
But that’s about as far as nature ever affected my growing up; the usual elements
of suburbia defined my youth. Our neighborhood was a predictable 1980’s development
with little in the way of walkable access to anything but other houses. Down the road a
ways was the quickly-expanding Tanasbourne strip mall whose golden arches, 13-screen
cineplex, and Target dominated the time I spent outside the neighborhood. My family
drove everywhere, and like any American teenage boy I daydreamed often of what car I
would get (Toyota MR2 or Porsche 365). My friends proudly drove old Mustangs and
souped-up Hondas, and I played racing video games late into more nights than I care to
admit.
Like many Christians, I attended a church whose building was many miles away –
in my case it was in nearby Beaverton, some six miles down the highway. It was one of
the area’s only megachurches at the time, though it bore few of that genre’s stereotypes.
The kids in my youth group were from at least three counties, and none of them were
from my high school. My family couldn’t tell you who at that church lived closest to us.
2
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Mostly we only bumped into other church attendees at sanctioned church events like
Thursday night youth group or Sunday morning. I didn’t see them at school, at the
grocery store, the comic book store, or the mall (talk about the “invisible church!”). The
truth is we came from all over the wider Portland metro area. I never really thought much
of it at the time.
Meanwhile, my family was relationally closest to those who we were physically
closest to: our immediate neighbors. The kids played together, we remembered one
another in prayer, and we helped each other out with yard work and babysitting. If my
dog ran away, which happened often, we’d all go looking for her. When one family’s
yelling seeped through their windows, we all knew, and knew our duty to support the
woman as a divorce unfolded. When another family opened a restaurant, we all showed
up in force. Late summer evenings effervesced with laughter as the adults enjoyed glasses
of wine by the sidewalk. We all still stay in touch, and almost all of those neighbors came
to my wedding in 2011. Such a convergence of geographic proximity and relational
proximity is, looking back on it, entirely rare for most suburbanites, and I count it as
Christ’s blessing.
In spite of all this sharing of life, we attended different churches. On Sunday
mornings we were Foursquare, Presbyterian, Calvary Chapel, and so on. We heard
different sermons, but (to caricature the matter only slightly) lived a common sermon.
Church was in our experience a space of relative anonymity, but the neighborhood one of
intimacy.
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Now I ask you: which group was my church? Why the fragmentation between
who we shared community with and who we shared Communion with? Why did I never
see the people of my official church outside of its building? Might all this have hindered
the missions of our respective churches?
I propose that the car is the primary reason for this gulf, but it will take the first
part of this book to explain why. Indicting the automobile in this way isn’t to guiltmonger suburbanites, suburban pastors, or drivers. Nor will I be blaming everything out
of vogue on suburbia and cars – though it may at times feel that way! Indeed, as my own
suburban story shows, it is the nature of God’s grace to create community in surprising
places, and that includes the suburbs. So while I may blame much on the car, I will also
credit God with using them to do much good for his Bride in America.

Introduction
No Gutenberg, no Martin Luther. This point is unchallenged.
No Benz and Ford, no Bill Hybels. Or Robert Schuller, or Mark Driscoll, or Rick
Warren, or Brian McLaren for that matter. This point is, well, neither challenged or
unchallenged. It’s not even being considered, which is its own set of problems. Let me
walk through that more carefully.
We would have no Protestant Reformation without the movable type printing
press. Martin Luther’s opinions were shaped, spread, and acted upon because of Johannes
Gutenberg’s magnificent invention. The Reformation’s subsequent focus on the
supremacy of the Bible caught traction because more and more people had a Bible of
their own, making each woman and man a judge themselves to interpret the holy texts.
This didn’t just create new flavors of high church: almost all free church traditions,
including every Baptist you ever met, traces their ecclesial heritage through the earliest
Anabaptists, whose radical offshoot of the Reformation hinged not on Luther’s tracts but
their family Bible’s teachings. Gutenberg’s press made that possible, and thus steered the
history of European Christianity until it spilled beyond its shores to become a global
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faith. The printing press created a new way to be human, and a new kind of Christianity.
Amazing leaps forward… from one invention.
Gutenberg’s catalyzing role in the Reformation is a well-trod trail among church
historians. It is a curious thing, though, that the wider church has been so slow to
applying this history to their own. Conversations about many technologies are ongoing,
but tend to be limited to intellectual circles on the one hand and pragmatic entrepreneurial
church leadership on the other. For example both have conversed themselves to death
about the ecclesial transformations, challenges, and opportunities of television and the
internet. Rightly so: those are world-changing innovations. We should continue to widen
and deepen the conversation about how to live with these technologies as the church. But
why limit this conversation to the Ivory Tower and entrepreneurial pastor? The
implications of inventions like the printing press, television, and internet should be
discussed by the entire Body of Christ. We simply don’t try to tell our story through the
lens of how we became the tools of our tools. We forget Gutenberg and remember only
Luther.
One invention – the automobile – has revolutionized the world and church at least
as much as Gutenberg, the internet, or television. Cars transformed every aspect of life. In
1900 most people never traveled outside of a 15-mile radius. That’s a lifetime’s travel in
one gallon of gasoline. Nowadays we go that far just to get to work. We send tomatoes
from Orlando to Anchorage without them spoiling, and can drive from deserts to rain
forests in a day. It’s an amazing invention that, like Gutenberg’s press created a new way
to be human. In the pages ahead I’ll survey how this invention changed the course of
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humanity, and just as importantly how it empowered some of our deepest hopes and
identities. Individualism, modernity, and consumerism as we have them today formed and
were formed by automobiles.
Cars, like Gutenberg’s press, also transformed Christianity. In that pedestrian
world of the 15-mile lifetime, church was a thoroughly local and naturally parish-shaped
phenomenon. In cities scaled to the hoof and foot, church choice was about as limited as
you felt like taking a stroll. The paved new world ahead permitted promiscuity between
pulpits according to lay penchants. We had a license to church shop.
Our cities changed with the car, and so also our lifestyle and ministry patterns.
Workplace and home stretched miles apart, as did ministry from home and worship and
work. A world where culture right out our front door was fast fading in our rearview
mirrors, and choice emerged as the normative gateway to community, service, and
worship. Automobility let us choose our peers and pews as never before. Car-crafted
Christianity’s effects go deeper and wider than this, and has a clear set of winner
churches and loser churches. In the first stretch of this book I will explore them further.
Hyper-mobile Christianity became what I will call suburban or placeless
Christianity – a stage in our faith’s development which has no durable space for
community, which privileges choice and consumption over roots and creativity, is more
private than public, more commuter than community, focuses on attraction more than
incarnation, trades in tradition for novelty and sentimentality, and prefers the universal
and global to the particular and local. That’s a consistently negative list, I’ll admit, and
for now one marked off with some caricature to elicit clarity. None of placeless
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Christianity is new, either: each of these components has flourished to varying degrees in
different times and places throughout the church’s history. But, as when you add
enormous sums of energy to any system (be it cooking or politics or a petri dish),
automobility exacerbated everything that was already latent in Christianity. This new
kind of Christianity had a few new developments of its own, but its deepest
characteristics were malignant developments of some of our pre-existing conditions.
Neil Postman notes that eras of rapid technological development tend to produce
identity crises in the cultures they are innoculating. Old traditions, definitions, habits, and
values feel uneasy. In such times, he says, identities convulse: some in metamorphosis,
others as in death throes. I will show that the technological revolution of automobility
catalyzed several cascading identity crises within the church. What it meant to be the
church was already up for re-evaluation. Automobility will be shown to have catalyzed
this process drastically by placing that negotiation into a market-like context.
Competition, not collaboration, defined the remaking of the faith in the emerging
American context. And I argue that it wouldn’t have happened quite like it did without all
those cars transitioning us from the parish and 15-mile-life to the market and 50-mile
world.
Like Gutenberg’s printing press, we have taken these changes to church life
largely for granted. A few in the Ivory Tower, and a few entrepreneurial church planters,
have teased out automobility. But with much detriment to the mission of God and God’s
church, most of us have not joined that conversation.
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Such a reflection would not be possible without a deeper reality that in turn
allowed motor vehicles to become as widespread as they. Cars need a cheap and abundant
fuel source to thrive, and they found their fuel in the deeper parts of the earth: petroleum
refined variously into diesel or gasoline. Oil was relatively easy to extract, abundant, easy
to safely transport, and we quickly figured out how to efficiently refine it – all reasons
why it’s still one of the most convenient fuels in the world. There were two trillion
barrels of it in the ground at the time, and turn-of-the-century entrepreneurs happily
established engines and oil production around one another. We were sitting on what felt
like limitless energy, and understandably America rebuilt herself in the decades ahead on
the promise of oil’s abundance. Choosing car-dependence, though, was only possible
with all that oil. The car-crafted new kind of humanity and new kind of Christianity that
developed in the 20th century only came to be because of this abundant, but finite,
resource.
So we must revise our opening thesis: no oil, no Benz, no Hybels.
“So what?” some may ask. “That’s in the past. We have oil, and Benz, and
Hybels. That’s where we’re at. It’s like saying ‘No trees and hemp, no Gutenberg, no
Luther.’ What’s the difference?”
Much in every way! For one, trees grow back. They are (in theory at least) a
renewable resource, and so allows Gutenberg’s culture and Luther’s church to develop
indefinitely. Oil, abundant though it may be, is not renewable. Benz’ culture and Hybels’
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church, then, are much more historically limited than those of Gutenberg and Luther.
Eventually, oil supplies max out and decline. Best estimates suggest that the era of cheap
and abundant oil (and therefore of affordable and ubiquitous Benz culture and Hybels
Christianity) will last no more than 150 years. The new kind of Christianity ushered in by
cars and all that oil, then, won’t last very long as part of the church’s long history.
Consider this approximate timeline, placing the history of oil and the printing press
within the deeper history of the church, extended half a millennia into our future.

The kind of Christianity we are experiencing is unprecedented in the history of the People
of God, but won’t last quite like Luther’s kind. A literate Christianity will likely last far
longer than an oil-powered variant. So while my opening comparison between the two is
fair insofar as both are technology-catalyzed church revolutions, it is not fails to mention
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this crucial difference. Oil-powered Christianity is a mere (if staggeringly important) blip
within Gutenberg’s more sustainable revolution.
That graph is worth a second look. Almost everything American Christians know
about their faith happened in the first half of that blue blip, and can be tied to the
explosive access to oil that so characterized it. Youth groups, worship bands, church
shopping, multi-site campuses, retreat centers, short-term mission trips, church
marketing, and more. The technology that enables today’s Christianity could be a flash in
the pan of history because what fuels it is finite. It’s one thing to observe how new much
of that is to Christianity, but another thing entirely to suggest it may fade away as fast as
it sprang up. That sort of suggestion doesn’t go well for most of us who are accustomed
to the future being like a shinier version of the present. “The idea of the future being
different from the present,” wrote John Maynard Keynes, “is so repugnant to our
conventional modes of thought and behavior, that we, most of us, offer a great resistance
to acting on it in practice.”1 We simply aren’t prepared to consider the blippiness of our
day.
It should be said, also, that petroleum betokens the wider world of fossil fuels,
including natural gas, shale, tar sands, and of course coal. We heat our homes with natural
gas and coal. We power our refrigerators, computers, phones, businesses, and schools
with them. Most of our nonorganic fertilizer is made from natural gas. As oil is to how
we get between buildings, so also natural gas and coal are to what we do in them. These
changed civilization and Christianity radically; in the pages ahead my arguments glance
1 John Maynard Keynes, quoted in Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, 2012, http://www.scribd.com/doc/115962650/Global-Trends-2030-AlternativeWorlds (accessed December 12, 2012).
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off coal and gas’ ecclesial ripples. Natural gas’ production lifecycle is even more of a blip
than petroleum, and coal somewhat less so; therefore I will also incorporate their finite
supplies into suggestions about the future, and the weightiest task of theologically renarrating church history in that light.
Christianity is long overdue for talking about this blip of fossil-fueled
Christianity. Our self-awareness and ability to discern the times is malnourished because
of it. I suggest we launch the conversation at four levels of inquiry.
First is the historian’s question: how did all that oil change the faith? Few have
asked this, and so our story has been told incompletely. It’s been like studying the
Reformation without looking at Gutenberg’s press. Second is the church and pastor’s
question: how can the church best retain her identity as the Body of Christ in this hypermobile age, to life in oil’s blip? Some have partially responded to this question, although
their voices have not been woven together into a conversation. Third is the futurist’s
question: how will oil’s future inform the church’s future? Although some authors have
explored ecclesial responses to the wider effects of oil’s future, no one is asking how
church may or must reorganize themselves as oil’s future unveils itself. Fourth and
riskiest is the prophet’s question: how in the long run is Jesus Christ using oil’s blip for
his kingdom and glory? Many have sought to consider how God may be using other
megatrends like the internet and American church decline, but none have publicly
integrated fossil fuels into it. Responding to these questions can bring healing to the
church, wisdom to our steps forward, and worship to the God who has been up to only
good through it all.
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Much of this may sound absurd to you. How could my Honda be on par with
Martin Luther? This question is entirely warranted. Christians commonly discuss church
history as a flow of ideas (e.g., Romanism giving way to Lutheranism and Calvinism, or
Liberalism producing Fundamentalism). This informs our ability to imagine the future. If
we assume big theological developments are what directed Christianity’s past, then it’s
understandable that we can only prospect about our own future through a similar lens of
ideas – say, of progress or postmodernism or missional theology. Suggesting that a given
technology, resource, or architecture pattern may condition our ideas’ development is at
best a footnote-level observation to many.
Yet that is not the only way to tell our story. Ideas matter, but there is more to our
history as the people of God than that. In order for this project to proceed I will need to
dispel these narratives as woefully incomplete, and so suggest a more techno-inclusive
way of doing history, theology, ministry, and future studies.
Truthfully, there are nearly limitless ways to tell a story. Each versions conjures
different aspects than even its nearest variants. Consider the synoptic gospels: remarkably
similar, yet each draws to the fore very distinct themes and visions without excluding the
themes and visions of the others. Thus Mark’s “kingdom of God” and Matthew’s
“kingdom of heaven” function as signposts to the same reality in non-competing ways
which, rather than limiting each other, permit a reciprocally-enlightened reading of each
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text. What is rejected in the pages to come, then, is one-or-the-other way of reading texts,
data, and history that pits them against one another. Though closed readings of Mark is
useful, theologians also note how Matthew, Luke, and John make it shine all the brighter.
My arguments arise from a more synergistic way of letting narratives texture a
topic. Each is a different mode of knowledge that enhances a shared understanding of the
subject. It is in much the same way that you know your mother different from how your
father knows her, or how her doctor or Google or her neighbors know her. Perhaps that’s
why funerals and weddings typically include commemorative reflections by a diversity of
parties. This may also be likened to the different tools of hammer, saw, measuring tape,
and nails needed to construct a chair; no one tool can build the whole thing. Or again:
adding a green and blue light to a red-lit room expands our understanding of the room’s
contents. Different bulbs, different friends, different narrative modes, should ultimately
yield richer understanding.2
Challenges arise in scholarship when its storytellers become stuck in one way of
narrating their topic, to the neglect of its other narratives. In telescoping toward some
essentialist “core” to the subject, we become oblivious to other ways of knowing and
narrating it. Thus it is in theology among atonement-theorists seeking a timeless and
extensively parsed-out knowledge of that subject; often they are most centrally faulted for
letting their context unfairly color the subject. The 17th-century jurist Hugo Grotius, for
example, is commonly critiqued for his governmental theory of atonement because he

2 Paul G. Hiebert, Missiological Implications of Epistemological Shifts: Affirming Truth in a
Modern/Postmodern World (Harrisburg, PN: Trinity Press Int’l, 1999): 81 ff.
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crafted a narrative of the atonement too gratuitously from his professional expertise.3
Such scholastic dead-ending is classically captured by Wittgenstein's maxim that our
metaphors have a way of dragging us along with them. “The model we choose to use to
understand something,” says Iain McGilchrist, “determines what we find.”4 The man with
only a hammer tends only to see nails.
The discipline of history has long been acknowledged to suffer in this way, of so
arguing for a unified telling of a history that it tends to become exclusive to other voices.
The “Big Ideas” (history is a sequence of big ideas like liberalism or industrialism daisychained together) and “Big Men” (history is a bunch of powerful men asserting their
power) for history-telling looms steadily here, and certainly dominated my pedagogy
growing up. In response to these totalizing histories, in the 20th century the discipline
burst into a salvo of ever-bifurcating sub-disciplines. Natural history, herstory, populist
history, botanical history, geographic history, race history, and myriad others have
crowded out the usual narratives of “Big Ideas” and “Big Men.” Each provided fresh
insight into aspects the dominant narratives left out. To return to the analogy of the blind
men grasping different parts of the elephant, these sub-disciplines are describing the
elephant’s ears and tail and feet to a public only taught about its tusks and trunk.
These alternative modes have produced some of the most celebrated historical
works of recent memory. Howard Zinn’s A People’s History of the United States shifted
the American story from big debates about big ideas among big men (Jefferson and

3

Millard Erickson, Christian Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2004): 808.

4 Iain McGilchrist, The Master and his Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the
Modern World (New Haven, CN: Yale University, 2009): 97.

16

Adams, for example) by telling that story from its underside, beneath its boot, among its
victims, and in its slave quarters. Likewise, and closer in spirit to this essay, Jared
Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel slew older theories of race, divine favor, and cultural
superiority of explaining the ascension of the West to its present power by demonstrating
the massive role of geography and ecology beneath it all. Big ideas and great men
certainly contributed to that rise: but that they achieved such significance is due in no
small part to the web of ecology, technology, and industry in which they ripened. There is
no Luther, as I have argued, without Gutenberg’s paper press.
The American church has proven remarkably slow to learn from all of this.
Important treatments of American church history consistently remain at the level of the
“Big Ideas” level discussed in this paper’s introduction. The roles of technology,
architecture, and living patterns feel almost incidental to their arguments. Consider
consumerism’s treatment in several major works. Darrell Guder’s seminal Missional
Church explores consumerism in society and church as it relates to postmodernism;5
Robert Wuthnow’s acclaimed After Heaven understands religious consumerism through
the prism of 1960’s cultural upheaval;6 Brian McLaren’s A Generous Orthodoxy refers to
it only in discussions of injustice, ecocide, and cheap grace. 7 All of these are important
and exciting angles which have thus far yielded much fruit. But the physical stuff by
which consumerism finds embodiment is an afterthought at best.

5

Darrell L. Guder, ed., Missional Church: A Vision for the Sending of the Church in North
America (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998): 18-45.
6

Robert Wuthnow, After Heaven: Spirituality in America Since the 1950’s (Los Angeles, CA:
University of California Press, 1998): 52ff.
7

Brian McLaren, A Generous Orthodoxy (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2004).
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Future-bent studies of tomorrow’s church are likewise guilty in only giving lip
service to technology. In their writings, technology like blogs, smartphones, and social
media primarily service an enhanced exchange of big ideas. While that is certainly true
enough, just how those technologies will impact church and spirituality patterns (still
less, relational patterns and home life) remains basically undiscussed. Tom Sine’s The
New Conspirators, Gabe Lyons’ The Next Christians, Tony Jones’ The New Christians,
and Phyllis Tickle’s The Great Emergence all variously chart out the future’s church
primarily through the lens of big ideas broadcast (but only mildly shaped) by technology.
How technology shapes our ideas and practices is a question I will lean into in Scenic
Viewpoint 4.
The discipline of church history to date, in only exploring the topic through the
history of Big Ideas and Big Men, it has come to be assumed that these ideas
(postmodernism, pluralism, marketing, whatever) would have causally emerged from
their predecessors. We’ve inherited a sort of “hearts-and-minds” determinism where ideas
and values emerge, evolve, spread, and eventually die without much regard for the
architecture, technology, or other artifacts of their context. In this view, postmodernism
was a tensed coil that would have burst out of modernism sooner or later, and its environs
were of little import to the final shape it took. The church’s historians have focused on
nature, not nurture; genetics, not context.
Not surprisingly, efforts to respond to challenges in faith and life remain at the
level of ideas. In a history of Big Ideas, changing the hearts and minds of churchgoers is
the natural response. This is all the more ironic at a time when themes of embodiment,
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creational theology, and a renewed focus on praxis’ relationship to faith are all so en
vogue among Christian intelligentsia. Far more tragic than this coy irony is the tragedy
with which this hearts-and-minds method has failed. 8 This failure is due in no small part
to reducing history and history-making to the level of Big Ideas. In this failure we’ve
been trying to build a chair with only a saw, to construct something with provenly
inadequate tools. We need a holist tool set for more honest history-telling, a timelier
faithfulness, and a more hopeful future.
Our problem is that we’ve only been lighting the halls of church history with one
color of bulb, and so have misunderstood it. What is needed is more colors of bulbs. A
full-spectrum reading of 20th-century church history must include a history of technology
and geography alongside that of ideas and texts. We must consider what lies beneath
these big ideas, in what technologies, landscapes, and places they find embodiment,
resistance, and reinforcement. These in turn can help the church better engage its various
contexts.
My extensive exploration on automobility’s role in church history conclusively
showed how much more richly we can tell our story as a faith when we tease out the links
between our physical and spiritual architecture. And because we’ve done so little of this
for North American 20th century church history, we’ve told it very partially. Automobility
has not been rigorously examined by academics or thought-leaders in the North American
church. At best, their reflections are an aside within a bigger project. 9 Practitioners of

8

James Davis Hunter, To Change the World: The Irony, Tragedy, & Possibility of Christianity in
the Late Modern World (New York, NY: Oxford Press, 2010): 1-31.
9

See Jacobsen, McLaren, Jethani, Lyons, and Sayers in the Bibliography.
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place-based faithfulness and neighborhood-rooted Christianity have bumped into some of
automobility’s effects, though my research shows them rarely grasping the whole of it.10
Indeed whatever grasping has been made does not seem to have substantially contributed
to the total issue. Telling our story so poorly has restricted our imagination for what is
possible in the future.

The road ahead
Earlier I suggested this topic compels me to ask the questions of the historian, the
pastor, the futurist, and the prophet. Professionally I am none of these; my training is in
environmental studies, intercultural ministry, semiotics and future studies. So my
collection of mortar boards offers me as a future-bent environmental pastor. The road
ahead is cross-disciplinary, though, which means no one is qualified to pen a full-throttle
journey down it. That would be best accomplished by practitioners and scholars in all of
the engaged fields. Precisely because the conversation about oil’s role in church history is
so young, no one person is qualified to answer all of the questions at once.
Thankfully, answering them is not my goal. My chief aim in this book is to
thoughtfully ask those questions to the wider church, and with that invitation to
conversation give some opening reflections about where fruitful responses may lead. I
would like to begin, not end, a conversation about automobility’s role in church history
past, present, and future. In doing so I will not pretend to have the final word on any of it.
To be sure, in the pages ahead I will get a handful of things wrong and out of focus. Some
10 See Halter & Smay, Morey, Guder, Hirsch, Roxburgh, Frost, Ford, and Boren in the
Bibliography.
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directions I will take may lead to dead ends. But for the most part I believe you will find
that other directions will put us on open roads.
The first leg of the road ahead will consider the questions of the historian; namely,
“How did all these cars and all this oil change Christianity?” It’s a question that I’ve
found to be rarely asked by church historians or thought leaders. To do this we will
review what led to the new way to be human enabled by oil and cars. I will summarize
the development of oil production, automobility’s expansion, suburbia’s ascendance, and
what sociologists and historians have identified as their cultural legacy and limits. Next I
will intertwine the results of that inquiry with 20th-century American church history,
discerning the shape of the petrol-driven church.
In the second section, I will ask the questions of the pastor as we consider current
shape of this new kind of Christianity. I will consider the diverse ways American
Christians respond to the lingering legacy of automobility in today’s church, and reflect
on what assumptions and etiquettes may resist a more in-focus consideration of the
placeless nature of much of our Christianity.
In the final and longest section, I will ask the questions of the futurist and the
prophet: “What is the future of oil, how will that steer the future of churches, and how
can we constructively live into that?” We’ll look at the geological underpinnings of oil
production, the likeliness of a permanent decline in oil production, and what role
alternative technologies will play in mitigating that decline. I will review how that may
change church patterns and practices, what will be church’s possible mitigating strategies
to energy decline, and practices churches can take in the meantime to lean into a lower-
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energy world. Finally I will consider what kinds of theological challenges and
opportunities are posed by integrating automobility into church history, and how God
may intend to use its blip for advancing the missio dei.
Along the way, as you have already seen, I will texture my arguments with
supplemental vignettes and considerations, playfully dubbed “Scenic Viewpoints.” These
will range from experiences whose hauntings drive me further down the road to deeper
arguments about the place of place within the life of the church. They mark of a shift in
voice and tenor: sometimes toward memoir and often toward the tone of scholarship. My
experience of automobility and faith in the Blip has informed my scholarship, and viceversa. Together I hope they will function like additional light bulbs that will provide a
full-spectrum consideration of automobility and the church.

My tone and vantage point
Questioning cars or suburbia in some circles approaches blasphemy – they can
embody freedom, success, national pride, and more. Elsewhere, questioning them is so
common as to seem passé – “Of course suburbia is bad! Welcome to the thinking part of
the population.” Most of us are somewhere between these poles, even as they are
complicit in suburbia and automobility. Therefore I will do my questioning with a tone of
repentant confession as much as is possible, for our own partaking in them is our
common denominator. The story of suburban Christianity is my story, too. As Scenic
Viewpoint 1 showed, I am from the suburbs. More than that, I love the thrill and
convenience of cars. However snotty and curmudgeonly I may get about cars, I am still
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quite inoculated with their ensuing culture – not all of which is bad. My heart flutters
when I hear a Harley roar by. Road trips are fun. Driving through winter rain is much
more pleasant than bicycling through it. Getting across town in 20 minutes instead of 60
minutes is just rad. And I can’t take my beagle on the bus, but he loves the back of a car.
My arguments, then, will not be as those from someone claiming to be a
disinterested observer. I write as a child of the suburbs and appreciator of automobiles
who has spent his entire life seeking understanding on these matters. My quest to
understand Blip Christianity is a quest to understand my own place within it, and
therefore my own place in the vast halls of church history. If you are reading this as an
American or Canadian, I invite you to consider your own past as automobility and energy
abundance have shaped it, and your similarly special place in church history. With that, I
invite you to not take my sharper jabs at suburbia or cars personally. Just because one
cannot easily extract themselves from car-dependence doesn’t exempt them from hearing
critiques. On the contrary: our dependence on cars and cheap oil only underscore that we
have driven ourselves into a dead end on these matters. We’re so entrenched that
alternative voices can sound like a threat.
Judgments and questions I level at cars or suburbia will be ones I have sought to
own and respond to in my own life. The practice I currently speak out of is as someone
grounded in a place-based church called Springwater in Portland, Oregon’s eclectic Lents
neighborhood. I will dedicate one of the Scenic Viewpoints to telling that story as it bears
on this effort. Suffice to say here we have struggled with how to be the church within
oil’s Blip, and have learned some lessons along the way. In giving ourselves to this one
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corner of our neighborhood we have learned more about our addiction to cars than
Netflixing any number of car-critical documentaries. For me personally, living without a
car has taught me some beautiful and painful lessons. I have learned the dangers and uses
of them through their relative absence in my adulthood, and will speak about them out of
that experience.

⤴ Scenic Viewpoint 2: Connecting Dots
Before the automobile, there was no such thing as suburbia. Sure, as many
historians of suburbia will note, the 19th century bore its architectural germ in the form of
borderland estates, picturesque enclaves, and streetcar developments.1 But suburbia as we
know it today – unremarkable square miles of single-family houses on winding sidewalkbereft roads giving way to indistinct square miles of big-box retail stores and shopping
malls awash in a sea of parking lots, overlooked by dreary square miles of office parks,
and stitched together with interstates, cloverleaf onramps, and left-turn lanes – is the
landscape of the automobile. Automobility didn’t just make it easier to get to work and
play; it created a geography, an architecture, an economy, and a culture around itself.
Suburbia is therefore also the culture of the car. No cars: no suburbia, and therefore
nothing quite like the culture of suburbia.
Car culture has reshaped every facet of American life. Leisure and labor, family
and farm, entertainment and exercise, work and worship all have newly suburbanized
modes of being. The scope of this overhaul of American life is monolithic: despite its
bland replicability and forgettable aesthetics, automobilized suburbia is nothing less than
a new culture. Cars as culture-makers, then, have occasioned a new way of being human.
Americans do everything different because of the car and the car’s culture: suburbia.
As I mentioned in the introduction this created a new form of Christianity, which I
will variously describe as suburban or placeless Christianity. My argument moving
forward is based on the relationship between the constellation of ideas just introduced,
1

Hayden, 3-9.
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which I believe bear defining and connecting early on. They are automobility, suburbia,
consumerism, and suburban Christianity. I have diagrammed their relationship in Figure
1.

At the root of all that follows is automobility, defined here as “the configuration
of people, machines, landscape, urban geography, and culture that attends the increasing
dependence upon the gas engine for transport in industrial and post industrial societies.”2
It is the expansive social, spatial, and institutional tapestry which both undergirds and
flows out of a widely democratized mode of petroleum-fueled individual mobility. It isn’t
just the stuff of driving – cars, oil supplies, onramps, and the like. It’s more than the
culture of cars – NASCAR, Sunday driving, andThe Fast and the Furious. It’s more than
the geography of easy-motoring – parking lots, java shacks, and exurbs. Automobility is
all of that combined (and more) in a comprehensive society-wide positive feedback loop
where increased mobility rewards new building and commerce modes, which in turn
2 Sidonie Smith, Moving Lives: Twentieth-Century Women’s Travel Writing, (Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press, 2001): 185.
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makes automobility a requisite for functional cultural membership. It is the interplay of
affordable driving with an individualistic culture and underregulated urban design which
produce a car-scaled landscape that in turn rewards and reinforces affordable driving and
individualism. And on the vicious cycle of automobility continues. For example: malls
are created as the automobilized bastard children of town centers, which steadily replace
actual town centers and public spaces, which in turn produces a culture dependent on cars
to get to its public (albeit civic-turned-commercial) spaces.
Suburbia is here defined as any urban geography which is patterned to the scale of
the automobile.3 While other forms of urban geography (new urbanism, city center, etc.)
incorporate and accommodate the automobile, it is suburbia which is built wholesale
around the car as a primary form of personal locomotion, accommodating non-motorized
mobility modes only where is minimally necessary. Suburbia, suburban, and
suburbanized will also be used in a slightly looser manner throughout this book to
conjure their wider colloquial cloud of cultural values, artifacts, rhythms, and architecture
associated with a car-scaled urban geography. Suburban Christianity, for example, is not
just the faith of Christians who happen to live in the suburbs, but more expansively is a
Christianity robustly adapted to and shaped by those automobilized cultures which
inhabit suburbia.

3

Most histories of suburbia include the many decades of suburban development prior to the
invention and eventual mass-adoption of the automoibile. In this broader sense suburbia is a low-density
non-farmed built environment. Some scholars link it with the ability to commute to work, as was allowed
by railroads and electric trollies in the late 19th century in America. I have chosen to tie the term to an
autmobile-scaled built environment because it takes both of these senses and applies it to what we have
before us today. It’s no good making space for the bourgeois enclaves of the 1880’s in defining suburbia
when those enclaves have long since been overrun with automobilized infrastructure and development. For
an example of those preferring commutability as suburbia’s metric, see Jon C. Teaford, The American
Suburb: The Basics (New York City, NY: Routledge, 2008): 1-17.
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Consumerism is an industry-choreographed cultural matrix designed to sell
products by crafting personal and group identity through an engineered narrative rooted
in individual choice.4 “Consumption,” said Jean Baudrillard, “is a system of meaning.”5
For example, the consumerism behind Apple products (exemplified in their “I’m a Mac”
TV spots) is a narrative of “other computers are hard to use, unpredictable, and for statusquo brown-shirt peons. We think different. Ours just work, and are for savvy innovators
like you.” At once they’ve conjured up an identity-forging story of both marginalized/
roguish independence and acceptance into an “in crowd” who have seen the light. Mac
users are painted as both the cool kids and the witty nerds who have emerged from the
Gatesian nightmare triumphant. That is consumerism at its most potent. Apple’s market
savvy is also consistent with the marketing proverb that you’re rarely selling the product
as much as the brand, the sizzle more than the steak. Consumerism rewards consistent,
dependable, predictable expectations based on a name: “there’s the REI, I know what to
expect there.” The predictability of brand recognition thus apes the dependability of a
relationship with less risk of surprises. This predictability in turn empowers the
consumer’s choice laying at the heart of the matter. Consumers are, according to the
narrative of the ads, keen discerners of product who are always on the lookout for the
best deal. To buy is, like voting, the ultimate expression of our public self; “I shop;

4 Skye Jethani, The Divine Commodity: Discovering a Faith Beyond Consumer Christianity
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2010): 50-53. On page 50, Jethani writes “We define our identity and
construct meaning for our lives through the brands we consume.”
5

2001): 49.

Jean Baudrillard, Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press,
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therefore I am.” One’s power to choose in a consumerism-saturated culture becomes a
mythologized potency unto itself.6
Appropriately choice lies at the center of suburban Christianity. You can choose to
go here, to this congregation, over so many other churches. One’s arrival or departure at
their chosen church is of little consequence to the rewards of this choice; what matters in
a consumerized, suburbanized church is that you chose it and can choose to leave it for
another church. Within the suburban church par excellence, the megachurch, that
identity-forging power of choice is again rewarded: I can choose which felt need or
affinity group I want to find belonging in. Stay-at-home moms, empty-nesters, golfers,
porn addicts, justice advocates, new parents, skateboarders, and dancers all get to choose
their own Jesus-ified social niche to belong to. Rather than being an alternative
community, suburban Christianity offers their version of already existing ways people
organize themselves (affinity, therapy, life-stage, etc.). Thus after the consumerism-act of
choosing a church, one further reinforces their consumerism-identity by choosing to
belong or not to belong to a particular ministry. Suburban Christianity, then, is defined in
this book as the forms of Christian faith specially adapted to suburbia by scaling to an
automobilized geography and culture, and by catering to consumerism’s identity-forming
narratives and techniques. Hence Figure 1’s rooting suburban Christianity in both
suburbia and consumerism – both of which are rooted in an affordable, sustained,
widespread automobility.

6

Seiler, 1-35.
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Summarily suburbia and automobility are foundational, not merely ornamental, to
a proper study of postwar American church habits because they are foundational to
proper studies of postwar Americana. Individualism, postmodernism, and consumerism
will be firmly tethered to the cul-de-sacs, big-boxes, and tailgates representing the
tapestry of American living, and in which those abstracts find embodiment and constant
negotiation. So also in the churches, as will be shown further in Chapter 2.

2 – The Petrol-Driven Church
One of the more remarkable things about studying how American Christianity has
related to suburbia and automobility is the almost total lack of conversation about it all.
Churches across the spectrum took suburbia for granted, and often adapted to it.
Considering the revolutionary scope of suburbia and automobility’s impact on American
society, it is astonishing how few Christians gave much moral discernment to it. Or rather
how few of those discernments can be found today. In my searches, I only discovered one
significant book1 on the topic in the entire twentieth century. Several articles were
published, but so few that you can count them on one hand. 2 If publishing is to be
counted as a valid indicator of a broad Christian discernment on a topic, this is a baffling
silence.
To be sure, in the pages ahead I will demonstrate how churches responded to
suburbia and automobility left, right, and center. Few, however, ever seemed to give
critical reflection. We just don’t have records of many Christians writing down, “Gosh,
cars are changing everything about my faith; here’s what we’re doing about it.” Almost
nobody was that direct about it. Instead suburbia was usually engaged by churches
through combating its symptoms instead of suburbia itself (and automobility) as root
1

Gibson Winter, The Suburban Captivity of the Churches (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1962); ;
James Hudnut-Beuler, Looking for God in the Suburbs: The Religion of the American Dream and its
Critics, 1945-1966 (Piscataway Township, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994).
2

John Gardner, “The Downtown Church” in The Biblical World 47, no. 3 (Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press, 1916): 156-160; Dan W. Dodson, “Religion in Suburbia” in Journal of Educational
Sociology 32, no. 8 (Washington, DC, American Sociological Association, 1959): 365-373; Darren
Dochuck, “Praying for a Wicked City: Congergation, Community, and the Suburbanization of
Fundamentalism” in Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation 13, No. 2. (Los Angeles,
CA: University of California Press, 2003): 167-203; Michael L. Berger, The Devil’s Wagon in God’s
Country: The Automobile and Social Change in Rural America, 1893-1929 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books,
1979).
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causes. A sort of dispersed series of proxy battles over family, loneliness, consumerism,
church growth, sexual promiscuity, individualism, church shopping, alienation, sacredsecular divides, divorce, and materialism has occurred, while the real culprit has
remained thus far untouched.
We have some distance, 100 years after cars were popularized, to consider this
root cause and catalyst of so much controversy in the American church. Most broadly,
church responses to and reflection on suburbia and automobility can be charted along two
axes (Figure 2): one a spectrum between critical reaction, cooperative obsolescence and/
or static non-response in the middle, and competitive hyper-adaptation. The other axis
slides between defending suburban values and norms, and aggressiveness regarding the
above-mentioned topical proxy battles caused by suburbia and automobility.
First, churches adapted to automobilized, consumerist suburbia through various
levels of accommodation, adaptation, and acquiescence. From drive-in churches and
church reader boards to seeker-sensitive market savvy and multi-site megachurches,
many evangelical churches have adapted to suburbia phenomenally. That is, they
provided the religious goods and services for a car-shaped America better than anyone
else. At the other end of the spectrum are the mainline and Anabaptist traditions, who
were slow and stubborn to respond to the tectonic shift taking place in America.
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Figure 2

The second axis, by focusing on the volume of dissent churches gave in response
to suburbia and automobility’s effects, winds up blurring conventional conservative/
liberal dichotomies.3 For example, liberal issues like creation-care, fair trade,
consumerism, social justice, and opposition to oil wars are all responses to the symptoms
and effects of automobilized, consumerized suburbia. Likewise with conservative
advocacy regarding sexual promiscuity, divorce, and financial responsibility. All flow
3 Some issues, however, basically elude suburbia’s shadow. Debates regarding Constantinian
nationalism, homosexuality, and culture-war issues like prayer in schools are basically ancillary to this
discussion.
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from suburbia, and so this spectrum brings together what conventional readings tear
asunder.
It is worth celebrating that some authors did suggest localizing, and in practicing
it inadvertently found various degrees of satisfaction in resolving the impacts of
automobility otherwise fought through “battle of ideas” methods as its proxies. Included
here are house churches, simple churches, and the germinal forms of today’s new
monastic, emerging, and missional movements. Most of these, however, were responding
to the church’s wider capitulation to Christendom and the Enlightenment, not
automobility. As Chapter 4 will show, in attempting to relocalize church habits these
fresh thinkers are also undoing much of the suburban captivity of the church. 4

1870’s to 1960: Church in Crisis and Flux
American cities historically segregated themselves loosely by ethnicity and
denomination.5 Local church buildings were stocked with people closest in proximity to
them; few persons commuted to get to a preferred church. Church choice was, after all,
limited by transportation technology – walking, horses, and, later, streetcars. Yet for the
most part, church affiliation was an inherited identity;6 it wasn’t “chosen” in the
contemporary sense of folks “church-shopping” to find just the right community for
them. Parishes and congregations were central administers of identity for neighborhoods

4

Winter, front cover.

5

Winter, chapter 1.
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and, in an urban geography of mixed residential, commercial, civic, and industrial uses,
also became a stabilizing arena for cross-class unity.7
Workplaces in this era were generally close to residences. Thus cobblers lived
near, if not above, shoe stores, factory workers lived within a reasonable walk of a
factory, and so on. This tight tapestry of mixed land uses kept a walkable, tight radius for
where most of urban life occurred, and for where worship was shared. This human-scaled
neighborhood decreased choice and homogeneity from the pool of possible personal
associations because in a human-scaled world, most goods and services need to remain
available close to where life is lived. 8 Unlike today’s array of affinity-associations, from
MeetUp groups and league sports to choosing to live in cultured enclaves of a kindred
subculture, by and large one in this era was stuck with the diversity of folks within an
economically-bonded district measured by the foot instead of the mile. You were in
Christ with these people for better and for worse.
This geography also involved a democratizing overlap between workers and
business leaders, between the poor, blue collar, and emerging white collar classes.
Although a new industrial economy was rapidly emerging in this era, economic
interdependence was nevertheless still visible at the neighborhood level because most
services were still scaled to foot and hoof.9 The impact of low wages were visible outside
factory walls as workers and owners of the means of production still had to live relatively
close to one another. The consequences of economic life were embodied, not abstracted,
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in our neighbor; Scrooge couldn’t so easily elude the visible misery of Bob Cratchit. One
broke bread with those who bake bread. It was an urban geography organized by our
pragmatic interdependence, thus elevating our common humanity even as it made more
evident our social differences.10
Community, then, was found largely in the neighborhood and open market’s
various networks of kinship, commerce, and street-level interaction – not, necessarily, in
churches.11 Instead, Christendom-style churches were administers of ethics, experience,
worship, and activism. At their best, churches of this era were not so much communities
as community centers. They were tribal institutions (with the possibility of) providing
coherence of identity, stability of presence, and catalyzing social uplift. Culture in these
churches was only as homogenous as its neighborhood, often only bearing class divisions
as far as the neighborhood already had.
The emergence of the middle class during this period changed the relative class
diversity of congregations and neighborhoods as many in this burgeoning bourgeoisie
moved to the streetcar suburbs and pre-war suburbs at the edge of the city. A combination
of increased pay with new transportation methods invoked the possibility of choice of
residence into urban life. Many families arriving in the middle class, upon reviewing the
pollution, squalor, and crime exigent to urban life, opted for the automobilized promised
land outside the industrial-financial core of central cities. Thus, the moneyed middle class
who would become the foundation of a more consumerism-saturated post-war suburbia
departed the city’s neighborhoods and neighborhood churches. Their liberation from
10

Ibid., 25.
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those old digs was brought about foremost by easy automobility and single-use land
patterns. That is, residential and occupational life were divorced from one another, thus
permitting a segregation of worker from owner. Those departed central city
congregations, meanwhile, suffered from underfunding in the midst of their increasingly
poor neighborhoods.
Another factor adding leverage to the middle class’ centrifugal migration was
race. In the century following the American Civil War, many black families moved to
northern cities. Indeed, some two million Americans of African descent moved from the
South to the Northeast, Midwest, and West between 1910 and 1930.12 Their arrival not
only created racial tensions in white city centers, but also forced a cultural crisis in
congregation life. 13 Music, theology, behavior, training, and liturgy were all markedly
different between black and white Protestantism, only reinforcing Sunday morning
segregation. Mainline and conservative traditions alike hadn’t produced faith
communities able to meaningfully adapt to this racial and cultural flux; they “were never
designed for ministry in a rapidly changing metropolis.”14 They were adapted to
relatively settled cultures inhabiting the economically-connected and class-diverse
neighborhood surrounding them. Such fast change wasn’t in their deck of ministry knowhow cards.
Automobilized middle-class white responses to this influx in a less mobile age
would have broadly been limited to fight or reconcile. Such rapid and distant migration
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just wasn’t possible in a pre-automobile landscape and economy back then. But in the
early automobilized age, flight, not fight or friendship, was the path forward for many
whites. Thus automobility and its suburban landscape laid the foundation for race and
class divisions existing in today’s consumer church.15 Without cars America’s racial
history may have been quite different.
Churches in the pre-war suburbia, and continuing through the 1950’s, came to
serve as a renewed locus of community and identity to a middle class increasingly
divorced from the living patterns of economic interdependence and urban social life
which had hitherto provided community and identity. 16 In a homogenized suburban
culture of middle-class whites the need for socialized identity was rampant, yet such
socialized identity had never really been much a product of choice. Socialized identity
was an incidental where one lived, buoyed by the geographically-anchored web of
economic interrelationships between neighbors of diverse fiscal means. One’s choice in
friends and associations was diverse, but also relatively static, in a neighborhood where
one was also likely to find much of their extended family and fellow church members,
along with their teacher, butcher, baker, and minister.
Suburbia provided little of this diversity, and that was part of its charm. One’s
choice in friendships and associations was about as diverse as the housing options in
Levittown: six nominally different versions of the same vanilla house. What mattered was

15 Against the incomplete “history of ideas” approach advanced in: Paul L. Metzger, Consuming
Jesus: Confronting Race and Class Divisions in the Consumer Church (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
2007): chapter 1.
16

Winter, 70-82. Also: Wuthnow, 37-39.
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the safety of that choice, that one knew what they were getting. 17 A de-homogenizing
effect on the neighborhood was a crisis of not only identity, but the choices behind that
identity. Note again the importance of choice in the identity-forming power of
consumerism, a force we see beginning to emerge in social patterns even here.

The

move to suburbia as a choice was an identity-forming act of class assertion and
consolidation which in turn demanded that suburbanites choose whom to relate. In the
landscape of suburbia, where residence and commerce are kept at car’s length, few spaces
beyond immediate neighbors – no choice at all! – afforded the opportunity for nurturing
middle class identity through relationships. Everyday “real life” interactions with people
on street corners and corner markets sufficed just decades prior, but suburbanites would
turn to choosing associations as a site to grow their identity. Churches were right
alongside rotary clubs and bowling leagues in providing this service.18
Previously the church’s organizing principle was geography; personal preference
and denominational affiliation came second in a low-mobility world. In suburbia, though,
stratified by class and race, the organizing principle was choice – again, consumerism
lurks in these early decades of the suburbanizing of the church. And almost immediately,
church choice was one based on similarity and affinity. Gibson Winter writes that the
church of this culture and land “is first and foremost an economic peer group; it is
secondarily a believing and worshiping fellowship. …it is a vehicle of the social identity
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of middle-class people.”19 These churches would succeed insofar as they coddled this
class distinction and provided tradition to a traditionless people. Writes Winter:

Congregations are explicitly organized around similarity in social and economic
rank; in fact, their survival generally depends upon the degree to which they can
maintain likeness in their memberships. A few highbrows and a few low-brows
can be thrown into the congregational mix, but the core has to be drawn from
similar occupation, income group, educational level, ethnic background, and
residential level if the congregation is to survive. 20

Long before Bill Hybels let the church world in on what marketers knew all along,
Winters’ words show that the homogenous growth principle promised at the gates of
suburbia was seen in his day also as foundational to suburbia’s church. As with race and
class divisions, again we observe the crucial leverage which automobility and suburbia
provided in creating affinity, niche subculture, and similarity as organizing principles in
today’s evangelical churches. If the church was to flourish in suburbia, it would have to
adapt to suburbia’s singular narrative of the middle-class choosing a homogenous
association to belong to.21
Suburbanizing the church also created a geographic gap between middle-to-upperclass people and the poor. Levittowns, highways, and class-homogenous churches help
people remain distant from the impoverishing consequences of their lifestyles22. The
automobilized citizen can choose not to see it by not living, worshiping, or working there.
19
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Cars, then, provided a way out from Jesus’ claim that “the poor will always be among
you.” Already careening in response to the social gospel movement, evangelicalism could
cultivate in suburbia a spirituality, gospel, and hermeneutics that were as segregated from
concerns of social uplift and justice as their own homes and churches were from those of
the poor. Preaching and ministry for the therapeutic and existential agonies of the middle
class was able to proceed unchallenged by the more holistic needs that can be so readily
seen in economically heterogenous neighborhoods and parishes.23 Poverty was now
abstracted from real-life relationships and increasingly seen as a public policy crisis, and
was no longer personal.24 Thus automobility once more added leverage to an already
unhealthy divide, this time between the justice-minded mainline traditions and the
justification-minded evangelical traditions.
This segregation of income levels made the preservation of historic central city
congregations difficult. Tithing, education, and participating membership all evacuated to
the suburbs.25 This in turn drew denominational attention away from poorer
neighborhoods and toward the bourgeoning bourgeoisie of suburbia. Winter again has
much wisdom to share:

The Protestant retreat, in this instance, meant a radical impoverishment of the
ministry to these areas and unchurched large numbers of rural in-migrants. The
derelict churches which remained could not provide adequate ministries for their
own constituencies and lacked the vitality and interest to recruit substantially
from the newcomer groups. These weakened churches provided vulnerable points
23
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for invasion by left-wing fundamentalist groups. Protestant gains in membership
through movement to the best residential areas were counterbalanced by heavy
losses in churches and memberships in the central areas of the city.26

With denominational inertia and contextual inertia moving in different directions, many
mainline congregations were stuck between a rock and a hard place as they could not
effectively adapt to the demands of either.27 Their way of organizing, both locally and
denominationally, were unable to weather these radical changes.28 The decline of the
mainline denominations in America was in large part a consequence of their inability to
adapt to or critique suburbia. They were dying in the cities; might the grass be greener on
the other side of the beltway?

Mainline Comity
The mainline response to suburbia was, at best, concerned cooperation. Still
thinking geographically, mainline church leaders saw the new residential sprawl as
basically unchurched and desperately needing new congregations. The most common
solution in many cities was to form church federations across denominational lines to
evaluate suburban demographics and projected sprawl. These federations would then
practice comity, wherein the construction of new church buildings would proceed in a
noncompetitive and evenly distributed mode. “The theory behind comity,” writes Etan
26
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the principle of Protestant survival in a mobile society.”
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Diamond, “was that competition among denominations and churches was detrimental to
religion as a whole. It was unseemly for churches to market themselves in an aggressive
manner and to ‘steal’ members from other churches.”29 According to one 1950 comity
report cited by Diamond, “an area should be considered ‘adequately churched’ when it
had a ratio of one congregation to two to four thousand people. Churches of the same
denomination were to be no closer than one and three-quarters of a mile apart, while
those from different denominations could be closer if their proximity did not create too
much competition.”30 The mainline federations frowned upon crass market-of-religion
approaches that saw suburbia as a commons to be plundered rather than a pie to be neatly
divided. Comity would be slow and feel bureaucratic, but it was their best thinking on
how to suburbanize without competing.31
The comity practices were, for all their civility, ultimately crippled by one glaring
omission from their cultural analysis. In a word, automobility. The neat distribution of
suburbia into a soft parish system forgot that the historically pedestrian limits to church
affiliation were left in the dust of an automobilized nation. Churchgoers do prefer to
minimize travel regardless of that travel’s mode, true enough. But what’s an extra five
minutes of driving if it gets someone to a congregation they feel better about? In a carscaled society, there is little to stop someone from breaking out of the mainline’s soft
parish system and finding the best bang for their tithing buck. Automobility thus trumped
comity in making a market where many congregations sought no such thing.
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Corollary to that omission of automobility is the mainline’s misunderstanding of
what drives suburban culture: choice! Suburban identity is rooted in choice, and will
choose between congregations whether the denominations intended it or not. Short of a
strict parish system, federations trying to neatly divide the spoils of suburbia among
themselves cannot finally compel anyone to forsake choice in these matters.
Congregations which best provided religious goods and services to the middle
class thus prospered in suburbia, even within those practicing comity. Two Lutheran
churches in the same suburban county, for example, could in the spirit of cooperation
over competition still ultimately compete with one another by providing a more splendid
cultural homogeneity, better parking, or a more fantastic Sunday School class for new
parents. Comity’s even division of land did not ensure even division, over time, of
members or money.
The mainline denominations had shifted their assets and tithing channels to
suburbia under the assumption that this land was their land, and nothing would
foreseeably alter it. Though they may incidentally be competing with one another, this
new focus on the middle class was a strategic move by church leaders to curry the
attention and tithes of suburbanites with excess income. Writing in 1962, Winter again is
useful here:

Denominational leaders have watched [suburbia]... with greedy eyes. These are
largely middle- and upper-class residential areas; they have adequate resources for
constructing church buildings; their residents are responsive to religious
programs; in fact, denominational leaders call these “high potential areas,” – and
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they do not mean potential for prayer. In recent decades almost exclusive attention
has been given to establishing churches in suburban areas. 32

Mainlines thus essentially sacrificed the city churches to squalor as they banked on
suburbia to be their safe haven for cultural and financial security. Yet they were not the
only Christians in town.

Evangelical Invasion
The coup de grace for the mainlines’ plans for peaceable suburban flourishing
were those congregations who bypassed comity federations and non-competition rules
entirely. These nonconformists – typically Baptist, nondenominational fundamentalists,
or Pentecostal – planted with little regard for other congregations in an area and,
reminiscent of gas stations competing on corners of the same intersection, often even
built directly adjacent to comity-seeking congregations.33 In fairness, evangelical’s
suburban priority was heavily driven by their contempt for urbanity as havens of
secularism and immorality, and wasn’t simply about their own market-shrewdness.34 Still,
their abruptly competitive actions were not well received by mainliners. Stereotypes of
the mainlines as overly procedural and evangelical independents as overly cavalier and
individualistic were surely upheld throughout these events; indeed, mainline leaders
sneered at the independents as sects and cults who were “positively war-like in their
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aggressiveness.”35 They had expected suburbia to be a haven from the Bible-waving
fundamentalists that they felt were invading city centers.
Uncivil though the conservative churches may have been, they were eager to
grow the evangelical movement in suburbia and seemed to have little problem with
competing mainline congregations for members. Unwittingly only perhaps at first, they
were appealing to that narrative of choice so core to suburbia. And choose evangelical
churches the suburbanites did. This marketplace dynamic, enabled by automobility, is
what helped launch to such success the conservative churches on the very soil the more
liberal mainlines had bet their future on.
Yet again automobility reveals its crucial role in another contemporary church
crisis: the demise of the mainline traditions. While other explanations for this carry
various levels of argumentative freight – capitulation to liberal theology, the end of
Christendom, culture’s distaste for high church, culturally irrelevant worship, etc. – they
remain at the level of ideas untethered to the technological and architectural changes
happening in real life. The failure of the mainlines to either adapt to or openly rebuke
suburbia,36 combined with the conservative church’s uncritical adaptation to it, ought to
be more richly considered in future tellings of 20th century American church history.
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The glow of faith-based franchised-fueled fortunes was not the only thing drawing
evangelicals to the lonely suburbs. Such caricatures does not honor the struggle for
historical responsibility many congregations felt toward their native neighborhood.
Historian Darren Dochuk records such a struggle from the 1910’s to the 1990’s at
Detroit’s fundamentalist Highland Park Baptist Church (HPBC). 37 Energized witness to
the vibrant, professional, and white namesake neighborhood characterized the 1910’s
through 1940’s. Caricatures of fundamentalist theology as categorically escapist or
individualistic do not hold up to those years at HPBC, where lucid fidelity to that
neighborhood was at the fore of their faith. Granted, their motives may have had more to
do with catalyzing revival than nurturing the neighborhood’s holistic flourishing, but the
effort to bear local witness is well documented by Dochuk. Moreover, HPBC actively
partnered with neighboring congregations of divergent theologies to provide community
services and events for one of Motor City’s most thriving areas. HPBC membership grew
to over 1,600 by the end of the 1940’s.
Their 30-year legacy of confident revivalism and outward focus in Highland Park
lost steam in the two decades following the war. Black immigration stigmatized the
overwhelmingly white neighborhood. The ensuing white flight did not drive out HPBC
members, but its surge of vacancy, poverty, and unemployment in a once-professionalclass neighborhood introduced ministry challenges they were not prepared to meet. The
ministry savvy (and whatever spiritual anointing HPBC may have had) which drove them
to success before the war did not translate to the their parish emerging realities. Black
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neighbors would be sent to black churches upon conversion. Salutary efforts to draw
these new neighbors in with “Negress” musicians stank of tokenist condescension and
racism, according to Dochuk, no matter how well-intended the outreach efforts may have
been. HPBC simply could not meaningfully relate to Highland Park as they once did.
The decision to head for the suburbs was not an immediate, clear, or simple
decision. Laity and pastorate feared it would betray their identity. It took an existing
ministry – a church plant – to provoke them to lifeboat out of the city. HPBC recently
planted Southfield Chapel a few miles away, a congregation they retained as a branch of
the historic mother church. Southfield was part of their longstanding revivalist passion,
but eventually became an opportunity to phase out of their neighborhood of origin
entirely. As leadership transitioned to a more dispensational bent and the fate of Highland
Park sturdily bent toward adversity, the decision to move to Southfield entirely emerged.
“In the end,” wrote Dochuk, “the ultimate decision to move to Southfield hinged less on
the practical implications of relocation than on the willingness of the congregation to
relinquish its sacred position and mandate in Highland Park.”38 Sermons decrying the
neighborhood as lost to tides of apocalyptic secularism helped legitimize and narrate their
pending relinquishment of historic calling.
Retreating from Highland Park – from a calling to one place to a calling unto noplace-in-particular – proved to be a painful identity crisis for the church. What would
happen to the name? To the sense of calling in the gospel to Highland Park? These and
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other laments became standard fare in the weekly bulletins leading up to the evacuation
from Highland Park. Dochuk writes that

at the heart of [senior pastor Robert McMillan’s] brief devotional pieces was a
chastisement of the church for abandoning its commitment to community and for
refusing to follow Christ’s lead in pursuing fellowship with “my neighbor,”
regardless of race, class, and cultural standing. In one of his last printed messages
to the church, McMillan added the final warning that any church that abandoned
the biblical imperative of involvement in the community would “become totally
irrelevant” and subject to divine judgment.39

The kind of ministry that allowed HPBC to survive in suburbia was finally one
which closed most of its ties with Highland Park and prioritized providing total services
to existing members and prospective members near their new campus. The “design of the
building deliberately merged a functional plan necessitated by the modern “total church
program” with an aesthetic link to a familiar past, all of which explicitly reflected
suburbia’s quest to provide comfort and rootedness in “today’s world of uncertainty and
insecurity.”40 HPBC marketed itself in local press alongside the PTA and similar
community groups – another option for suburbanites to associate with. 41 Ministries
focused on white middle-class social and spiritual challenges, a veritable vendor of
religious goods and services. 42 Thus did one urban fundamentalist congregation steadily
and winsomely abandon their neighborhood and retrofit their ministries for suburbia’s
emerging culture of isolation, choice-based identity formation, and comfort.
39
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Their transition to suburban Christianity wasn’t a greedy escape to pilfer betterlined tithing purses. It was a ministry revolution grounded in a paralysis to adapt to
significant social change in their neighborhood. But it was a paralysis that occurred
precisely as the automobile opened up the opportunity to move as a community out of
that context. The old options toward change of “adapt or perish” were amended with the
third option of “escape” thanks to cars and suburbia. This kind of response was wholly
new, and in the liminality of that escape from Highland Park, loosened up their sense of
identity enough to encourage a reorganization of ministry around suburban culture and its
environs. They could choose, amid their suburb’s religious marketplace, the shape of their
ministry’s calling.

Changing Tides: Freedom of Choice in Religion
The culture that Highland Park drove into, though, was rapidly changing.
Spirituality in 1960’s America sanctified choice as a core religious virtue. Although
religious self-determination was a deeply held national value, it rarely took on new
meaning and vitality in a decade of questioning all authority and exploring new vistas in
politics, sexuality, music, and religion. The virtuous narrative of leaving-authority-fordiscovery embedded in America’s founding documents found a rhyme in the mix-andmatch spirituality that flourished in these years as many youth left the church,
experimented with Eastern faiths, and ultimately matured in the decades ahead in the
muddled New Age spirituality still thriving today.43
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It’s not coincidental that such a shopping for spirituality arose at the same time as
consumerized suburbia was coming of age. As sociologist of religion Robert Wuthnow
notes, “the emphasis that many Americans placed on questioning established social
conditions was itself rooted in social conditions. Freedom of choice was the rallying cry
of consumers even more than it was of civil rights activists and hippies.”44 If choice was
emerging as an identity-consolidating value in the shopping mall and real estate market,
the same was true in matters of faith. To be sure, that “Americans were deliberately being
taught to shop as never before” was not missed by religious entrepreneurs, who quickly
began marketing spiritual paraphernalia in shopping malls and church foyers.45
“Spirituality, like hamburgers, was increasingly something one could get quickly and in a
variety of ways.”46 Likewise spiritual truth and experience became a commodity,
something that could in many circles be hodgepodged together like assembling a
wardrobe. We could be a Methodist, but also hang Tibetan prayer flags, read Gnostic
gospels, and decorate with energy crystals.47
The impact of suburbia and automobility on minority faiths should not be
overestimated here. What counts is how suburbia’s prized values of consumerism and
individualism produced the right cultural context for such an explosion of pluralism and
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elevation of religious choice.48 Post-war suburbia’s first children were reared in houses
designed, as noted earlier, for the cultivation of individualism; they were also the
television’s first children, soaked increasingly in advertisements, shopping malls, and
supermarkets all encouraging people to get out there and decide with a choice what’s best
for them. That commodified religious pluralism would blossom in this generation should
have surprised no one.
Those who did not finally leave the church still may well have left their church
for another one down the road. The choice narrative fueling pluralism paradoxically lent
a rhetorical force to those invading evangelical churches competing for suburban
adherents. If people wouldn’t leave Christianity categorically, then perhaps they could at
least leave higher-church traditions (which also contributed to the decline of mainline
traditions) in favor of the incoming low churches. These churches were likely rewarded
simply for having the minority report in that moment in American church history.
Churches would in the years to come fight pluralism, postmodernism, and New
Age faiths, but do little to explore the consumerist values and choice narratives
undergirding them. It may well be that this inability to more deeply reflect on the
shopping elements of pluralism is a form of willed ignorance by church leaders unable to
acknowledge their own dependence on those very values and narratives. The identityforming consumerism behind New Age crystals, after all, is also what drives church
shopping.

48 Wade Clark Roof, Spiritual Marketplace: Baby Boomers and the Remaking of American
Religion (Princeton, NJ, Princeton, 1999): 66-67; Robert N. Bellah, et al., Habits of the Heart:
Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Los Angeles, CA: University of California, 1985) 65.
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Consumerism Helps Churches Begin to Specialize in Suburbia
It has been shown that suburban culture is rooted in automobility, and blossoms in
consumerism, a cultural matrix of identity-formation rooted in choice-narratives.49 And
central to those choices is how to memorably tell different choices apart, what is usually
called branding. It’s how we differentiate Pepsi from Coke. They are basically identical
products, marked out in American culture by the stories their advertisements tell. Their
branding is how we tell them apart, and perhaps why the “blind taste test” is so
compelling: deep down we know they’re the same, but love the vindication of knowing
that when stripped of their branded stories, somehow we really could tell a difference.
Without there being a real difference, the choice-narrative which undergirds consumerism
collapses.
Attractional branding among the churches was well underway before
automobility, as urban churches found themselves competing with the city’s alternative
socialities of leisure and theater.50 Automobility accelerated a consumer-market dynamic
among churches, which in turn accelerated church branding. One of the earliest examples
of church leaders deploying the technique of branding to local congregations is the
roadside reader board. Where churches in pedestrian-scaled eras had scarcely needed to
mark out their buildings from one another, the explosion of automobility allowed
Americans to reasonably choose from among many churches. How would they tell one
Baptist congregation apart from another? These marquees – signs used more recognizably
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outside movie theaters and other dens of entertainment – could help establish story and
identity for the local church among a people group who experienced most of their world
through their windshield. “Such signs,” writes James Twitchell, “opens up a fascinating
subject: How do churches position themselves, how do they separate themselves from
one another, how do they break through the clutter of not just other religions but other
denominations?”51 The answer to those questions has been born out in the 50-plus years
since J.M. Stewart’s first church marquee, “The Witness”, was manufactured: snappy
politics, bite-sized wisdom, brimstone scaremongering, and sundry fifty-character
streetside slogans. The highway thus became a contested space for church choice and
competition as they began “to separate and – again in adspeak – brand the specific
church.”52 These signs signaled not only the theology of the church, but a wider shift
among the churches as they scrambled for members as if they were a scarce resource.
This marketplace approach to pastoring and church planting came into maturity in
the 1980’s as a new breed of pastors applied lessons from advertising, retail architecture,
and brand savviness to the Bride of Christ. George Barna’s words in 1988 aptly capture
the wisdom of the age: “The major problem plaguing the church is its failure to embrace
a marketing orientation in what has become a market-driven environment.” The
mainlines were in full-scale decline relative to market-savvier and suburbia-suited
evangelical churches, but few had dared name what was happening. Here Barna was
finally naming the elephant in the room: if churches want to effectively attract new
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members, they must capitulate to the reality that church affiliation in an automobilized
world is first and foremost a choice.
In the landscape of plenty of churches, Barna and church planter Bill Hybels were
the mouthpieces of the church growth movement, ostensibly a trend of churches
capitulating to their need to adapt to suburbia’s commodification of religion. More to the
point, Hybels and Barna taught the clergy the art of customer feedback.53 What potential
church-shoppers say matters in this paradigm, and brand identity should match what
they’re looking for. Surveys said suburbanites didn’t like pews, big crosses, guilt-tripping
sermons, or dull music. And, sure enough, the churches of Hybels and others succeeded
in rapid growth as they took their cues for architecture, liturgy, language, and ministry
from what shoppers wanted instead of from prayer or scripture. Sunday morning became
about creating an inoffensive “seeker-sensitive” environment for worship and preaching.
Not unfairly, these ministers have been dubbed pastorpreneurs for their savvy more as
CEOs than as spiritual shepherds.
One of the church growth movement’s most notorious tactics was the
homogenous growth principle, or HGP. Following HGP’s basic premise that people are
likelier to join a voluntary association or social network when people are like them,
churches were encouraged to primarily seek growth through catering to specific
subcultures, economic rungs, and life stations – segregations sanitized as “people
groups.”54 Granted that automobilized prospective members have choice between
53
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churches (and whether to church), this technique was what marketers call niche
marketing: a brand tailoring itself to best appeal to a target demographic. This is, almost
verbatim, what Gibson Winter lamented in 1962 as the suburban captivity of the
churches, a whittling down ecclesiology to a social club for the rootless bourgeois.
Much has been said elsewhere of the church growth, seeker-sensitive, and
megachurch movements as overt capitulations to consumerism’s mindset, techniques, and
priorities.55 With Luddite pitch these critiques variously appeal to the Bible, cultural
studies, and a wider assault on social injustices associated with consumerism. They argue
against the suburbanization of the church, in other words, with a battle of ideas.
What’s not often noted is the role of automobility in the choice-narrative laying at
the driving core of seeker-sensitive and megachurch dominance. As this paper has
demonstrated over and over, and which any reader may confirm by simply trying to walk
to their preferred church, such ecclesial consumerism and church choice can scarcely
exist without the automobile. These critics are making the same basic mistake as the
mainlines did in the decades culminating in their marginalization. Their comity
federations were vain efforts in civility to refuse the eclipse of the local church by the
forces of choice and competition, finally toppled not by a better idea but by the
automobilized American’s expanded ecclesial marketplace. So also with critics of the
Hybels crowd, who are unlikely to succeed in significant alternatives without confronting
the foundational role of automobility in delocalizing and commodifying churches. Cars
and their attendant geography of sprawl have made church choice very hard to be
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undone. Church consumerism is unlikely to be reversed or challenged without a stubborn
relocalizing of ecclesiology and ministry at every level.

Refrain: Sunday Morning Wanderlust
Consider how many churches you can reasonably drive to. How do you choose
whom to worship with? Many of those churches probably cater to a particular cultural
niche. Thus it’s possible to find a congregation whose kids program has the right safety
precautions, who sing our favorite songs, that don’t use wine in Communion, who are
racially similar to us, whose preaching is just as progressive as we are, and whose foyer
café has sufficiently yummy lattés. Or maybe our standard is if we click with people
there, or like the pastor’s theology. It’s all interior and, speaking for myself anyway, quite
the subjective and fickle decision.
What about leaving a particular church? What is sufficient reason for that? It isn’t
necessarily a high-stakes decision: if the music changes for the worse, there’s probably
another church nearby whose style is more to my Sufjan-esque sensibilities. There are so
many churches to choose from for the automobilized American, it’s like trying to choose
an ice-cream flavor at Baskin-Robbins. The 31 flavors of the body of Christ! We can get
just the right Sunday for us, and it’s up to you to choose which one. Even in my own very
post-Christian Portland there is a glut of churches.
I’m being a bit coarse in my argument here, I know. But if you’ve been walking
with the Lord for much time, particularly without denominational loyalty, I bet you know
just what I’m talking about. The ease of selecting and de-selecting a church is absolutely
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remarkable. It’s also strongly enabled by automobility. Not only can we drive to any
number of churches, but we can also leave without seeing too many folks from our own
church in the “real world” – similar to my own experience in the suburbs. We can leave
poorly. Our lives are so dispersed that we don’t always have to live with the
consequences of our departure. Sometimes, as in the case of spiritual abuse, this is a very
good thing. But generally, it reinforces choice and wanderlust at the expense of covenant
and responsibility.
We return again to Blip Christianity’s inundation with an identity-forming choicenarrative. Indeed, any sense of “belonging” in Christ with or to others is here ultimately
an expression of one’s choice. This bodes poorly in a movement whose founder
proclaimed, “Remember you did not choose me; no, I have chosen you.” Loyalty, fidelity,
stability, and longsuffering become optional for this lowest-common-denominator of
church life. Parker Palmer’s proverb that “we might define true community as that place
where the person you least want to live with always lives,” and the Quaker saying, “True
community exists when the person you dislike most dies or moves away and someone
worse takes that place,” become irrelevant.56 Church attendance and ministry
participation in such settings finally arrives as expendable, throw-away, commitmentoptional.
This church marketplace results in a steady flux of attendees between
congregations. Many Christians these days drive to several different worship services
over the course of a month. This undependability is debilitating for pastors and only
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deepens our sense of rootlessness. Bivocational pastor-scholar David Fitch describes the
habit of planting new churches that brand themselves over against the last generation of
church plants as church cannibalism.57 Existing Christians move to trendier pews, leaving
last year’s model at the altar (so to speak). No wonder church plants don’t last.
Many pastors are in denial of this. I brought up Fitch’s point about cannibalizing
churches at a luncheon of church planters in late 2012, and only received many blank
stares. They knew the laity was fickle, but didn’t understand how such a seemingly good
thing – planting more churches – could be bad for existing churches, or present
challenges for their own congregations down the road. I told stories of friends who move
to town, attend the most popular church for six months, then move to a newer church, and
then begin hanging out with a couple more. I pointed to the pastors of all three churches
in the room without condemnation – simply to show that it’s happening in their own
tribes.
The repeated volleys of blank stares were broken by the oldest pastor in the room,
who hails from the most well-known church in town. “I get what you’re saying,” he said.
“But I just don’t see it.” Baffling – of course he does! A sympathetic friend in the room
later said that the proper response from me would have been, “Of course you don’t see it:
you’re on top of the food chain! Every new church planter in Portland wants to be the
next [his church]. They get what you can’t keep.” The older pastor later conceded that
such church wanderlust is a pastoral problem whose moral burden is on the laity. It’s not
a problem, he felt, with the system and culture of church planting.
57 David Fitch, “On Planting Churches That Do Not Cannibalize: The Luke 10 Project” on
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The old man was right that it’s a pastoral problem, but it’s not only a pastoral
problem. The system is also to blame. We were at that luncheon because a seminary was
starting a church-planting track and wanted input on how to partner wisely such that their
graduates plant churches that last – and therefore will be able to pay off their school
loans. My suggestion was that there must be a plan in place for the class of 2015 to not be
cannibalized by the churches planted by the class of 2016. Until church planters and a
city’s pastorate work together to address this, we’ll probably continue to see
cannibalization.
Automobility, though, is the opened Pandora’s box that makes this such an
enduring challenge. Even rigidly parish-bound and diocesan traditions such as the Roman
church witness parishioners jumping parishes according to taste. No matter how well
pastors work together to reduce ecclesial cannibalization and promote rootedness, life in
a car-scaled world means we’ll always be able to church shop ‘til we drop. Only low-car
or car-free households find themselves able to, quite involuntarily, be cut off from church
shopping. But that is not a lifestyle I anticipate many families choosing any time soon.

Churches or Malls?
Automobilized church shopping may cannibalize some churches, but it has
strongly rewarded others. Church growth strategies like the homogenous growth
principle, along with the catering-to-suburban-values model we saw Highland Park
Baptist Church adopt upon their move to the suburbs, have paved the way for the
megachurches. Here defined as congregations constituting over 2000 regular attendees,
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the number of these churches have exploded along with suburbia in the late 20th century.
In fact, as Figure 3 shows, they swelled from 10 in 1970 to over 1,200 in 2005.58 At the
conservative rate of one church crossing the 2,00 per-week threshold, as happened in
2005, it can be estimated that there are now 1,730 megachurches in America – about as
many Lowe’s big-box hardware stores as there are in the United States and Canada
combined.

Few things are more telling of the megachurch’s success in its capitulation to
suburbia than their architectural resemblance to the rest of suburbia’s consumerist
subdivisions. They are “the culmination of the integration of religious practice into the
freeway-driven, market-savvy, franchise form of American life.”59 Indeed, church
planters with dreams of going mega look at development and traffic patterns just like big
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box retailers do, and even tend toward the same sites by the freeway.60 Automobility,
while undercritiqued by the church, has certainly been latched onto as a core concept to
be exploited for high-aspiring pastorpreneurs.
There also seems to be a very self-conscious decision among megachurches and
the mega-bound churches to attempt to divorce their building styles from those of brickand-mortar traditional church buildings.61 Instead they take their architectural cues from
the shopping mall, movie theater, big-box outlet, and airport terminal. The message sent
seems to be not unlike the “I’m a Mac” commercials mentioned earlier; an eager attempt
in architecture to demonstrate that “we’re the cool and hip ones; they’re the clunky and
anachronistic ones.” In this way even architecture becomes part of the brand.
There are acres of parking around a sprawling one or two-story flagship building,
which is frequently facaded like a Best Buy with the church’s own brand logo. Wide
lobbies with flat-screen TV’s announcing upcoming events and missionary updates
conclude with easy-to-read arrow signs directing possible newcomers to childcare, a
welcome desk, the church’s retail strip (bookstore, music station, and café), and various
worship venues. Often front and center in the layout is the auditorium, a high-tech
amphiteather packed with top-notch audio, video, musical, and lighting equipment. The
worship band plays and looks like Coldplay, the preacher’s sermons are positive and fun,
and the entire Sunday experience is precisely timed to shuffle thousands of attendees out
from the first service and bring in the next couple thousand for the same performance.
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This is a finely-tuned organization engineered to optimally meet the felt needs and
experiential desires of attendees. 62
To be sure, while glorifying God and seeking the kingdom are undoubtedly the
driving concern for the tens of thousands on staff at these churches, in this car-capitulated
culture all their efforts tend to culminate in producing a thoroughly entertaining Sunday
morning. It’s what Southern Baptist church consultants Thomas White and John Yeats
call “theotainment… an attempt to use entertainment to fill the spiritual needs of the
church attendees.”63 Highly-trained musicians, flawlessly-delivered messages that can be
remembered either with a podcast or with fill-in-the-blank sermon notes for iPads 64 are
all designed to ensure a spiritually satisfying experience for all open hearts present. Like
a grocery store putting essentials like milk at the back of the store to increase the chance
of further sales, these events are engineered to give attendees a spiritual high. Some
churches even offer multiple simultaneous worship services according to what you prefer
– traditional chapel hymns, contemporary worship, dance club, or drum circle – each
manufactured and staffed like a high-end cruise line venue.65 It all makes for an
astoundingly well put together performance worthy, if not of tithe dollars, then at least of
applause.
Theotainment, though, is another adaptation to suburbia; it’s an an effort to win
over automobilized church shoppers with the best product available for adults and kids
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alike. It’s a church building and experience tailor-fit to the culture’s expectations for
satisfaction, instant gratification, and affinity groupings. What these may lack in biblical
discernment or inspiration “they more than make up for in social adaptation.”66 West and
Yeats bravely note with regard to youth groups and those coming of age in this kind of
Christianity:

Society has trained them to be careful consumers, with an uncanny ability to ferret
out what best suits their personal desires. Christianity, for many in American
culture, is simply a selection on the Buffet of Religion. If they buy into
Christianity through entertainment, the show must go on to keep them engaged.
Thanks to the law of diminishing returns, that same show must continue to attract
their attention with newer or greater things, or else these shoppers will find
another, more interesting show down the road, which may or may not be another
church.67

Automobility’s commodification of religion, then, has produced another sort of religion
entirely. Rather than challenging Mammon, it plays by its rules. Instead of cultivating
fidelity, it strains only to keep our attention. The purpose of the gathered worship of the
church becomes not edification and exhortation, but Jesus-ified entertainment.
Where have the Christians attending these churches come from? Overwhelmingly,
they’ve come from smaller local churches (44%) but also draw 28% from people new to
the area entirely (that is, new church shoppers). 68 Churches that so consciously scaled
themselves to the automobile, as megachurches have, are like the shopping malls and big
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box stores described earlier that, in also scaling to the automobile, were able to
outcompete mom-and-pop stores in historic downtowns. Each could provide a similar
product, if possibly more cheaply made and overhyped, at a lower cost. Automobility
created in megachurches the equivalent effect of “economies of scale” for religious
associations. The little guys just can’t compete with these Wal-Marts of worship.
Their imitation of Wal-Mart styles of commerce reveals a new, deeply ironic trend
among suburban megachurch architecture. Retail chains such as Wal-Mart have been
widely credited with collapsing the economic vitality of local businesses in downtown
areas across the continent, leading many to lament the loss of America’s most livable,
walkable, and most idyllic neighborhoods. Indeed, while most Americans choose to live
and shop in suburbia, the most preferred setting to live in continues to be the small
town.69 They sense something has been lost, and dream of returning to it. Megachurches,
being the market-sensitive adapters that they are, have realized this and begun to include
fake small town plazas and commons into their architecture.70 It’s a move that another
engineer of suburban delight, Walt Disney, incorporated half a century earlier in his first
theme park’s first steps with his gimmicky Main Street USA. And like Disney, it’s all
designed to be predictable for the consumer and profitable for the provider: many of these
ecclesial re-jiggings are stacked with church-owned businesses. The New York Times in
2002 reported the following of two such churches:
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For Fellowship Church in Grapevine, Tex., attracting young congregants, and
keeping them, has helped it grow from 30 families to 20,000 members in a dozen
years. Fellowship offers a 40,000-square-foot youth center with a climbing wall
and video arcade and is creating a lake to encourage father-son bass fishing.
Prestonwood Baptist Church in Plano, Tex., has a youth center so elaborate that
some have called it Preston World: 15 ball fields, a 1950's-style diner and a fitness
center, as well as classrooms and a 7,000-seat sanctuary. It is adding a $19 million
school, coffee shop, food court, student ministry center, youth building, an
outdoor prayer walk, a chapel and an indoor commons, modeled on the idea of
Main Street. ''We're not a large church,'' said Mike Basta, the executive pastor.
''We're a small town.''71

Rather than advocating or investing in returning neighborhoods to this walkable, human
scale, megachurches have simply offered a simulacra of it, a sadly plastic memorial
Mayberry to the once-lively neighborhoods upon whose demise their religious styles
have long depended.

Automobilized Diaspora of the Ministries
It’s not just Sunday morning theatrics and building styles that have been infected
by automobility and consumerism. Even how ministries are provided and organized
ultimately capitulate to these forces. Consider the common division of ministries into,
broadly, the following six categories: fellowship (home groups), scripture (Sunday
School classes, Bible studies, etc.), mission (soup kitchen, missionaries, AIDS relief,
prostitute outreach, etc.), recovery (drugs, divorce, porn, alcohol, etc.), Sunday efforts
(music, audio/video, youth group, ushers, etc.), and affinity (snowboarding, life-stage,
71
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knitting, etc.). When the desire to grow deeper in the life of the church is expressed, these
are the common places to find opportunities to serve and be served. Discernment for how
to live into spiritual gifts and talents is not made; it’s an individual, yes, choice. And
shifting from one to another, or shopping for the right one? Also, a choice.72
The fellowship groups suffer acutely in this choice-based organization of church
life. Although named after their neighborhoods, they are regularly stocked with people
commuting past closer fellowship groups to get to their preferred one. If there are too
many single people, or not enough, or too many End-Timers, or too few, or the kids are
too loud, or whatever: all these are unquestioned criteria for how people decide on where
to grow. Affinity and similarity become, as Gibson Winter lamented, once more the
organizing principle for the church within a given church. The naming of these groups
after neighborhoods or quadrants of town thus perform the same fallacy as comity
federations decades ago, in neglecting the power of automobility over civilly-suggested
localism.
Now map these hypothetical ministries, relative to where participants live and
where the church building is. There’s little overlap. Fellowship groups are dispersed
throughout the city and sprawl, the youth group only meets in the church building, and
the compassion ministries variously serves soup downtown, combats sex trafficking on
the north side of town, and helps the elderly near the Olive Garden get their groceries.
Afterwards, each participant leaves the ministry setting, returning to their dispersed
homes. Again, there are likely only incidental correlations between ministry site and the
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participant’s housing. We love our neighbor on the other side of the city, but remain
estranged from our neighbor next door.
Finally to be considered is how segregating these ministry contexts from one
another affects their composition, faithfulness, and spiritual health. In a choice-shaped,
automobilized church, the social justice people will sort themselves into the compassion
ministries, zealots join the evangelism team, the exegetes will flock to the Bible studies,
and the fellowship groups organize by affinity and life stage. Thus, to risk caricaturing
the situation: the justice crowd burns out by not being nourished with scripture and
fellowship, the Bible studiers don’t translate their studies into mission together, the
addicts might only know other addicts, and the singles and families stay apart from each
other.
Each becomes, in other words, an echo chamber and a dead end. Those studying
scripture can, divorced from the poor and oppressed, develop theologies that blindfold
them to the scriptural mandate for justice and compassion. Evangelists, meanwhile, can
continue to nurse worries that the justice crowd really only is about the social gospel. And
so on. The expected pillars of biblical discipleship – mission, community, personal faith –
become separate pillars of an automobilized ecclesial bureaucracy that Christians can
choose from, separate, and ultimately pit against one another. There is no place in the
geography of nowhere for these three things to interlock. What God meant to go together,
the suburban church is able to tear apart.
What suburbia has torn apart (families, neighborhoods, identity, contexts for
community), the suburban church has promised to bring back together in its many
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splendid ministries and theotainment venues. The suburban church has, in short, adapted
brilliantly to America’s automobilized landscape by attempting to fill the voids created in
suburbia’s wake. To the degree that this was possible before cars, we must also
acknowledge that today’s consumer culture was also not there to reward such ministry
shopping. Therefore automobility’s culture, if not directly its geography, still contributes
to this fracturing of ministries from one another.

Other Shifts
Many other subtle features of Blip Christianity can be traced to automobility. I
will close this section with a flyover of many of them, along with some lingering
questions posed by each.
Commitment fears – Fidelity and commitment to making things work out in a
congregation are, in a mobile society, increasingly optional. The hardships and damage
caused by infidelity, addiction, or anger can simply be driven away from. Likewise, one
can avoid committing to a congregation in such a society and keep their cards as close as
they feel comfortable. In a culture torn apart by sky-high divorce rates, and accustomed
to consumer goods only getting better every year (think of the iPhone’s liturgical calendar
of renewal), there has developed in many a deeply seeded fear of commitment in all
aspects of life. This is a fear automobility has only given leverage to; just as cars made it
easier to get to a preferred church, so also our dispersed automobilized lives also make
escaping tough or undesirable churches much easier. Detangling ourselves from tough
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situations (or Sunday morning boredom) is much, much easier. How might the suburban
church’s capitulation to spiritual consumerism be stalling restoration in these matters?
The “One Anothers” – Much discipleship in contemporary evangelicalism is
focused on biblical knowledge, ministry participation, and therapeutic self-help. But
there’s little about the “One Another” commands that dominate the New Testament’s
counsel. We are taught that we are forgiven, but not how to forgive one another; that God
bears with us in mercy, but not how to bear with one another in mercy; that we are
reconciled to God, but not how to be reconciled to one another; to consider God greater
than ourselves, but not how to consider others better than ourselves. Yet these teachings
are precisely the elements that non-automobilized, localist churches like house churches
and new-monastic communities focus so much on. The reason for this, frankly, returns to
the issue of how easy it is to escape tough situations and relationships, rooted again in
how astoundingly mobile we all are. Most of us don’t share life with anyone besides our
spouse for long enough to have to forgive them seven times – let alone seventy-seven!
The Christian disciplines that are most needed in a high-commitment community of
reconciliation are much less important for delocalized, individualistic contemporary life
patterns. We may no longer believe, in other words, that the “One Another’s” are all that
necessary. How can churches create contexts that make these skills not only celebrated,
but necessary? What shapes of ministry might churches pursue that give plausible context
to the “One Another’s”?
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Family and Gender Roles – As has been shown, much that Americans assume
about gender roles and normative family life is radically shaped by suburbia. 73 The
single-family dwelling segregated from extended family and those in other stations of
life, wifehood centered on the purchasing (rather than production) of goods and services,
fathers working far from home and children, children getting jobs to buy junk rather than
to help around the house, elderly in care facilities, and families moving every few years
due to dad’s promotion are all symptoms of the car’s impact on families. And this
automobilized family is basically what conservative evangelicals have been defending as
a biblical view of family. This defense is all the more ironic because I have argued
throughout the past two chapters that suburban economics and automobility are chief
enemies of families. How can churches celebrate family and defend it from the economic
and technological forces that array themselves against its health?
Sex – Driving from its earliest decades, as has been shown, has changed how
humans understand the values of chastity and fidelity. More than that, they’ve made
promiscuity – the patent evasion of chastity and fidelity – easier than ever. As the
churches struggles to celebrate a biblical sexuality of chastity and fidelity, how can
acknowledgement of this relationship between sexual license and a driver’s license be
mined for renewed purity?
Parachurch Ministries – Automobility and accessible intercontinental travel have
permitted weekend retreat centers, Bible camps, and short-term mission trips as new
rhythms of faithfulness to the petrol-driven Christian. How have these hit-and-run
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spiritual practices affected how Americans relate to the divine, to a sense of sacred space,
and to other countries? Moreover, how has the explosion of itinerant missionaries from
America changed the world? How has the option of furlough changed how missionaries
embed in their fields?
Evangelism – Rodney Stark has shown that the early church’s remarkable success
in witnessing and evangelizing laid in its organization as extremely human-scaled.74 It
was even more human-scaled and kept at the size of real life than church life in the
Byzantine, medieval, or post-reformation ages. Meeting in courtyards of apartment
buildings, penetrating all social strata, and living ethically together at this scale provided
an immeasurably compelling witness, particularly in hard times. Most importantly when
a local “lost soul” had a higher percentage of Christians among their neighbors,
acquaintances, and friends, their own conversion was much likelier. Yet automobilized
life is thoroughly dispersed and decentralized, thus making evangelism much more
difficult. As important as pluralism, Enlightenment thinking, and postmodernism are as
challenges to evangelism, from a sociological perspective the dispersed nature of church
life in automobilized societies must be explored as possible tethering points for how these
ideas take embodiment. How can the church redeploy the evangelistic lessons of the early
church’s hyperlocalism in a car-shaped society?

What Drives Us
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I’ve been very aggressive in arguing that cars and the cultural revolutions they
catalyzed have created a new kind of Christianity – perhaps seeing their shadow where
there is none. Perhaps. But judge for yourself where American church history would have
gone without all this oil. It’s akin to asking how our faith would have unfolded without
the printing press.
Without automobility, most of us would still be farmers. Christianity would still
be a mostly village-scaled or urban parish-scaled affair because that would be the scale
we would have continued to live at. We would still have 15-mile worlds, still mostly live
near extended family, and live closer to the earth.
Without automobility, churches would better reflect the demographics of their
building’s surrounding neighborhood. Mixed incomes, yes, but also perhaps still
segregated along America’s fading legacy of ethnic ghettos – Irish Catholic
neighborhoods, for example. The desire and ability to create desegregated churches and
multicultural churches may have never flourished as it now does.
Without automobility, churches would not have been able to evacuate urban areas
for beltline havens. Evangelicals, mainlines, and Catholics alike would have continued to
remain in the high-income and high-poverty contexts of cities and provide ministries
accordingly. Urban ministry would not have become a distinct discipline or calling
because it would have been the common calling of all non-rural Christians.
Without automobility, the decline of mainlines and ascent of evangelicals would
not have been so certain. Middle class tithing in suburban contexts would not have turned
anchor churches into mission churches, or church plants into franchises. Evangelicalism
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may have never ascended to the comparative dominance it now enjoys in America’s
fading Christendom. Nor may the mainlines have declined so sharply.
Without automobility, the notion of church shopping would not have emerged.
Some choice would have remained for urban and small-town Christians, but nothing like
what developed in the age of the automobile. Churches would not have been so
preoccupied with branding, spectacle, or competition as they now are. The capitulation to
suburban norms, isolation, needs, and values would not have developed.
Without automobility the cascading identity crises of a choice-based marketplace
of churches would not have developed. Contemporary church impulses to define
ourselves by differentiation from other options would not have so confused our sense of
mission and identity. Likewise our consumerism-driven preoccupation with image and
surface-level revisions of church (as seen in some timid forays into missional and
emerging church practice) would not have so cartoonishly developed.
Without automobility, choice-based identities would not have woven so deeply
into our churches, families, and selves. Our methods of discipleship, evangelism (“the
choice for Christ”), ministry, and vocation would all be quite different.
Without automobility, the culture war front of defending the family would be
quite different. The isolated nuclear family created by suburbia, the stereotypical gender
roles of breadwinning-dad-who-leaves-home-for-most-of-the-day and housekeepingmom-who-does-chores-while-kids-are-at-school would never have become normative.
Evangelical defenses of the family would have been quite different, for the family would
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not have been under such assault. One may wonder whether the divorce crisis would have
exploded as it has without automobility.
Without automobility, we would not be able to take regular weekend retreats and
develop a spirituality around that practice.
Without cheap oil, short-term missions trips would not have been possible.
Without automobility, the circuit of national conferences selling the latest set of
“innovative” ministry tips would not have developed. Nor, to a degree, our culture’s total
obsession with pulpit celebrity.
Without automobility, megachurches and multisite congregations would not have
developed as they did. Multiple services catering to aesthetic preference, massive swaths
of parking lot, video venues, and the homogenous growth principle would not have found
purchase in the 15-mile world that would have endured.
Without automobility we would practice a different kind of Christianity. Not
necessarily better, but certainly facing different sets of challenges. Its reforms in
theology, worship, discipleship, and mission would have developed more slowly, and
spread even slower. Automobility seemed to catalyze everything already dormant in
American culture and American Christianity – individualism, innovation, hope in
progress, expansionism, abhorrence of cities, and faith in markets. Some good, some bad,
and much left to be evaluated emerged from oil’s abundance.
That legacy is in our rearview mirror. But knowing all this gives us a clearer sense
of where we’re at now. It lets us more soberly and creatively pursue faithfulness where
we find ourselves. And it presses new questions of us for the road ahead. We must
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consider our context and our shared future afresh in the headlight of the petrol-driven
church.
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